diff --git a/aes.c b/aes.c deleted file mode 100644 index 4afc3c4..0000000 --- a/aes.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2171 +0,0 @@ -/* - * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. - * - * http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/rijndael/Rijndael.pdf - * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/aes.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "padlock.h" -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "aesni.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) - -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define AES_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) -#define AES_VALIDATE( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) ) -static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) -/* - * Forward S-box - */ -static const unsigned char FSb[256] = -{ - 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, - 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, - 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, - 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, - 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, - 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15, - 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, - 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, - 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, - 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, - 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, - 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF, - 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, - 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, - 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, - 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, - 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, - 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73, - 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, - 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, - 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, - 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, - 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, - 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08, - 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, - 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, - 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, - 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, - 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, - 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF, - 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, - 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 -}; - -/* - * Forward tables - */ -#define FT \ -\ - V(A5,63,63,C6), V(84,7C,7C,F8), V(99,77,77,EE), V(8D,7B,7B,F6), \ - V(0D,F2,F2,FF), V(BD,6B,6B,D6), V(B1,6F,6F,DE), V(54,C5,C5,91), \ - V(50,30,30,60), V(03,01,01,02), V(A9,67,67,CE), V(7D,2B,2B,56), \ - V(19,FE,FE,E7), V(62,D7,D7,B5), V(E6,AB,AB,4D), V(9A,76,76,EC), \ - V(45,CA,CA,8F), V(9D,82,82,1F), V(40,C9,C9,89), V(87,7D,7D,FA), \ - V(15,FA,FA,EF), V(EB,59,59,B2), V(C9,47,47,8E), V(0B,F0,F0,FB), \ - V(EC,AD,AD,41), V(67,D4,D4,B3), V(FD,A2,A2,5F), V(EA,AF,AF,45), \ - V(BF,9C,9C,23), V(F7,A4,A4,53), V(96,72,72,E4), V(5B,C0,C0,9B), \ - V(C2,B7,B7,75), V(1C,FD,FD,E1), V(AE,93,93,3D), V(6A,26,26,4C), \ - V(5A,36,36,6C), V(41,3F,3F,7E), V(02,F7,F7,F5), V(4F,CC,CC,83), \ - V(5C,34,34,68), V(F4,A5,A5,51), V(34,E5,E5,D1), V(08,F1,F1,F9), \ - V(93,71,71,E2), V(73,D8,D8,AB), V(53,31,31,62), V(3F,15,15,2A), \ - V(0C,04,04,08), V(52,C7,C7,95), V(65,23,23,46), V(5E,C3,C3,9D), \ - V(28,18,18,30), V(A1,96,96,37), V(0F,05,05,0A), V(B5,9A,9A,2F), \ - V(09,07,07,0E), V(36,12,12,24), V(9B,80,80,1B), V(3D,E2,E2,DF), \ - V(26,EB,EB,CD), V(69,27,27,4E), V(CD,B2,B2,7F), V(9F,75,75,EA), \ - V(1B,09,09,12), V(9E,83,83,1D), V(74,2C,2C,58), V(2E,1A,1A,34), \ - V(2D,1B,1B,36), V(B2,6E,6E,DC), V(EE,5A,5A,B4), V(FB,A0,A0,5B), \ - V(F6,52,52,A4), V(4D,3B,3B,76), V(61,D6,D6,B7), V(CE,B3,B3,7D), \ - V(7B,29,29,52), V(3E,E3,E3,DD), V(71,2F,2F,5E), V(97,84,84,13), \ - V(F5,53,53,A6), V(68,D1,D1,B9), V(00,00,00,00), V(2C,ED,ED,C1), \ - V(60,20,20,40), V(1F,FC,FC,E3), V(C8,B1,B1,79), V(ED,5B,5B,B6), \ - V(BE,6A,6A,D4), V(46,CB,CB,8D), V(D9,BE,BE,67), V(4B,39,39,72), \ - V(DE,4A,4A,94), V(D4,4C,4C,98), V(E8,58,58,B0), V(4A,CF,CF,85), \ - V(6B,D0,D0,BB), V(2A,EF,EF,C5), V(E5,AA,AA,4F), V(16,FB,FB,ED), \ - V(C5,43,43,86), V(D7,4D,4D,9A), V(55,33,33,66), V(94,85,85,11), \ - V(CF,45,45,8A), V(10,F9,F9,E9), V(06,02,02,04), V(81,7F,7F,FE), \ - V(F0,50,50,A0), V(44,3C,3C,78), V(BA,9F,9F,25), V(E3,A8,A8,4B), \ - V(F3,51,51,A2), V(FE,A3,A3,5D), V(C0,40,40,80), V(8A,8F,8F,05), \ - V(AD,92,92,3F), V(BC,9D,9D,21), V(48,38,38,70), V(04,F5,F5,F1), \ - V(DF,BC,BC,63), V(C1,B6,B6,77), V(75,DA,DA,AF), V(63,21,21,42), \ - V(30,10,10,20), V(1A,FF,FF,E5), V(0E,F3,F3,FD), V(6D,D2,D2,BF), \ - V(4C,CD,CD,81), V(14,0C,0C,18), V(35,13,13,26), V(2F,EC,EC,C3), \ - V(E1,5F,5F,BE), V(A2,97,97,35), V(CC,44,44,88), V(39,17,17,2E), \ - V(57,C4,C4,93), V(F2,A7,A7,55), V(82,7E,7E,FC), V(47,3D,3D,7A), \ - V(AC,64,64,C8), V(E7,5D,5D,BA), V(2B,19,19,32), V(95,73,73,E6), \ - V(A0,60,60,C0), V(98,81,81,19), V(D1,4F,4F,9E), V(7F,DC,DC,A3), \ - V(66,22,22,44), V(7E,2A,2A,54), V(AB,90,90,3B), V(83,88,88,0B), \ - V(CA,46,46,8C), V(29,EE,EE,C7), V(D3,B8,B8,6B), V(3C,14,14,28), \ - V(79,DE,DE,A7), V(E2,5E,5E,BC), V(1D,0B,0B,16), V(76,DB,DB,AD), \ - V(3B,E0,E0,DB), V(56,32,32,64), V(4E,3A,3A,74), V(1E,0A,0A,14), \ - V(DB,49,49,92), V(0A,06,06,0C), V(6C,24,24,48), V(E4,5C,5C,B8), \ - V(5D,C2,C2,9F), V(6E,D3,D3,BD), V(EF,AC,AC,43), V(A6,62,62,C4), \ - V(A8,91,91,39), V(A4,95,95,31), V(37,E4,E4,D3), V(8B,79,79,F2), \ - V(32,E7,E7,D5), V(43,C8,C8,8B), V(59,37,37,6E), V(B7,6D,6D,DA), \ - V(8C,8D,8D,01), V(64,D5,D5,B1), V(D2,4E,4E,9C), V(E0,A9,A9,49), \ - V(B4,6C,6C,D8), V(FA,56,56,AC), V(07,F4,F4,F3), V(25,EA,EA,CF), \ - V(AF,65,65,CA), V(8E,7A,7A,F4), V(E9,AE,AE,47), V(18,08,08,10), \ - V(D5,BA,BA,6F), V(88,78,78,F0), V(6F,25,25,4A), V(72,2E,2E,5C), \ - V(24,1C,1C,38), V(F1,A6,A6,57), V(C7,B4,B4,73), V(51,C6,C6,97), \ - V(23,E8,E8,CB), V(7C,DD,DD,A1), V(9C,74,74,E8), V(21,1F,1F,3E), \ - V(DD,4B,4B,96), V(DC,BD,BD,61), V(86,8B,8B,0D), V(85,8A,8A,0F), \ - V(90,70,70,E0), V(42,3E,3E,7C), V(C4,B5,B5,71), V(AA,66,66,CC), \ - V(D8,48,48,90), V(05,03,03,06), V(01,F6,F6,F7), V(12,0E,0E,1C), \ - V(A3,61,61,C2), V(5F,35,35,6A), V(F9,57,57,AE), V(D0,B9,B9,69), \ - V(91,86,86,17), V(58,C1,C1,99), V(27,1D,1D,3A), V(B9,9E,9E,27), \ - V(38,E1,E1,D9), V(13,F8,F8,EB), V(B3,98,98,2B), V(33,11,11,22), \ - V(BB,69,69,D2), V(70,D9,D9,A9), V(89,8E,8E,07), V(A7,94,94,33), \ - V(B6,9B,9B,2D), V(22,1E,1E,3C), V(92,87,87,15), V(20,E9,E9,C9), \ - V(49,CE,CE,87), V(FF,55,55,AA), V(78,28,28,50), V(7A,DF,DF,A5), \ - V(8F,8C,8C,03), V(F8,A1,A1,59), V(80,89,89,09), V(17,0D,0D,1A), \ - V(DA,BF,BF,65), V(31,E6,E6,D7), V(C6,42,42,84), V(B8,68,68,D0), \ - V(C3,41,41,82), V(B0,99,99,29), V(77,2D,2D,5A), V(11,0F,0F,1E), \ - V(CB,B0,B0,7B), V(FC,54,54,A8), V(D6,BB,BB,6D), V(3A,16,16,2C) - -#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##a##b##c##d -static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT }; -#undef V - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - -#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##b##c##d##a -static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT }; -#undef V - -#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##c##d##a##b -static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT }; -#undef V - -#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##d##a##b##c -static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT }; -#undef V - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -#undef FT - -/* - * Reverse S-box - */ -static const unsigned char RSb[256] = -{ - 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, - 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, - 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, - 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, - 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, - 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E, - 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, - 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, - 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, - 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, - 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, - 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84, - 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, - 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, - 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, - 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, - 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, - 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73, - 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, - 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, - 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, - 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, - 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, - 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4, - 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, - 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, - 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, - 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, - 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, - 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, - 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, - 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D -}; - -/* - * Reverse tables - */ -#define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define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##a##b##c##d -static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT }; -#undef V - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - -#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##b##c##d##a -static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT }; -#undef V - -#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##c##d##a##b -static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT }; -#undef V - -#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##d##a##b##c -static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; -#undef V - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -#undef RT - -/* - * Round constants - */ -static const uint32_t RCON[10] = -{ - 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008, - 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080, - 0x0000001B, 0x00000036 -}; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ - -/* - * Forward S-box & tables - */ -static unsigned char FSb[256]; -static uint32_t FT0[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) -static uint32_t FT1[256]; -static uint32_t FT2[256]; -static uint32_t FT3[256]; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -/* - * Reverse S-box & tables - */ -static unsigned char RSb[256]; -static uint32_t RT0[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) -static uint32_t RT1[256]; -static uint32_t RT2[256]; -static uint32_t RT3[256]; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -/* - * Round constants - */ -static uint32_t RCON[10]; - -/* - * Tables generation code - */ -#define ROTL8(x) ( ( (x) << 8 ) & 0xFFFFFFFF ) | ( (x) >> 24 ) -#define XTIME(x) ( ( (x) << 1 ) ^ ( ( (x) & 0x80 ) ? 0x1B : 0x00 ) ) -#define MUL(x,y) ( ( (x) && (y) ) ? pow[(log[(x)]+log[(y)]) % 255] : 0 ) - -static int aes_init_done = 0; - -static void aes_gen_tables( void ) -{ - int i, x, y, z; - int pow[256]; - int log[256]; - - /* - * compute pow and log tables over GF(2^8) - */ - for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++ ) - { - pow[i] = x; - log[x] = i; - x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ^ XTIME( x ) ); - } - - /* - * calculate the round constants - */ - for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++ ) - { - RCON[i] = (uint32_t) x; - x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( XTIME( x ) ); - } - - /* - * generate the forward and reverse S-boxes - */ - FSb[0x00] = 0x63; - RSb[0x63] = 0x00; - - for( i = 1; i < 256; i++ ) - { - x = pow[255 - log[i]]; - - y = x; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); - x ^= y ^ 0x63; - - FSb[i] = (unsigned char) x; - RSb[x] = (unsigned char) i; - } - - /* - * generate the forward and reverse tables - */ - for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) - { - x = FSb[i]; - y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( XTIME( x ) ); - z = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( y ^ x ); - - FT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) y ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) x << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) x << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) z << 24 ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - FT1[i] = ROTL8( FT0[i] ); - FT2[i] = ROTL8( FT1[i] ); - FT3[i] = ROTL8( FT2[i] ); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - - x = RSb[i]; - - RT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0E, x ) ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x09, x ) << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0D, x ) << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0B, x ) << 24 ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - RT1[i] = ROTL8( RT0[i] ); - RT2[i] = ROTL8( RT1[i] ); - RT3[i] = ROTL8( RT2[i] ); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - } -} - -#undef ROTL8 - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - -#define ROTL8(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 8 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 24 ) ) -#define ROTL16(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 16 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 16 ) ) -#define ROTL24(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 24 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 8 ) ) - -#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx] -#define AES_RT1(idx) ROTL8( RT0[idx] ) -#define AES_RT2(idx) ROTL16( RT0[idx] ) -#define AES_RT3(idx) ROTL24( RT0[idx] ) - -#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx] -#define AES_FT1(idx) ROTL8( FT0[idx] ) -#define AES_FT2(idx) ROTL16( FT0[idx] ) -#define AES_FT3(idx) ROTL24( FT0[idx] ) - -#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx] -#define AES_RT1(idx) RT1[idx] -#define AES_RT2(idx) RT2[idx] -#define AES_RT3(idx) RT3[idx] - -#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx] -#define AES_FT1(idx) FT1[idx] -#define AES_FT2(idx) FT2[idx] -#define AES_FT3(idx) FT3[idx] - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) -{ - AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); - - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) -void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) -{ - AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); - - mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->crypt ); - mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->tweak ); -} - -void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->crypt ); - mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->tweak ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ - -/* - * AES key schedule (encryption) - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) -int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits ) -{ - unsigned int i; - uint32_t *RK; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); - - switch( keybits ) - { - case 128: ctx->nr = 10; break; - case 192: ctx->nr = 12; break; - case 256: ctx->nr = 14; break; - default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) - if( aes_init_done == 0 ) - { - aes_gen_tables(); - aes_init_done = 1; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) - if( aes_padlock_ace == -1 ) - aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support( MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE ); - - if( aes_padlock_ace ) - ctx->rk = RK = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( ctx->buf ); - else -#endif - ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) - if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) - return( mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( (unsigned char *) ctx->rk, key, keybits ) ); -#endif - - for( i = 0; i < ( keybits >> 5 ); i++ ) - { - RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, i << 2 ); - } - - switch( ctx->nr ) - { - case 10: - - for( i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4 ) - { - RK[4] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[3] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[3] ) ] << 24 ); - - RK[5] = RK[1] ^ RK[4]; - RK[6] = RK[2] ^ RK[5]; - RK[7] = RK[3] ^ RK[6]; - } - break; - - case 12: - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6 ) - { - RK[6] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[5] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[5] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[5] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[5] ) ] << 24 ); - - RK[7] = RK[1] ^ RK[6]; - RK[8] = RK[2] ^ RK[7]; - RK[9] = RK[3] ^ RK[8]; - RK[10] = RK[4] ^ RK[9]; - RK[11] = RK[5] ^ RK[10]; - } - break; - - case 14: - - for( i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8 ) - { - RK[8] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[7] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[7] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[7] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[7] ) ] << 24 ); - - RK[9] = RK[1] ^ RK[8]; - RK[10] = RK[2] ^ RK[9]; - RK[11] = RK[3] ^ RK[10]; - - RK[12] = RK[4] ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[11] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[11] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[11] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[11] ) ] << 24 ); - - RK[13] = RK[5] ^ RK[12]; - RK[14] = RK[6] ^ RK[13]; - RK[15] = RK[7] ^ RK[14]; - } - break; - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ - -/* - * AES key schedule (decryption) - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) -int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits ) -{ - int i, j, ret; - mbedtls_aes_context cty; - uint32_t *RK; - uint32_t *SK; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); - - mbedtls_aes_init( &cty ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) - if( aes_padlock_ace == -1 ) - aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support( MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE ); - - if( aes_padlock_ace ) - ctx->rk = RK = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( ctx->buf ); - else -#endif - ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf; - - /* Also checks keybits */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &cty, key, keybits ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - ctx->nr = cty.nr; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) - if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) - { - mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( (unsigned char *) ctx->rk, - (const unsigned char *) cty.rk, ctx->nr ); - goto exit; - } -#endif - - SK = cty.rk + cty.nr * 4; - - *RK++ = *SK++; - *RK++ = *SK++; - *RK++ = *SK++; - *RK++ = *SK++; - - for( i = ctx->nr - 1, SK -= 8; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8 ) - { - for( j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++ ) - { - *RK++ = AES_RT0( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *SK ) ] ) ^ - AES_RT1( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *SK ) ] ) ^ - AES_RT2( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *SK ) ] ) ^ - AES_RT3( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *SK ) ] ); - } - } - - *RK++ = *SK++; - *RK++ = *SK++; - *RK++ = *SK++; - *RK++ = *SK++; - -exit: - mbedtls_aes_free( &cty ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) -static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits, - const unsigned char **key1, - unsigned int *key1bits, - const unsigned char **key2, - unsigned int *key2bits ) -{ - const unsigned int half_keybits = keybits / 2; - const unsigned int half_keybytes = half_keybits / 8; - - switch( keybits ) - { - case 256: break; - case 512: break; - default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); - } - - *key1bits = half_keybits; - *key2bits = half_keybits; - *key1 = &key[0]; - *key2 = &key[half_keybytes]; - - return 0; -} - -int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const unsigned char *key1, *key2; - unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); - - ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, - &key2, &key2bits ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for the encryption mode. */ - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Set crypt key for encryption. */ - return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits ); -} - -int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const unsigned char *key1, *key2; - unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); - - ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, - &key2, &key2bits ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for encryption. */ - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Set crypt key for decryption. */ - return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ - -#define AES_FROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ - do \ - { \ - (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y0 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y1 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y2 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y3 ) ); \ - \ - (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y1 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y2 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y3 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y0 ) ); \ - \ - (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y2 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y3 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y0 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y1 ) ); \ - \ - (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y3 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y0 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y1 ) ) ^ \ - AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y2 ) ); \ - } while( 0 ) - -#define AES_RROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ - do \ - { \ - (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y0 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y3 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y2 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y1 ) ); \ - \ - (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y1 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y0 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y3 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y2 ) ); \ - \ - (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y2 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y1 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y0 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y3 ) ); \ - \ - (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y3 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y2 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y1 ) ) ^ \ - AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y0 ) ); \ - } while( 0 ) - -/* - * AES-ECB block encryption - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - int i; - uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; - struct - { - uint32_t X[4]; - uint32_t Y[4]; - } t; - - t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; - t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; - t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; - t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; - - for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) - { - AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); - AES_FROUND( t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3] ); - } - - AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); - - t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[0] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[1] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[2] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[3] ) ] << 24 ); - - t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[1] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[2] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[0] ) ] << 24 ); - - t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[2] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[0] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[1] ) ] << 24 ); - - t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[3] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[0] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[1] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[2] ) ] << 24 ); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ - -/* - * AES-ECB block decryption - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - int i; - uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; - struct - { - uint32_t X[4]; - uint32_t Y[4]; - } t; - - t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; - t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; - t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; - t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; - - for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) - { - AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); - AES_RROUND( t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3] ); - } - - AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); - - t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[0] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[2] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[1] ) ] << 24 ); - - t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[1] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[0] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[2] ) ] << 24 ); - - t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[2] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[1] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[0] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[3] ) ] << 24 ); - - t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[3] ) ] ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[2] ) ] << 8 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[1] ) ] << 16 ) ^ - ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[0] ) ] << 24 ); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ - -/* - * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ) -{ - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) - if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) - return( mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) - if( aes_padlock_ace > 0) - { - if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to - // unaccelerated mode - // - } -#endif - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) - return( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); - else - return( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/* - * AES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int i; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char temp[16]; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - - if( length % 16 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) - if( aes_padlock_ace > 0 ) - { - if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output ) == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to - // unaccelerated mode - // - } -#endif - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - { - while( length > 0 ) - { - memcpy( temp, input, 16 ); - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); - - memcpy( iv, temp, 16 ); - - input += 16; - output += 16; - length -= 16; - } - } - else - { - while( length > 0 ) - { - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); - - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - memcpy( iv, output, 16 ); - - input += 16; - output += 16; - length -= 16; - } - } - ret = 0; - -exit: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - -typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16]; - -/* - * GF(2^128) multiplication function - * - * This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field - * representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates - * for machine endianess and hence works correctly on both big and little - * endian machines. - */ -static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( unsigned char r[16], - const unsigned char x[16] ) -{ - uint64_t a, b, ra, rb; - - a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 0 ); - b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 8 ); - - ra = ( a << 1 ) ^ 0x0087 >> ( 8 - ( ( b >> 63 ) << 3 ) ); - rb = ( a >> 63 ) | ( b << 1 ); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( ra, r, 0 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( rb, r, 8 ); -} - -/* - * AES-XTS buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - const unsigned char data_unit[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t blocks = length / 16; - size_t leftover = length % 16; - unsigned char tweak[16]; - unsigned char prev_tweak[16]; - unsigned char tmp[16]; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( data_unit != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - - /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */ - if( length < 16 ) - return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; - - /* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */ - if( length > ( 1 << 20 ) * 16 ) - return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; - - /* Compute the tweak. */ - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->tweak, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, - data_unit, tweak ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - while( blocks-- ) - { - size_t i; - - if( leftover && ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) && blocks == 0 ) - { - /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has - * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block, - * and this tweak for the lefover bytes. Save the current tweak for - * the leftovers and then update the current tweak for use on this, - * the last full block. */ - memcpy( prev_tweak, tweak, sizeof( tweak ) ); - mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak ); - } - - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - tmp[i] = input[i] ^ tweak[i]; - - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - output[i] = tmp[i] ^ tweak[i]; - - /* Update the tweak for the next block. */ - mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak ); - - output += 16; - input += 16; - } - - if( leftover ) - { - /* If we are on the leftover bytes in a decrypt operation, we need to - * use the previous tweak for these bytes (as saved in prev_tweak). */ - unsigned char *t = mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ? prev_tweak : tweak; - - /* We are now on the final part of the data unit, which doesn't divide - * evenly by 16. It's time for ciphertext stealing. */ - size_t i; - unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16; - - /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each - * byte of cyphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the - * remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds - * are the same). */ - for( i = 0; i < leftover; i++ ) - { - output[i] = prev_output[i]; - tmp[i] = input[i] ^ t[i]; - } - - /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this - * round. */ - for( ; i < 16; i++ ) - tmp[i] = prev_output[i] ^ t[i]; - - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return ret; - - /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous - * output we copied. */ - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - prev_output[i] = tmp[i] ^ t[i]; - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -/* - * AES-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - size_t *iv_off, - unsigned char iv[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int c; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - - n = *iv_off; - - if( n > 15 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - { - while( length-- ) - { - if( n == 0 ) - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - } - - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); - iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; - - n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; - } - } - else - { - while( length-- ) - { - if( n == 0 ) - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - } - - iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); - - n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; - } - } - - *iv_off = n; - ret = 0; - -exit: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * AES-CFB8 buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char c; - unsigned char ov[17]; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - while( length-- ) - { - memcpy( ov, iv, 16 ); - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - ov[16] = *input; - - c = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[0] ^ *input++ ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) - ov[16] = c; - - memcpy( iv, ov + 1, 16 ); - } - ret = 0; - -exit: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) -/* - * AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - size_t length, - size_t *iv_off, - unsigned char iv[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t n; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - - n = *iv_off; - - if( n > 15 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - while( length-- ) - { - if( n == 0 ) - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - } - *output++ = *input++ ^ iv[n]; - - n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; - } - - *iv_off = n; - -exit: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -/* - * AES-CTR buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - size_t length, - size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char nonce_counter[16], - unsigned char stream_block[16], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int c, i; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - - n = *nc_off; - - if ( n > 0x0F ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - while( length-- ) - { - if( n == 0 ) { - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - for( i = 16; i > 0; i-- ) - if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - } - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); - - n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; - } - - *nc_off = n; - ret = 0; - -exit: - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * AES test vectors from: - * - * http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/rijndael-vals.zip - */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[3][16] = -{ - { 0x44, 0x41, 0x6A, 0xC2, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x58, - 0x33, 0x03, 0x91, 0x7E, 0x6B, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0xE0 }, - { 0x48, 0xE3, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x25, 0x67, 0x18, 0xF2, - 0x92, 0x29, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x19, 0xF1, 0x5B, 0xA4 }, - { 0x05, 0x8C, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x2D, - 0x1F, 0x6F, 0x56, 0x58, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x4A, 0xDE } -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[3][16] = -{ - { 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x2C, 0xC0, 0xDA, 0x8D, 0x73, - 0x45, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x03, 0xBE, 0x29, 0x7F }, - { 0xF3, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x2A, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x83, 0x11, - 0x38, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x56, 0x06, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x14 }, - { 0x8B, 0x79, 0xEE, 0xCC, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xEE, 0x5D, - 0xFF, 0x30, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x21, 0x63, 0x6D, 0xA4 } -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[3][16] = -{ - { 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x53, 0x73, - 0xDF, 0x70, 0x6E, 0x73, 0xF7, 0xC9, 0xAF, 0x86 }, - { 0x5D, 0xF6, 0x78, 0xDD, 0x17, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x75, - 0xB6, 0x17, 0x68, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x7B }, - { 0x48, 0x04, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x75, - 0x19, 0xA3, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x57, 0x31, 0x04, 0x13 } -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[3][16] = -{ - { 0x8A, 0x05, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x09, 0x5A, 0xF4, 0x84, - 0x8A, 0x08, 0xD3, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x3D }, - { 0x7B, 0xD9, 0x66, 0xD5, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0xC1, 0xBB, - 0x85, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE8, 0x7B, 0xB1, 0x04 }, - { 0xFE, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x65, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xB5, - 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x88, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xF0 } -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -/* - * AES-CFB128 test vectors from: - * - * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf - */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[3][32] = -{ - { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, - 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, - { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, - 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, - 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, - { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, - 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, - 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, - 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_iv[16] = -{ - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_pt[64] = -{ - 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, - 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, - 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, - 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, - 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, - 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, - 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17, - 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = -{ - { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, - 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, - 0xC8, 0xA6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xA9, 0x3F, - 0xCD, 0xE3, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9F, 0x1C, 0xE5, 0x8B, - 0x26, 0x75, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xA3, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0x40, - 0xB1, 0x80, 0x8C, 0xF1, 0x87, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0xDF, - 0xC0, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x35, 0x7C, 0x5D, 0x1C, 0x0E, - 0xEA, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xE6 }, - { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, - 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, - 0x67, 0xCE, 0x7F, 0x7F, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21, - 0x96, 0x1A, 0x2B, 0x70, 0x17, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0x7A, - 0x2E, 0x1E, 0x8A, 0x1D, 0xD5, 0x9B, 0x88, 0xB1, - 0xC8, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0xED, 0x1E, 0xFA, 0xC4, 0xC9, - 0xC0, 0x5F, 0x9F, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x83, 0x4F, 0xA0, - 0x42, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x4B, 0x09, 0xFF }, - { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B, - 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60, - 0x39, 0xFF, 0xED, 0x14, 0x3B, 0x28, 0xB1, 0xC8, - 0x32, 0x11, 0x3C, 0x63, 0x31, 0xE5, 0x40, 0x7B, - 0xDF, 0x10, 0x13, 0x24, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0x92, - 0xA1, 0x3E, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x26, 0x7A, 0xE2, 0xF9, - 0x75, 0xA3, 0x85, 0x74, 0x1A, 0xB9, 0xCE, 0xF8, - 0x20, 0x31, 0x62, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xB1, 0xE4, 0x71 } -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) -/* - * AES-OFB test vectors from: - * - * https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final - */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[3][32] = -{ - { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, - 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, - { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, - 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, - 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, - { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, - 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, - 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, - 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_iv[16] = -{ - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_pt[64] = -{ - 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, - 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, - 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, - 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, - 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, - 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, - 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17, - 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = -{ - { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, - 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, - 0x77, 0x89, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x03, - 0xf5, 0x3c, 0x52, 0xda, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0xd8, 0x25, - 0x97, 0x40, 0x05, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0x5f, 0xec, 0xf6, - 0x43, 0x44, 0xf7, 0xa8, 0x22, 0x60, 0xed, 0xcc, - 0x30, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x28, 0xf6, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x78, - 0x66, 0xa5, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x5e }, - { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, - 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, - 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c, - 0x09, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x10, 0x04, 0x01, - 0x8d, 0x9a, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xf6, 0x59, 0x6f, - 0x55, 0x9c, 0x6d, 0x4d, 0xaf, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xf2, - 0x6d, 0x9f, 0x20, 0x08, 0x57, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x3e, - 0x9c, 0xac, 0x52, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0xac, 0xc9, 0x2a }, - { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B, - 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60, - 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x3a, - 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x8d, - 0x71, 0xab, 0x47, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xed, - 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0xba, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x08, - 0x01, 0x26, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xf3, 0x7b, 0xe8, - 0x53, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x8b, 0xe7, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x84 } -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -/* - * AES-CTR test vectors from: - * - * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3686.html - */ - -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[3][16] = -{ - { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, - 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, - { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7, - 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 }, - { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8, - 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = -{ - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, - { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59, - 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, - { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F, - 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = -{ - { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, - 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, - - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, - 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, - 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F }, - - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, - 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, - 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, - 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[3][48] = -{ - { 0xE4, 0x09, 0x5D, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xA7, 0xB3, 0x79, - 0x2D, 0x61, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x13, 0x11, 0xB8 }, - { 0x51, 0x04, 0xA1, 0x06, 0x16, 0x8A, 0x72, 0xD9, - 0x79, 0x0D, 0x41, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0xDA, 0xD3, 0x88, - 0xEB, 0x2E, 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x46, 0xDA, 0x57, 0xC8, - 0xFC, 0xE6, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x91, 0x41, 0xBE, 0x28 }, - { 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x9F, 0x2F, 0xFD, 0xD9, - 0xCF, 0x46, 0x52, 0xE9, 0xEF, 0xDB, 0x72, 0xD7, - 0x45, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x2B, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x78, 0x36, - 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x5C, 0xEA, 0xAE, 0xF3, 0x10, 0x53, - 0x25, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x2F } -}; - -static const int aes_test_ctr_len[3] = - { 16, 32, 36 }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) -/* - * AES-XTS test vectors from: - * - * IEEE P1619/D16 Annex B - * https://web.archive.org/web/20150629024421/http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf - * (Archived from original at http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf) - */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_key[][32] = -{ - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, - 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, - 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, - 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }, - { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc, 0xfb, 0xfa, 0xf9, 0xf8, - 0xf7, 0xf6, 0xf5, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xf0, - 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, - 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }, -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_pt32[][32] = -{ - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, - 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, - 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, - 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }, - { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, - 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, - 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, - 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }, -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_ct32[][32] = -{ - { 0x91, 0x7c, 0xf6, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0x68, 0xb2, 0xec, - 0x9b, 0x9f, 0xe9, 0xa3, 0xea, 0xdd, 0xa6, 0x92, - 0xcd, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xf5, 0x95, 0x98, 0xed, 0x85, - 0x8c, 0x02, 0xc2, 0x65, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x2e }, - { 0xc4, 0x54, 0x18, 0x5e, 0x6a, 0x16, 0x93, 0x6e, - 0x39, 0x33, 0x40, 0x38, 0xac, 0xef, 0x83, 0x8b, - 0xfb, 0x18, 0x6f, 0xff, 0x74, 0x80, 0xad, 0xc4, - 0x28, 0x93, 0x82, 0xec, 0xd6, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xf0 }, - { 0xaf, 0x85, 0x33, 0x6b, 0x59, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0x1a, - 0x90, 0x0b, 0x2e, 0xb2, 0x1e, 0xc9, 0x49, 0xd2, - 0x92, 0xdf, 0x4c, 0x04, 0x7e, 0x0b, 0x21, 0x53, - 0x21, 0x86, 0xa5, 0x97, 0x1a, 0x22, 0x7a, 0x89 }, -}; - -static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_data_unit[][16] = -{ - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, -}; - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int ret = 0, i, j, u, mode; - unsigned int keybits; - unsigned char key[32]; - unsigned char buf[64]; - const unsigned char *aes_tests; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - unsigned char iv[16]; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - unsigned char prv[16]; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - size_t offset; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - int len; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - unsigned char nonce_counter[16]; - unsigned char stream_block[16]; -#endif - mbedtls_aes_context ctx; - - memset( key, 0, 32 ); - mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); - - /* - * ECB mode - */ - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) - { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); - - memset( buf, 0, 16 ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, keybits ); - aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u]; - } - else - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); - aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u]; - } - - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) - { - mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); - continue; - } - else if( ret != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - - for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx, mode, buf, buf ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - } - - if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 16 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - /* - * CBC mode - */ - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) - { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); - - memset( iv , 0, 16 ); - memset( prv, 0, 16 ); - memset( buf, 0, 16 ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, keybits ); - aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u]; - } - else - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); - aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u]; - } - - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) - { - mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); - continue; - } - else if( ret != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - - for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) - { - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) - { - unsigned char tmp[16]; - - memcpy( tmp, prv, 16 ); - memcpy( prv, buf, 16 ); - memcpy( buf, tmp, 16 ); - } - - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - } - - if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 16 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - /* - * CFB128 mode - */ - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) - { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); - - memcpy( iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16 ); - memcpy( key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8 ); - - offset = 0; - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) - { - mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); - continue; - } - else if( ret != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - { - memcpy( buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64 ); - aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt; - } - else - { - memcpy( buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64 ); - aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u]; - } - - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 64 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - /* - * OFB mode - */ - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) - { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); - - memcpy( iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16 ); - memcpy( key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8 ); - - offset = 0; - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) - { - mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); - continue; - } - else if( ret != 0 ) - { - goto exit; - } - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - { - memcpy( buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64 ); - aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt; - } - else - { - memcpy( buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64 ); - aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u]; - } - - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 64 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - /* - * CTR mode - */ - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) - { - u = i >> 1; - mode = i & 1; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-CTR-128 (%s): ", - ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); - - memcpy( nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16 ); - memcpy( key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16 ); - - offset = 0; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - len = aes_test_ctr_len[u]; - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - { - memcpy( buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len ); - aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u]; - } - else - { - memcpy( buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len ); - aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u]; - } - - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( &ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, - stream_block, buf, buf ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, len ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - { - static const int num_tests = - sizeof(aes_test_xts_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_xts_key); - mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx_xts; - - /* - * XTS mode - */ - mbedtls_aes_xts_init( &ctx_xts ); - - for( i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++ ) - { - const unsigned char *data_unit; - u = i >> 1; - mode = i & 1; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " AES-XTS-128 (%s): ", - ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); - - memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) ); - memcpy( key, aes_test_xts_key[u], 32 ); - data_unit = aes_test_xts_data_unit[u]; - - len = sizeof( *aes_test_xts_ct32 ); - - if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( &ctx_xts, key, 256 ); - if( ret != 0) - goto exit; - memcpy( buf, aes_test_xts_ct32[u], len ); - aes_tests = aes_test_xts_pt32[u]; - } - else - { - ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &ctx_xts, key, 256 ); - if( ret != 0) - goto exit; - memcpy( buf, aes_test_xts_pt32[u], len ); - aes_tests = aes_test_xts_ct32[u]; - } - - - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &ctx_xts, mode, len, data_unit, - buf, buf ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, len ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - mbedtls_aes_xts_free( &ctx_xts ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ - - ret = 0; - -exit: - if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ diff --git a/aesni.h b/aesni.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3359cfe..0000000 --- a/aesni.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file aesni.h - * - * \brief AES-NI for hardware AES acceleration on some Intel processors - * - * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library - * functions; you must not call them directly. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H -#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H - -#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" - -#include "mbedtls/aes.h" - -#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u -#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && \ - ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) ) && \ - ! defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief Internal function to detect the AES-NI feature in CPUs. - * - * \note This function is only for internal use by other library - * functions; you must not call it directly. - * - * \param what The feature to detect - * (MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES or MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL) - * - * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise - */ -int mbedtls_aesni_has_support( unsigned int what ); - -/** - * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption - * - * \note This function is only for internal use by other library - * functions; you must not call it directly. - * - * \param ctx AES context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT - * \param input 16-byte input block - * \param output 16-byte output block - * - * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) - */ -int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16] ); - -/** - * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) - * - * \note This function is only for internal use by other library - * functions; you must not call it directly. - * - * \param c Result - * \param a First operand - * \param b Second operand - * - * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as - * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. - */ -void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( unsigned char c[16], - const unsigned char a[16], - const unsigned char b[16] ); - -/** - * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes - * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. - * - * \note This function is only for internal use by other library - * functions; you must not call it directly. - * - * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher - * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) - * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) - */ -void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( unsigned char *invkey, - const unsigned char *fwdkey, - int nr ); - -/** - * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption - * - * \note This function is only for internal use by other library - * functions; you must not call it directly. - * - * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written - * \param key Encryption key - * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256) - * - * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH - */ -int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( unsigned char *rk, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t bits ); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */ diff --git a/bignum.c b/bignum.c deleted file mode 100644 index e47e259..0000000 --- a/bignum.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3073 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Multi-precision integer library - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -/* - * The following sources were referenced in the design of this Multi-precision - * Integer library: - * - * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997 - * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone - * - * [2] Multi-Precision Math - * Tom St Denis - * https://github.com/libtom/libtommath/blob/develop/tommath.pdf - * - * [3] GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Library - * https://gmplib.org/manual/index.html - * - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "bn_mul.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "constant_time_internal.h" - -#include -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) -#define MPI_VALIDATE( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) - -#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ -#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ -#define biH (ciL << 2) /* half limb size */ - -#define MPI_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ - -/* - * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs - * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows - */ -#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / biL + ( (i) % biL != 0 ) ) -#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / ciL + ( (i) % ciL != 0 ) ) - -/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ -static void mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( mbedtls_mpi_uint *v, size_t n ) -{ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( v, ciL * n ); -} - -/* - * Initialize one MPI - */ -void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ) -{ - MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); - - X->s = 1; - X->n = 0; - X->p = NULL; -} - -/* - * Unallocate one MPI - */ -void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ) -{ - if( X == NULL ) - return; - - if( X->p != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); - mbedtls_free( X->p ); - } - - X->s = 1; - X->n = 0; - X->p = NULL; -} - -/* - * Enlarge to the specified number of limbs - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - if( X->n < nblimbs ) - { - if( ( p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint*)mbedtls_calloc( nblimbs, ciL ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - if( X->p != NULL ) - { - memcpy( p, X->p, X->n * ciL ); - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); - mbedtls_free( X->p ); - } - - X->n = nblimbs; - X->p = p; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Resize down as much as possible, - * while keeping at least the specified number of limbs - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; - size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */ - if( X->n <= nblimbs ) - return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, nblimbs ) ); - /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */ - - for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) - if( X->p[i] != 0 ) - break; - i++; - - if( i < nblimbs ) - i = nblimbs; - - if( ( p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint*)mbedtls_calloc( i, ciL ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - if( X->p != NULL ) - { - memcpy( p, X->p, i * ciL ); - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); - mbedtls_free( X->p ); - } - - X->n = i; - X->p = p; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */ -static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs ) -{ - if( limbs == 0 ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); - return( 0 ); - } - else if( X->n == limbs ) - { - memset( X->p, 0, limbs * ciL ); - X->s = 1; - return( 0 ); - } - else - { - mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); - return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); - } -} - -/* - * Copy the contents of Y into X. - * - * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. - * - * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, - * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example - * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(). - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - - if( X == Y ) - return( 0 ); - - if( Y->n == 0 ) - { - if( X->n != 0 ) - { - X->s = 1; - memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); - } - return( 0 ); - } - - for( i = Y->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) - if( Y->p[i] != 0 ) - break; - i++; - - X->s = Y->s; - - if( X->n < i ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i ) ); - } - else - { - memset( X->p + i, 0, ( X->n - i ) * ciL ); - } - - memcpy( X->p, Y->p, i * ciL ); - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Swap the contents of X and Y - */ -void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE( Y != NULL ); - - memcpy( &T, X, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); - memcpy( X, Y, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); - memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); -} - -/* - * Set value from integer - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, 1 ) ); - memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); - - X->p[0] = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z; - X->s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Get a specific bit - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ) -{ - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - if( X->n * biL <= pos ) - return( 0 ); - - return( ( X->p[pos / biL] >> ( pos % biL ) ) & 0x01 ); -} - -/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ -#define GET_BYTE( X, i ) \ - ( ( ( X )->p[( i ) / ciL] >> ( ( ( i ) % ciL ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff ) - -/* - * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1 - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t off = pos / biL; - size_t idx = pos % biL; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - if( val != 0 && val != 1 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( X->n * biL <= pos ) - { - if( val == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, off + 1 ) ); - } - - X->p[off] &= ~( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0x01 << idx ); - X->p[off] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) val << idx; - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Return the number of less significant zero-bits - */ -size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) -{ - size_t i, j, count = 0; - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL, 0 ); - - for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) - for( j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++ ) - if( ( ( X->p[i] >> j ) & 1 ) != 0 ) - return( count ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Count leading zero bits in a given integer - */ -static size_t mbedtls_clz( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) -{ - size_t j; - mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); - - for( j = 0; j < biL; j++ ) - { - if( x & mask ) break; - - mask >>= 1; - } - - return j; -} - -/* - * Return the number of bits - */ -size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) -{ - size_t i, j; - - if( X->n == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) - if( X->p[i] != 0 ) - break; - - j = biL - mbedtls_clz( X->p[i] ); - - return( ( i * biL ) + j ); -} - -/* - * Return the total size in bytes - */ -size_t mbedtls_mpi_size( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) -{ - return( ( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) + 7 ) >> 3 ); -} - -/* - * Convert an ASCII character to digit value - */ -static int mpi_get_digit( mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, int radix, char c ) -{ - *d = 255; - - if( c >= 0x30 && c <= 0x39 ) *d = c - 0x30; - if( c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x46 ) *d = c - 0x37; - if( c >= 0x61 && c <= 0x66 ) *d = c - 0x57; - - if( *d >= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) radix ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Import from an ASCII string - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, j, slen, n; - int sign = 1; - mbedtls_mpi_uint d; - mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); - - if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); - - if( s[0] == 0 ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); - return( 0 ); - } - - if( s[0] == '-' ) - { - ++s; - sign = -1; - } - - slen = strlen( s ); - - if( radix == 16 ) - { - if( slen > MPI_SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( slen << 2 ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); - - for( i = slen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i - 1] ) ); - X->p[j / ( 2 * ciL )] |= d << ( ( j % ( 2 * ciL ) ) << 2 ); - } - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); - - for( i = 0; i < slen; i++ ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T, X, radix ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, &T, d ) ); - } - } - - if( sign < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) != 0 ) - X->s = -1; - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Helper to write the digits high-order first. - */ -static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, - char **p, const size_t buflen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r; - size_t length = 0; - char *p_end = *p + buflen; - - do - { - if( length >= buflen ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, radix ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( X, NULL, X, radix ) ); - /* - * Write the residue in the current position, as an ASCII character. - */ - if( r < 0xA ) - *(--p_end) = (char)( '0' + r ); - else - *(--p_end) = (char)( 'A' + ( r - 0xA ) ); - - length++; - } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) != 0 ); - - memmove( *p, p_end, length ); - *p += length; - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Export into an ASCII string - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, - char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t n; - char *p; - mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); - - if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - n = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); /* Number of bits necessary to present `n`. */ - if( radix >= 4 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of 4-adic digits necessary to present - * `n`. If radix > 4, this might be a strict - * overapproximation of the number of - * radix-adic digits needed to present `n`. */ - if( radix >= 16 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of hexadecimal digits necessary to - * present `n`. */ - - n += 1; /* Terminating null byte */ - n += 1; /* Compensate for the divisions above, which round down `n` - * in case it's not even. */ - n += 1; /* Potential '-'-sign. */ - n += ( n & 1 ); /* Make n even to have enough space for hexadecimal writing, - * which always uses an even number of hex-digits. */ - - if( buflen < n ) - { - *olen = n; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - } - - p = buf; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); - - if( X->s == -1 ) - { - *p++ = '-'; - buflen--; - } - - if( radix == 16 ) - { - int c; - size_t i, j, k; - - for( i = X->n, k = 0; i > 0; i-- ) - { - for( j = ciL; j > 0; j-- ) - { - c = ( X->p[i - 1] >> ( ( j - 1 ) << 3) ) & 0xFF; - - if( c == 0 && k == 0 && ( i + j ) != 2 ) - continue; - - *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c / 16]; - *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c % 16]; - k = 1; - } - } - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T, X ) ); - - if( T.s == -1 ) - T.s = 1; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( &T, radix, &p, buflen ) ); - } - - *p++ = '\0'; - *olen = p - buf; - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -/* - * Read X from an opened file - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint d; - size_t slen; - char *p; - /* - * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, - * newline characters and '\0' - */ - char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( fin != NULL ); - - if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); - if( fgets( s, sizeof( s ) - 1, fin ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - slen = strlen( s ); - if( slen == sizeof( s ) - 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - - if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\n' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } - if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\r' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } - - p = s + slen; - while( p-- > s ) - if( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, *p ) != 0 ) - break; - - return( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( X, radix, p + 1 ) ); -} - -/* - * Write X into an opened file (or stdout if fout == NULL) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n, slen, plen; - /* - * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, - * newline characters and '\0' - */ - char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_string( X, radix, s, sizeof( s ) - 2, &n ) ); - - if( p == NULL ) p = ""; - - plen = strlen( p ); - slen = strlen( s ); - s[slen++] = '\r'; - s[slen++] = '\n'; - - if( fout != NULL ) - { - if( fwrite( p, 1, plen, fout ) != plen || - fwrite( s, 1, slen, fout ) != slen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - } - else - mbedtls_printf( "%s%s", p, s ); - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - - -/* Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint - * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. */ - -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) -{ - uint8_t i; - unsigned char *x_ptr; - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0; - - for( i = 0, x_ptr = (unsigned char*) &x; i < ciL; i++, x_ptr++ ) - { - tmp <<= CHAR_BIT; - tmp |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) *x_ptr; - } - - return( tmp ); -} - -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) -{ -#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) - -/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ -#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ ) - return( x ); -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */ - -#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ ) - -/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) -#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) -#define have_bswap -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) -#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && \ - __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) -#define have_bswap -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(have_bswap) - /* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */ - switch( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) ) - { - case 4: - return( __builtin_bswap32(x) ); - case 8: - return( __builtin_bswap64(x) ); - } -#endif -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */ -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */ - - /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order - * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */ - return( mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( x ) ); -} - -static void mpi_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; - mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; - if( limbs == 0 ) - return; - - /* - * Traverse limbs and - * - adapt byte-order in each limb - * - swap the limbs themselves. - * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right - * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger - * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the - * indices coincide in the last iteration). - */ - for( cur_limb_left = p, cur_limb_right = p + ( limbs - 1 ); - cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; - cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right-- ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; - /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, - * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ - tmp = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_left ); - *cur_limb_left = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_right ); - *cur_limb_right = tmp; - } -} - -/* - * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); - - /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); - - for( i = 0; i < buflen; i++ ) - X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3); - -cleanup: - - /* - * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers - * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any - * input is copied. - */ - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); - size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - buflen; - unsigned char *Xp; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); - - /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); - - /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument, - * even if buflen is 0. */ - if( buflen != 0 ) - { - Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p; - memcpy( Xp + overhead, buf, buflen ); - - mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); - } - -cleanup: - - /* - * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers - * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any - * input is copied. - */ - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, - unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) -{ - size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; - size_t bytes_to_copy; - size_t i; - - if( stored_bytes < buflen ) - { - bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; - } - else - { - bytes_to_copy = buflen; - - /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. - * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ - for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) - { - if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - } - } - - for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) - buf[i] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); - - if( stored_bytes < buflen ) - { - /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ - memset( buf + stored_bytes, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, - unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) -{ - size_t stored_bytes; - size_t bytes_to_copy; - unsigned char *p; - size_t i; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); - - stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; - - if( stored_bytes < buflen ) - { - /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial - * null bytes and record the position at which to start - * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution - * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the - * number. */ - bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; - p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes; - memset( buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); - } - else - { - /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. - * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ - bytes_to_copy = buflen; - p = buf; - for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) - { - if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); - } - } - - for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) - p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Left-shift: X <<= count - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, v0, t1; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - v0 = count / (biL ); - t1 = count & (biL - 1); - - i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) + count; - - if( X->n * biL < i ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, BITS_TO_LIMBS( i ) ) ); - - ret = 0; - - /* - * shift by count / limb_size - */ - if( v0 > 0 ) - { - for( i = X->n; i > v0; i-- ) - X->p[i - 1] = X->p[i - v0 - 1]; - - for( ; i > 0; i-- ) - X->p[i - 1] = 0; - } - - /* - * shift by count % limb_size - */ - if( t1 > 0 ) - { - for( i = v0; i < X->n; i++ ) - { - r1 = X->p[i] >> (biL - t1); - X->p[i] <<= t1; - X->p[i] |= r0; - r0 = r1; - } - } - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Right-shift: X >>= count - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) -{ - size_t i, v0, v1; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - v0 = count / biL; - v1 = count & (biL - 1); - - if( v0 > X->n || ( v0 == X->n && v1 > 0 ) ) - return mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ); - - /* - * shift by count / limb_size - */ - if( v0 > 0 ) - { - for( i = 0; i < X->n - v0; i++ ) - X->p[i] = X->p[i + v0]; - - for( ; i < X->n; i++ ) - X->p[i] = 0; - } - - /* - * shift by count % limb_size - */ - if( v1 > 0 ) - { - for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) - { - r1 = X->p[i - 1] << (biL - v1); - X->p[i - 1] >>= v1; - X->p[i - 1] |= r0; - r0 = r1; - } - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Compare unsigned values - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) -{ - size_t i, j; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - - for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) - if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - for( j = Y->n; j > 0; j-- ) - if( Y->p[j - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - if( i == 0 && j == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - if( i > j ) return( 1 ); - if( j > i ) return( -1 ); - - for( ; i > 0; i-- ) - { - if( X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1] ) return( 1 ); - if( X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] ) return( -1 ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Compare signed values - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) -{ - size_t i, j; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - - for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) - if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - for( j = Y->n; j > 0; j-- ) - if( Y->p[j - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - if( i == 0 && j == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - if( i > j ) return( X->s ); - if( j > i ) return( -Y->s ); - - if( X->s > 0 && Y->s < 0 ) return( 1 ); - if( Y->s > 0 && X->s < 0 ) return( -1 ); - - for( ; i > 0; i-- ) - { - if( X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1] ) return( X->s ); - if( X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] ) return( -X->s ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Compare signed values - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi Y; - mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - - *p = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z; - Y.s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; - Y.n = 1; - Y.p = p; - - return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( X, &Y ) ); -} - -/* - * Unsigned addition: X = |A| + |B| (HAC 14.7) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, j; - mbedtls_mpi_uint *o, *p, c, tmp; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - - if( X == B ) - { - const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T; - } - - if( X != A ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); - - /* - * X should always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. - */ - X->s = 1; - - for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) - if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) - break; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) ); - - o = B->p; p = X->p; c = 0; - - /* - * tmp is used because it might happen that p == o - */ - for( i = 0; i < j; i++, o++, p++ ) - { - tmp= *o; - *p += c; c = ( *p < c ); - *p += tmp; c += ( *p < tmp ); - } - - while( c != 0 ) - { - if( i >= X->n ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + 1 ) ); - p = X->p + i; - } - - *p += c; c = ( *p < c ); i++; p++; - } - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/** - * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. - * - * Calculate l - r where l and r have the same size. - * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry - * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `l < r`, and 0 otherwise). - * - * d may be aliased to l or r. - * - * \param n Number of limbs of \p d, \p l and \p r. - * \param[out] d The result of the subtraction. - * \param[in] l The left operand. - * \param[in] r The right operand. - * - * \return 1 if `l < r`. - * 0 if `l >= r`. - */ -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *l, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) -{ - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t, z; - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) - { - z = ( l[i] < c ); t = l[i] - c; - c = ( t < r[i] ) + z; d[i] = t - r[i]; - } - - return( c ); -} - -/* - * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - - for( n = B->n; n > 0; n-- ) - if( B->p[n - 1] != 0 ) - break; - if( n > A->n ) - { - /* B >= (2^ciL)^n > A */ - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, A->n ) ); - - /* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs - * because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the - * significant digits of B. */ - if( A->n > n ) - memcpy( X->p + n, A->p + n, ( A->n - n ) * ciL ); - if( X->n > A->n ) - memset( X->p + A->n, 0, ( X->n - A->n ) * ciL ); - - carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, A->p, B->p ); - if( carry != 0 ) - { - /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ - for( ; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++ ) - --X->p[n]; - /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result - * is negative. */ - if( n == X->n ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; - goto cleanup; - } - --X->p[n]; - } - - /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ - X->s = 1; - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Signed addition: X = A + B - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) -{ - int ret, s; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - - s = A->s; - if( A->s * B->s < 0 ) - { - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) >= 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, A, B ) ); - X->s = s; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, B, A ) ); - X->s = -s; - } - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( X, A, B ) ); - X->s = s; - } - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Signed subtraction: X = A - B - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) -{ - int ret, s; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - - s = A->s; - if( A->s * B->s > 0 ) - { - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) >= 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, A, B ) ); - X->s = s; - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, B, A ) ); - X->s = -s; - } - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( X, A, B ) ); - X->s = s; - } - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Signed addition: X = A + b - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi B; - mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - - p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; - B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; - B.n = 1; - B.p = p; - - return( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); -} - -/* - * Signed subtraction: X = A - b - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi B; - mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - - p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; - B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; - B.n = 1; - B.p = p; - - return( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); -} - -/** Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication. - * - * Add \p b * \p s to \p d. - * - * \param i The number of limbs of \p s. - * \param[in] s A bignum to multiply, of size \p i. - * It may overlap with \p d, but only if - * \p d <= \p s. - * Its leading limb must not be \c 0. - * \param[in,out] d The bignum to add to. - * It must be sufficiently large to store the - * result of the multiplication. This means - * \p i + 1 limbs if \p d[\p i - 1] started as 0 and \p b - * is not known a priori. - * \param b A scalar to multiply. - */ -static -#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__arm__) -/* - * Apple LLVM version 4.2 (clang-425.0.24) (based on LLVM 3.2svn) - * appears to need this to prevent bad ARM code generation at -O3. - */ -__attribute__ ((noinline)) -#endif -void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, - mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t = 0; - -#if defined(MULADDC_HUIT) - for( ; i >= 8; i -= 8 ) - { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_HUIT - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for( ; i > 0; i-- ) - { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } -#else /* MULADDC_HUIT */ - for( ; i >= 16; i -= 16 ) - { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for( ; i >= 8; i -= 8 ) - { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for( ; i > 0; i-- ) - { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } -#endif /* MULADDC_HUIT */ - - t++; - - while( c != 0 ) - { - *d += c; c = ( *d < c ); d++; - } -} - -/* - * Baseline multiplication: X = A * B (HAC 14.12) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, j; - mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; - int result_is_zero = 0; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); - - if( X == A ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); A = &TA; } - if( X == B ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); B = &TB; } - - for( i = A->n; i > 0; i-- ) - if( A->p[i - 1] != 0 ) - break; - if( i == 0 ) - result_is_zero = 1; - - for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) - if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) - break; - if( j == 0 ) - result_is_zero = 1; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + j ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); - - for( ; j > 0; j-- ) - mpi_mul_hlp( i, A->p, X->p + j - 1, B->p[j - 1] ); - - /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces - * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do - * need to take care to set the sign bit properly since the library does - * not fully support an MPI object with a value of 0 and s == -1. */ - if( result_is_zero ) - X->s = 1; - else - X->s = A->s * B->s; - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Baseline multiplication: X = A * b - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) -{ - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - - /* mpi_mul_hlp can't deal with a leading 0. */ - size_t n = A->n; - while( n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0 ) - --n; - - /* The general method below doesn't work if n==0 or b==0. By chance - * calculating the result is trivial in those cases. */ - if( b == 0 || n == 0 ) - { - return( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); - } - - /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mpi_mul_hlp */ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If - * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same - * number of limbs as A and the call to grow() is not required since - * copy() will take care of the growth if needed. However, experimentally, - * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer - * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the - * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly - * grow to its final size. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n + 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); - mpi_mul_hlp( n, A->p, X->p, b - 1 ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Unsigned integer divide - double mbedtls_mpi_uint dividend, u1/u0, and - * mbedtls_mpi_uint divisor, d - */ -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, - mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, mbedtls_mpi_uint d, mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) - mbedtls_t_udbl dividend, quotient; -#else - const mbedtls_mpi_uint radix = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH; - const mbedtls_mpi_uint uint_halfword_mask = ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH ) - 1; - mbedtls_mpi_uint d0, d1, q0, q1, rAX, r0, quotient; - mbedtls_mpi_uint u0_msw, u0_lsw; - size_t s; -#endif - - /* - * Check for overflow - */ - if( 0 == d || u1 >= d ) - { - if (r != NULL) *r = ~0; - - return ( ~0 ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) - dividend = (mbedtls_t_udbl) u1 << biL; - dividend |= (mbedtls_t_udbl) u0; - quotient = dividend / d; - if( quotient > ( (mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL ) - 1 ) - quotient = ( (mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL ) - 1; - - if( r != NULL ) - *r = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( dividend - (quotient * d ) ); - - return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) quotient; -#else - - /* - * Algorithm D, Section 4.3.1 - The Art of Computer Programming - * Vol. 2 - Seminumerical Algorithms, Knuth - */ - - /* - * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 - */ - s = mbedtls_clz( d ); - d = d << s; - - u1 = u1 << s; - u1 |= ( u0 >> ( biL - s ) ) & ( -(mbedtls_mpi_sint)s >> ( biL - 1 ) ); - u0 = u0 << s; - - d1 = d >> biH; - d0 = d & uint_halfword_mask; - - u0_msw = u0 >> biH; - u0_lsw = u0 & uint_halfword_mask; - - /* - * Find the first quotient and remainder - */ - q1 = u1 / d1; - r0 = u1 - d1 * q1; - - while( q1 >= radix || ( q1 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_msw ) ) - { - q1 -= 1; - r0 += d1; - - if ( r0 >= radix ) break; - } - - rAX = ( u1 * radix ) + ( u0_msw - q1 * d ); - q0 = rAX / d1; - r0 = rAX - q0 * d1; - - while( q0 >= radix || ( q0 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_lsw ) ) - { - q0 -= 1; - r0 += d1; - - if ( r0 >= radix ) break; - } - - if (r != NULL) - *r = ( rAX * radix + u0_lsw - q0 * d ) >> s; - - quotient = q1 * radix + q0; - - return quotient; -#endif -} - -/* - * Division by mbedtls_mpi: A = Q * B + R (HAC 14.20) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, - const mbedtls_mpi *B ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, n, t, k; - mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; - mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); - /* - * Avoid dynamic memory allocations for constant-size T2. - * - * T2 is used for comparison only and the 3 limbs are assigned explicitly, - * so nobody increase the size of the MPI and we're safe to use an on-stack - * buffer. - */ - T2.s = 1; - T2.n = sizeof( TP2 ) / sizeof( *TP2 ); - T2.p = TP2; - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 ) - { - if( Q != NULL ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( Q, 0 ) ); - if( R != NULL ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( R, A ) ); - return( 0 ); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &X, A ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Y, B ) ); - X.s = Y.s = 1; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &Z, A->n + 2 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Z, 0 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T1, A->n + 2 ) ); - - k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &Y ) % biL; - if( k < biL - 1 ) - { - k = biL - 1 - k; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &X, k ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &Y, k ) ); - } - else k = 0; - - n = X.n - 1; - t = Y.n - 1; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &Y, biL * ( n - t ) ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y ) >= 0 ) - { - Z.p[n - t]++; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &Y ) ); - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Y, biL * ( n - t ) ) ); - - for( i = n; i > t ; i-- ) - { - if( X.p[i] >= Y.p[t] ) - Z.p[i - t - 1] = ~0; - else - { - Z.p[i - t - 1] = mbedtls_int_div_int( X.p[i], X.p[i - 1], - Y.p[t], NULL); - } - - T2.p[0] = ( i < 2 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; - T2.p[1] = ( i < 1 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; - T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; - - Z.p[i - t - 1]++; - do - { - Z.p[i - t - 1]--; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &T1, 0 ) ); - T1.p[0] = ( t < 1 ) ? 0 : Y.p[t - 1]; - T1.p[1] = Y.p[t]; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &T1, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T1, &T2 ) > 0 ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &Y, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T1, biL * ( i - t - 1 ) ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 0 ) < 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T1, &Y ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T1, biL * ( i - t - 1 ) ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); - Z.p[i - t - 1]--; - } - } - - if( Q != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &Z ) ); - Q->s = A->s * B->s; - } - - if( R != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &X, k ) ); - X.s = A->s; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( R, &X ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 0 ) == 0 ) - R->s = 1; - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( TP2, sizeof( TP2 ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Division by int: A = Q * b + R - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, - const mbedtls_mpi *A, - mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi B; - mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - - p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; - B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; - B.n = 1; - B.p = p; - - return( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( Q, R, A, &B ) ); -} - -/* - * Modulo: R = A mod B - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( NULL, R, A, B ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 0 ) < 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( R, R, B ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( R, B ) >= 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( R, R, B ) ); - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Modulo: r = A mod b - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) -{ - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - - if( b == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); - - if( b < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); - - /* - * handle trivial cases - */ - if( b == 1 ) - { - *r = 0; - return( 0 ); - } - - if( b == 2 ) - { - *r = A->p[0] & 1; - return( 0 ); - } - - /* - * general case - */ - for( i = A->n, y = 0; i > 0; i-- ) - { - x = A->p[i - 1]; - y = ( y << biH ) | ( x >> biH ); - z = y / b; - y -= z * b; - - x <<= biH; - y = ( y << biH ) | ( x >> biH ); - z = y / b; - y -= z * b; - } - - /* - * If A is negative, then the current y represents a negative value. - * Flipping it to the positive side. - */ - if( A->s < 0 && y != 0 ) - y = b - y; - - *r = y; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis) - */ -static void mpi_montg_init( mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint x, m0 = N->p[0]; - unsigned int i; - - x = m0; - x += ( ( m0 + 2 ) & 4 ) << 1; - - for( i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2 ) - x *= ( 2 - ( m0 * x ) ); - - *mm = ~x + 1; -} - -/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) - * - * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply. - * It must have at least as many limbs as N - * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored. - * On successful completion, A contains the result of - * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where - * R = (2^ciL)^n. - * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply. - * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N - * (B->n <= N->n). - * \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd. - * \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`. - * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL. - * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage. - * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2 - * (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)). - * Its initial content is unused and - * its final content is indeterminate. - * Note that unlike the usual convention in the library - * for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change. - */ -static void mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, - const mbedtls_mpi *T ) -{ - size_t i, n, m; - mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d; - - memset( T->p, 0, T->n * ciL ); - - d = T->p; - n = N->n; - m = ( B->n < n ) ? B->n : n; - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) - { - /* - * T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL - */ - u0 = A->p[i]; - u1 = ( d[0] + u0 * B->p[0] ) * mm; - - mpi_mul_hlp( m, B->p, d, u0 ); - mpi_mul_hlp( n, N->p, d, u1 ); - - *d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0; - } - - /* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result - * plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the - * subtraction is performed through side channels. */ - - /* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that - * A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */ - memcpy( A->p, d, n * ciL ); - /* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks, - * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ - /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ - d[n] += 1; - d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, d, N->p ); - /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n - * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. - * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n - * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction - * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. - * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ - mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] ); -} - -/* - * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N - * - * See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters. - */ -static void mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, - mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1; - mbedtls_mpi U; - - U.n = U.s = (int) z; - U.p = &z; - - mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ); -} - -/** - * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index. - * - * This is functionally equivalent to mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, T[idx]) except it - * reads the entire table in order to avoid leaking the value of idx to an - * attacker able to observe memory access patterns. - * - * \param[out] R Where to write the selected MPI. - * \param[in] T The table to read from. - * \param[in] T_size The number of elements in the table. - * \param[in] idx The index of the element to select; - * this must satisfy 0 <= idx < T_size. - * - * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code. - */ -static int mpi_select( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i], - (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) ); - } - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N (HAC 14.85) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, - const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, - mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t wbits, wsize, one = 1; - size_t i, j, nblimbs; - size_t bufsize, nbits; - mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state; - mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], WW, Apos; - int neg; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( E != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || ( N->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS || - mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) - return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Init temps and window size - */ - mpi_montg_init( &mm, N ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &Apos ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &WW ); - memset( W, 0, sizeof( W ) ); - - i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ); - - wsize = ( i > 671 ) ? 6 : ( i > 239 ) ? 5 : - ( i > 79 ) ? 4 : ( i > 23 ) ? 3 : 1; - -#if( MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) - if( wsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) - wsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE; -#endif - - j = N->n + 1; - /* All W[i] and X must have at least N->n limbs for the mpi_montmul() - * and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure that W[1] and X are - * large enough, and later we'll grow other W[i] to the same length. - * They must not be shrunk midway through this function! - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], j ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T, j * 2 ) ); - - /* - * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end) - */ - neg = ( A->s == -1 ); - if( neg ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Apos, A ) ); - Apos.s = 1; - A = &Apos; - } - - /* - * If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N - */ - if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &RR, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &RR, N->n * 2 * biL ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &RR, &RR, N ) ); - - if( prec_RR != NULL ) - memcpy( prec_RR, &RR, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); - } - else - memcpy( &RR, prec_RR, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); - - /* - * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( A, N ) >= 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &W[1], A, N ) ); - /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before - * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow - * in mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], N->n + 1 ) ); - } - else - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[1], A ) ); - - /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs - * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */ - mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ); - - /* - * X = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &RR ) ); - mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); - - if( wsize > 1 ) - { - /* - * W[1 << (wsize - 1)] = W[1] ^ (wsize - 1) - */ - j = one << ( wsize - 1 ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[j], N->n + 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[j], &W[1] ) ); - - for( i = 0; i < wsize - 1; i++ ) - mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ); - - /* - * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1] - */ - for( i = j + 1; i < ( one << wsize ); i++ ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[i], N->n + 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[i], &W[i - 1] ) ); - - mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ); - } - } - - nblimbs = E->n; - bufsize = 0; - nbits = 0; - wbits = 0; - state = 0; - - while( 1 ) - { - if( bufsize == 0 ) - { - if( nblimbs == 0 ) - break; - - nblimbs--; - - bufsize = sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) << 3; - } - - bufsize--; - - ei = (E->p[nblimbs] >> bufsize) & 1; - - /* - * skip leading 0s - */ - if( ei == 0 && state == 0 ) - continue; - - if( ei == 0 && state == 1 ) - { - /* - * out of window, square X - */ - mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); - continue; - } - - /* - * add ei to current window - */ - state = 2; - - nbits++; - wbits |= ( ei << ( wsize - nbits ) ); - - if( nbits == wsize ) - { - /* - * X = X^wsize R^-1 mod N - */ - for( i = 0; i < wsize; i++ ) - mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); - - /* - * X = X * W[wbits] R^-1 mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, (size_t) 1 << wsize, wbits ) ); - mpi_montmul( X, &WW, N, mm, &T ); - - state--; - nbits = 0; - wbits = 0; - } - } - - /* - * process the remaining bits - */ - for( i = 0; i < nbits; i++ ) - { - mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); - - wbits <<= 1; - - if( ( wbits & ( one << wsize ) ) != 0 ) - mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T ); - } - - /* - * X = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N - */ - mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); - - if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) - { - X->s = -1; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, N, X ) ); - } - -cleanup: - - for( i = ( one << ( wsize - 1 ) ); i < ( one << wsize ); i++ ) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[i] ); - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[1] ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Apos ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &WW ); - - if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL ) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) (HAC 14.54) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t lz, lzt; - mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); - - lz = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ); - lzt = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ); - - /* The loop below gives the correct result when A==0 but not when B==0. - * So have a special case for B==0. Leverage the fact that we just - * calculated the lsb and lsb(B)==0 iff B is odd or 0 to make the test - * slightly more efficient than cmp_int(). */ - if( lzt == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &TB, 0 ) == 0 ) - { - ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, A ); - goto cleanup; - } - - if( lzt < lz ) - lz = lzt; - - TA.s = TB.s = 1; - - /* We mostly follow the procedure described in HAC 14.54, but with some - * minor differences: - * - Sequences of multiplications or divisions by 2 are grouped into a - * single shift operation. - * - The procedure in HAC assumes that 0 < TB <= TA. - * - The condition TB <= TA is not actually necessary for correctness. - * TA and TB have symmetric roles except for the loop termination - * condition, and the shifts at the beginning of the loop body - * remove any significance from the ordering of TA vs TB before - * the shifts. - * - If TA = 0, the loop goes through 0 iterations and the result is - * correctly TB. - * - The case TB = 0 was short-circuited above. - * - * For the correctness proof below, decompose the original values of - * A and B as - * A = sa * 2^a * A' with A'=0 or A' odd, and sa = +-1 - * B = sb * 2^b * B' with B'=0 or B' odd, and sb = +-1 - * Then gcd(A, B) = 2^{min(a,b)} * gcd(A',B'), - * and gcd(A',B') is odd or 0. - * - * At the beginning, we have TA = |A| and TB = |B| so gcd(A,B) = gcd(TA,TB). - * The code maintains the following invariant: - * gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k (I) - */ - - /* Proof that the loop terminates: - * At each iteration, either the right-shift by 1 is made on a nonzero - * value and the nonnegative integer bitlen(TA) + bitlen(TB) decreases - * by at least 1, or the right-shift by 1 is made on zero and then - * TA becomes 0 which ends the loop (TB cannot be 0 if it is right-shifted - * since in that case TB is calculated from TB-TA with the condition TB>TA). - */ - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TA, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - /* Divisions by 2 preserve the invariant (I). */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ) ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ) ) ); - - /* Set either TA or TB to |TA-TB|/2. Since TA and TB are both odd, - * TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result. - * Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB - * also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2 - * also divides TB, and any odd divisior of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also - * divides TA. - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TA, &TB ) >= 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TA, &TA, &TB ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, 1 ) ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TB, &TB, &TA ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, 1 ) ); - } - /* Note that one of TA or TB is still odd. */ - } - - /* By invariant (I), gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k. - * At the loop exit, TA = 0, so gcd(TA,TB) = TB. - * - If there was at least one loop iteration, then one of TA or TB is odd, - * and TA = 0, so TB is odd and gcd(TA,TB) = gcd(A',B'). In this case, - * lz = min(a,b) so gcd(A,B) = 2^lz * TB. - * - If there was no loop iteration, then A was 0, and gcd(A,B) = B. - * In this case, lz = 0 and B = TB so gcd(A,B) = B = 2^lz * TB as well. - */ - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &TB, lz ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, &TB ) ); - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. - * X must already have room for those bytes. - * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for - * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()). - * The size and sign of X are unchanged. - * n_bytes must not be 0. - */ -static int mpi_fill_random_internal( - mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( n_bytes ); - const size_t overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - n_bytes; - - if( X->n < limbs ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memset( X->p, 0, overhead ); - memset( (unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, ( X->n - limbs ) * ciL ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes ) ); - mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Fill X with size bytes of random. - * - * Use a temporary bytes representation to make sure the result is the same - * regardless of the platform endianness (useful when f_rng is actually - * deterministic, eg for tests). - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( size ); - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - - /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); - if( size == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - ret = mpi_fill_random_internal( X, size, f_rng, p_rng ); - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, - mbedtls_mpi_sint min, - const mbedtls_mpi *N, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - int count; - unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; - size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ); - size_t n_bytes = ( n_bits + 7 ) / 8; - mbedtls_mpi lower_bound; - - if( min < 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, min ) <= 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing - * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will - * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). - * - * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating - * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with - * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, - * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has - * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. - * - * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible - * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but - * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N - * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of - * failure is macroscopic. - */ - count = ( n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250 ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &lower_bound ); - - /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs - * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. - * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, N->n ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &lower_bound, N->n ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &lower_bound, min ) ); - - /* - * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) - * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: - * - use the same byte ordering; - * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; - * - try until result is in the desired range. - * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. - */ - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random_internal( X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits ) ); - - if( --count == 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, &lower_bound, <_lower ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, N, <_upper ) ); - } - while( lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0 ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &lower_bound ); - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N (HAC 14.61 / 14.64) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U2 ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TV ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &V1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &V2 ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, A, N ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &TA, A, N ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TU, &TA ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, N ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TV, N ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &U1, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &U2, 0 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &V1, 0 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &V2, 1 ) ); - - do - { - while( ( TU.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TU, 1 ) ); - - if( ( U1.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 || ( U2.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &U1, &U1, &TB ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U2, &U2, &TA ) ); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &U1, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &U2, 1 ) ); - } - - while( ( TV.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TV, 1 ) ); - - if( ( V1.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 || ( V2.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &V1, &V1, &TB ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V2, &V2, &TA ) ); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &V1, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &V2, 1 ) ); - } - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TU, &TV ) >= 0 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &TU, &TU, &TV ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U1, &U1, &V1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U2, &U2, &V2 ) ); - } - else - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &TV, &TV, &TU ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V1, &V1, &U1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V2, &V2, &U2 ) ); - } - } - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TU, 0 ) != 0 ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &V1, 0 ) < 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &V1, &V1, N ) ); - - while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &V1, N ) >= 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V1, &V1, N ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &V1 ) ); - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U2 ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TV ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &V1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V2 ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) - -static const int small_prime[] = -{ - 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, - 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, - 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, - 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, - 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, - 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, - 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, - 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, - 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, - 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, - 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, - 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, - 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, - 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, - 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, - 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, - 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, - 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, - 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, - 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, - 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, -103 -}; - -/* - * Small divisors test (X must be positive) - * - * Return values: - * 0: no small factor (possible prime, more tests needed) - * 1: certain prime - * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: certain non-prime - * other negative: error - */ -static int mpi_check_small_factors( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r; - - if( ( X->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); - - for( i = 0; small_prime[i] > 0; i++ ) - { - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, small_prime[i] ) <= 0 ) - return( 1 ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, small_prime[i] ) ); - - if( r == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); - } - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24) - */ -static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret, count; - size_t i, j, k, s; - mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); - - /* - * W = |X| - 1 - * R = W >> lsb( W ) - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &W, X, 1 ) ); - s = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &W ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R, &W ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &R, s ) ); - - for( i = 0; i < rounds; i++ ) - { - /* - * pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1 - */ - count = 0; - do { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A ); - k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W ); - if (j > k) { - A.p[A.n - 1] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( k - ( A.n - 1 ) * biL - 1 ) ) - 1; - } - - if (count++ > 30) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; - goto cleanup; - } - - } while ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) <= 0 ); - - /* - * A = A^R mod |X| - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &A, &A, &R, X, &RR ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) == 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) - continue; - - j = 1; - while( j < s && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) != 0 ) - { - /* - * A = A * A mod |X| - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &A, &A ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &A, &T, X ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) - break; - - j++; - } - - /* - * not prime if A != |X| - 1 or A == 1 - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) != 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; - break; - } - } - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi XX; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - - XX.s = 1; - XX.n = X->n; - XX.p = X->p; - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 0 ) == 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 1 ) == 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 2 ) == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &XX ) ) != 0 ) - { - if( ret == 1 ) - return( 0 ); - - return( ret ); - } - - return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ); -} - -/* - * Prime number generation - * - * To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must - * be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain - * MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR. - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ -#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 -// ceil(2^63.5) -#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f333f9de6485ULL -#else -// ceil(2^31.5) -#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f334U -#endif - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; - size_t k, n; - int rounds; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r; - mbedtls_mpi Y; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - - if( nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); - - n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( nbits ); - - if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR ) == 0 ) - { - /* - * 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4 - */ - rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 3 : - ( nbits >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 350 ) ? 8 : - ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 ); - } - else - { - /* - * 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC, - * fact 4.48 - */ - rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1450 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 1150 ) ? 5 : - ( nbits >= 1000 ) ? 6 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 7 : - ( nbits >= 750 ) ? 8 : ( nbits >= 500 ) ? 13 : - ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 28 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 40 : 51 ); - } - - while( 1 ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - /* make sure generated number is at least (nbits-1)+0.5 bits (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 steps 4.4, 5.5) */ - if( X->p[n-1] < CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 ) continue; - - k = n * biL; - if( k > nbits ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, k - nbits ) ); - X->p[0] |= 1; - - if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH ) == 0 ) - { - ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ); - - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) - goto cleanup; - } - else - { - /* - * An necessary condition for Y and X = 2Y + 1 to be prime - * is X = 2 mod 3 (which is equivalent to Y = 2 mod 3). - * Make sure it is satisfied, while keeping X = 3 mod 4 - */ - - X->p[0] |= 2; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, 3 ) ); - if( r == 0 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 8 ) ); - else if( r == 1 ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 4 ) ); - - /* Set Y = (X-1) / 2, which is X / 2 because X is odd */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Y, X ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Y, 1 ) ); - - while( 1 ) - { - /* - * First, check small factors for X and Y - * before doing Miller-Rabin on any of them - */ - if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( X ) ) == 0 && - ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &Y ) ) == 0 && - ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) - == 0 && - ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) - == 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) - goto cleanup; - - /* - * Next candidates. We want to preserve Y = (X-1) / 2 and - * Y = 1 mod 2 and Y = 2 mod 3 (eq X = 3 mod 4 and X = 2 mod 3) - * so up Y by 6 and X by 12. - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 12 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &Y, &Y, 6 ) ); - } - } - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -#define GCD_PAIR_COUNT 3 - -static const int gcd_pairs[GCD_PAIR_COUNT][3] = -{ - { 693, 609, 21 }, - { 1764, 868, 28 }, - { 768454923, 542167814, 1 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int ret, i; - mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, X, Y, U, V; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &V ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &A, 16, - "EFE021C2645FD1DC586E69184AF4A31E" \ - "D5F53E93B5F123FA41680867BA110131" \ - "944FE7952E2517337780CB0DB80E61AA" \ - "E7C8DDC6C5C6AADEB34EB38A2F40D5E6" ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &E, 16, - "B2E7EFD37075B9F03FF989C7C5051C20" \ - "34D2A323810251127E7BF8625A4F49A5" \ - "F3E27F4DA8BD59C47D6DAABA4C8127BD" \ - "5B5C25763222FEFCCFC38B832366C29E" ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &N, 16, - "0066A198186C18C10B2F5ED9B522752A" \ - "9830B69916E535C8F047518A889A43A5" \ - "94B6BED27A168D31D4A52F88925AA8F5" ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &X, &A, &N ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, - "602AB7ECA597A3D6B56FF9829A5E8B85" \ - "9E857EA95A03512E2BAE7391688D264A" \ - "A5663B0341DB9CCFD2C4C5F421FEC814" \ - "8001B72E848A38CAE1C65F78E56ABDEF" \ - "E12D3C039B8A02D6BE593F0BBBDA56F1" \ - "ECF677152EF804370C1A305CAF3B5BF1" \ - "30879B56C61DE584A0F53A2447A51E" ) ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #1 (mul_mpi): " ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &X, &Y, &A, &N ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, - "256567336059E52CAE22925474705F39A94" ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &V, 16, - "6613F26162223DF488E9CD48CC132C7A" \ - "0AC93C701B001B092E4E5B9F73BCD27B" \ - "9EE50D0657C77F374E903CDFA4C642" ) ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #2 (div_mpi): " ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &V ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &X, &A, &E, &N, NULL ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, - "36E139AEA55215609D2816998ED020BB" \ - "BD96C37890F65171D948E9BC7CBAA4D9" \ - "325D24D6A3C12710F10A09FA08AB87" ) ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #3 (exp_mod): " ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &X, &A, &N ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, - "003A0AAEDD7E784FC07D8F9EC6E3BFD5" \ - "C3DBA76456363A10869622EAC2DD84EC" \ - "C5B8A74DAC4D09E03B5E0BE779F2DF61" ) ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #4 (inv_mod): " ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #5 (simple gcd): " ); - - for( i = 0; i < GCD_PAIR_COUNT; i++ ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &X, gcd_pairs[i][0] ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Y, gcd_pairs[i][1] ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &A, &X, &Y ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, gcd_pairs[i][2] ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed at %d\n", i ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - -cleanup: - - if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ diff --git a/bn_mul.h b/bn_mul.h deleted file mode 100644 index b71ddd8..0000000 --- a/bn_mul.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,974 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file bn_mul.h - * - * \brief Multi-precision integer library - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * Multiply source vector [s] with b, add result - * to destination vector [d] and set carry c. - * - * Currently supports: - * - * . IA-32 (386+) . AMD64 / EM64T - * . IA-32 (SSE2) . Motorola 68000 - * . PowerPC, 32-bit . MicroBlaze - * . PowerPC, 64-bit . TriCore - * . SPARC v8 . ARM v3+ - * . Alpha . MIPS32 - * . C, longlong . C, generic - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H -#define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H - -#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" - -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" - - -/* - * Conversion macros for embedded constants: - * build lists of mbedtls_mpi_uint's from lists of unsigned char's grouped by 8, 4 or 2 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) - -#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24 ) - -#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, 0, 0 ) - -#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ), \ - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( e, f, g, h ) - -#else /* 64-bits */ - -#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (e) << 32 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (f) << 40 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (g) << 48 ) | \ - ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (h) << 56 ) - -#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) - -#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) - -#endif /* bits in mbedtls_mpi_uint */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) - -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif - -/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ - ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) - -/* - * Disable use of the i386 assembly code below if option -O0, to disable all - * compiler optimisations, is passed, detected with __OPTIMIZE__ - * This is done as the number of registers used in the assembly code doesn't - * work with the -O0 option. - */ -#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" \ - "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" \ - "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" \ - "movl %7, %%ecx \n\t" \ - "movl %8, %%ebx \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "lodsl \n\t" \ - "mull %%ebx \n\t" \ - "addl %%ecx, %%eax \n\t" \ - "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ - "addl (%%edi), %%eax \n\t" \ - "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ - "movl %%edx, %%ecx \n\t" \ - "stosl \n\t" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) - -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ - "movd %%ecx, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd %%ebx, %%mm0 \n\t" \ - "movd (%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd (%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ - "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ - "movd 4(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ - "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ - "movd 8(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ - "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ - "movd 12(%%esi), %%mm7 \n\t" \ - "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm7 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd 4(%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm4, %%mm3 \n\t" \ - "movd 8(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm6, %%mm5 \n\t" \ - "movd 12(%%edi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm4, %%mm7 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, (%%edi) \n\t" \ - "movd 16(%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ - "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ - "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd 20(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ - "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd 24(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ - "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, 4(%%edi) \n\t" \ - "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd 28(%%esi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ - "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm3 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm5, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd 16(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm5, %%mm2 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, 8(%%edi) \n\t" \ - "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm7, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd 20(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm5, %%mm4 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, 12(%%edi) \n\t" \ - "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd 24(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm5, %%mm6 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, 16(%%edi) \n\t" \ - "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm4, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd 28(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm5, %%mm3 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, 20(%%edi) \n\t" \ - "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm6, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, 24(%%edi) \n\t" \ - "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, 28(%%edi) \n\t" \ - "addl $32, %%edi \n\t" \ - "addl $32, %%esi \n\t" \ - "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ - "movd %%mm1, %%ecx \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "emms \n\t" \ - "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ - "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ - "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ - "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ - ); - -#else - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ - "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ - "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ - "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ - ); -#endif /* SSE2 */ -#endif /* i386 */ - -#if defined(__amd64__) || defined (__x86_64__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \ - "mulq %%rbx\n" \ - "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \ - "addq %%rcx, %%rax\n" \ - "movq %%r8, %%rcx\n" \ - "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" \ - "nop \n" \ - "addq %%rax, (%%rdi)\n" \ - "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \ - "addq $8, %%rdi\n" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ - : "b" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ - : "rax", "rdx", "r8" \ - ); - -#endif /* AMD64 */ - -#if defined(__aarch64__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldr x4, [%2], #8 \n\t" \ - "ldr x5, [%1] \n\t" \ - "mul x6, x4, %4 \n\t" \ - "umulh x7, x4, %4 \n\t" \ - "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \ - "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \ - "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \ - "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \ - "str x5, [%1], #8 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - : "+r" (c), "+r" (d), "+r" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ - : "r" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ - : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \ - ); - -#endif /* Aarch64 */ - -#if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "movl %3, %%a2 \n\t" \ - "movl %4, %%a3 \n\t" \ - "movl %5, %%d3 \n\t" \ - "movl %6, %%d2 \n\t" \ - "moveq #0, %%d0 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ - "moveq #0, %%d3 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "movl %%d3, %0 \n\t" \ - "movl %%a3, %1 \n\t" \ - "movl %%a2, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "d0", "d1", "d2", "d3", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ - ); - -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ - "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ - "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" - -#endif /* MC68000 */ - -#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__) - -#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "ld r3, %3 \n\t" \ - "ld r4, %4 \n\t" \ - "ld r5, %5 \n\t" \ - "ld r6, %6 \n\t" \ - "addi r3, r3, -8 \n\t" \ - "addi r4, r4, -8 \n\t" \ - "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldu r7, 8(r3) \n\t" \ - "mulld r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ - "mulhdu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ - "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ - "ld r7, 8(r4) \n\t" \ - "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ - "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ - "stdu r8, 8(r4) \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ - "addi r4, r4, 8 \n\t" \ - "addi r3, r3, 8 \n\t" \ - "std r5, %0 \n\t" \ - "std r4, %1 \n\t" \ - "std r3, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ - ); - - -#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "ld %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ - "ld %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ - "ld %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ - "ld %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ - "addi %%r3, %%r3, -8 \n\t" \ - "addi %%r4, %%r4, -8 \n\t" \ - "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldu %%r7, 8(%%r3) \n\t" \ - "mulld %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ - "mulhdu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ - "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ - "ld %%r7, 8(%%r4) \n\t" \ - "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ - "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ - "stdu %%r8, 8(%%r4) \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ - "addi %%r4, %%r4, 8 \n\t" \ - "addi %%r3, %%r3, 8 \n\t" \ - "std %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ - "std %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ - "std %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ - ); - -#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ - -#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) /* end PPC64/begin PPC32 */ - -#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "lwz r3, %3 \n\t" \ - "lwz r4, %4 \n\t" \ - "lwz r5, %5 \n\t" \ - "lwz r6, %6 \n\t" \ - "addi r3, r3, -4 \n\t" \ - "addi r4, r4, -4 \n\t" \ - "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "lwzu r7, 4(r3) \n\t" \ - "mullw r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ - "mulhwu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ - "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ - "lwz r7, 4(r4) \n\t" \ - "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ - "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ - "stwu r8, 4(r4) \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ - "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" \ - "addi r3, r3, 4 \n\t" \ - "stw r5, %0 \n\t" \ - "stw r4, %1 \n\t" \ - "stw r3, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ - ); - -#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "lwz %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ - "lwz %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ - "lwz %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ - "lwz %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ - "addi %%r3, %%r3, -4 \n\t" \ - "addi %%r4, %%r4, -4 \n\t" \ - "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "lwzu %%r7, 4(%%r3) \n\t" \ - "mullw %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ - "mulhwu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ - "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ - "lwz %%r7, 4(%%r4) \n\t" \ - "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ - "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ - "stwu %%r8, 4(%%r4) \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ - "addi %%r4, %%r4, 4 \n\t" \ - "addi %%r3, %%r3, 4 \n\t" \ - "stw %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ - "stw %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ - "stw %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ - ); - -#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ - -#endif /* PPC32 */ - -/* - * The Sparc(64) assembly is reported to be broken. - * Disable it for now, until we're able to fix it. - */ -#if 0 && defined(__sparc__) -#if defined(__sparc64__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "ldx %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ - "ldx %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ - "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ - "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ - "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ - "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ - "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ - "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ - "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ - "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ - "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ - "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ - "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ - "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" - - #define MULADDC_STOP \ - "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ - "stx %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ - "stx %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ - "o5" \ - ); - -#else /* __sparc64__ */ - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "ld %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ - "ld %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ - "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ - "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ - "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ - "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ - "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ - "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ - "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ - "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ - "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ - "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ - "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ - "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ - "st %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ - "st %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ - "o5" \ - ); - -#endif /* __sparc64__ */ -#endif /* __sparc__ */ - -#if defined(__microblaze__) || defined(microblaze) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "lwi r3, %3 \n\t" \ - "lwi r4, %4 \n\t" \ - "lwi r5, %5 \n\t" \ - "lwi r6, %6 \n\t" \ - "andi r7, r6, 0xffff \n\t" \ - "bsrli r6, r6, 16 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t" \ - "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ - "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" \ - "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ - "mul r10, r9, r6 \n\t" \ - "mul r11, r8, r7 \n\t" \ - "mul r12, r9, r7 \n\t" \ - "mul r13, r8, r6 \n\t" \ - "bsrli r8, r10, 16 \n\t" \ - "bsrli r9, r11, 16 \n\t" \ - "add r13, r13, r8 \n\t" \ - "add r13, r13, r9 \n\t" \ - "bslli r10, r10, 16 \n\t" \ - "bslli r11, r11, 16 \n\t" \ - "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ - "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ - "add r12, r12, r11 \n\t" \ - "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ - "lwi r10, r4, 0 \n\t" \ - "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ - "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ - "add r12, r12, r5 \n\t" \ - "addc r5, r13, r0 \n\t" \ - "swi r12, r4, 0 \n\t" \ - "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "swi r5, %0 \n\t" \ - "swi r4, %1 \n\t" \ - "swi r3, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", \ - "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13" \ - ); - -#endif /* MicroBlaze */ - -#if defined(__tricore__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "ld.a %%a2, %3 \n\t" \ - "ld.a %%a3, %4 \n\t" \ - "ld.w %%d4, %5 \n\t" \ - "ld.w %%d1, %6 \n\t" \ - "xor %%d5, %%d5 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ld.w %%d0, [%%a2+] \n\t" \ - "madd.u %%e2, %%e4, %%d0, %%d1 \n\t" \ - "ld.w %%d0, [%%a3] \n\t" \ - "addx %%d2, %%d2, %%d0 \n\t" \ - "addc %%d3, %%d3, 0 \n\t" \ - "mov %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" \ - "st.w [%%a3+], %%d2 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "st.w %0, %%d4 \n\t" \ - "st.a %1, %%a3 \n\t" \ - "st.a %2, %%a2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "d0", "d1", "e2", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ - ); - -#endif /* TriCore */ - -/* - * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about - * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. - * - * On the other hand, -fomit-frame-pointer is implied by any -Ox options with - * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by - * clang and armcc5 under the same conditions). - * - * So, only use the optimized assembly below for optimized build, which avoids - * the build error and is pretty reasonable anyway. - */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) -#define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7 -#endif - -#if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7) - -#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ - "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ - "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ - "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ - "mov r9, r7 \n\t" \ - "lsl r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r7, #16 \n\t" \ - "mov r8, r7 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldmia r0!, {r6} \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r6, #16 \n\t" \ - "lsl r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ - "lsr r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ - "mov r4, r8 \n\t" \ - "mul r4, r6 \n\t" \ - "mov r3, r9 \n\t" \ - "mul r6, r3 \n\t" \ - "mov r5, r9 \n\t" \ - "mul r5, r7 \n\t" \ - "mov r3, r8 \n\t" \ - "mul r7, r3 \n\t" \ - "lsr r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ - "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ - "lsr r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ - "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ - "add r4, r4, r2 \n\t" \ - "mov r2, #0 \n\t" \ - "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ - "lsl r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ - "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ - "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ - "lsl r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ - "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ - "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ - "ldr r3, [r1] \n\t" \ - "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ - "adc r2, r5 \n\t" \ - "stmia r1!, {r4} \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ - "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ - "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ - "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "cc" \ - ); - -#elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \ - defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldr r0, [%0], #4 \n\t" \ - "ldr r1, [%1] \n\t" \ - "umaal r1, %2, %3, r0 \n\t" \ - "str r1, [%1], #4 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - : "=r" (s), "=r" (d), "=r" (c) \ - : "r" (b), "0" (s), "1" (d), "2" (c) \ - : "r0", "r1", "memory" \ - ); - -#else - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ - "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ - "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ - "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldr r4, [r0], #4 \n\t" \ - "mov r5, #0 \n\t" \ - "ldr r6, [r1] \n\t" \ - "umlal r2, r5, r3, r4 \n\t" \ - "adds r7, r6, r2 \n\t" \ - "adc r2, r5, #0 \n\t" \ - "str r7, [r1], #4 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ - "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ - "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ - "r6", "r7", "cc" \ - ); - -#endif /* Thumb */ - -#endif /* ARMv3 */ - -#if defined(__alpha__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "ldq $1, %3 \n\t" \ - "ldq $2, %4 \n\t" \ - "ldq $3, %5 \n\t" \ - "ldq $4, %6 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldq $6, 0($1) \n\t" \ - "addq $1, 8, $1 \n\t" \ - "mulq $6, $4, $7 \n\t" \ - "umulh $6, $4, $6 \n\t" \ - "addq $7, $3, $7 \n\t" \ - "cmpult $7, $3, $3 \n\t" \ - "ldq $5, 0($2) \n\t" \ - "addq $7, $5, $7 \n\t" \ - "cmpult $7, $5, $5 \n\t" \ - "stq $7, 0($2) \n\t" \ - "addq $2, 8, $2 \n\t" \ - "addq $6, $3, $3 \n\t" \ - "addq $5, $3, $3 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "stq $3, %0 \n\t" \ - "stq $2, %1 \n\t" \ - "stq $1, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "$1", "$2", "$3", "$4", "$5", "$6", "$7" \ - ); -#endif /* Alpha */ - -#if defined(__mips__) && !defined(__mips64) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( \ - "lw $10, %3 \n\t" \ - "lw $11, %4 \n\t" \ - "lw $12, %5 \n\t" \ - "lw $13, %6 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "lw $14, 0($10) \n\t" \ - "multu $13, $14 \n\t" \ - "addi $10, $10, 4 \n\t" \ - "mflo $14 \n\t" \ - "mfhi $9 \n\t" \ - "addu $14, $12, $14 \n\t" \ - "lw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ - "sltu $12, $14, $12 \n\t" \ - "addu $15, $14, $15 \n\t" \ - "sltu $14, $15, $14 \n\t" \ - "addu $12, $12, $9 \n\t" \ - "sw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ - "addu $12, $12, $14 \n\t" \ - "addi $11, $11, 4 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "sw $12, %0 \n\t" \ - "sw $11, %1 \n\t" \ - "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15", "lo", "hi" \ - ); - -#endif /* MIPS */ -#endif /* GNUC */ - -#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - __asm mov esi, s \ - __asm mov edi, d \ - __asm mov ecx, c \ - __asm mov ebx, b - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - __asm lodsd \ - __asm mul ebx \ - __asm add eax, ecx \ - __asm adc edx, 0 \ - __asm add eax, [edi] \ - __asm adc edx, 0 \ - __asm mov ecx, edx \ - __asm stosd - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) - -#define EMIT __asm _emit - -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC9 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC3 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x1F \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x16 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x04 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x08 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0C \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF8 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5F EMIT 0x04 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDC \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x08 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xEE \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x67 EMIT 0x0C \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xFC \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0F \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x56 EMIT 0x10 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x14 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x18 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x04 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5E EMIT 0x1C \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD8 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCD \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x10 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xD5 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x08 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCF \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x14 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xE5 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x0C \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x18 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xF5 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x10 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCC \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x1C \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDD \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x14 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCE \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x18 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x1C \ - EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC7 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC6 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0xC9 - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x77 \ - __asm mov c, ecx \ - __asm mov d, edi \ - __asm mov s, esi \ - -#else - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - __asm mov c, ecx \ - __asm mov d, edi \ - __asm mov s, esi \ - -#endif /* SSE2 */ -#endif /* MSVC */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ - -#if !defined(MULADDC_CORE) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ -{ \ - mbedtls_t_udbl r; \ - mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1; - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - r = *(s++) * (mbedtls_t_udbl) b; \ - r0 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) r; \ - r1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( r >> biL ); \ - r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ - r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ - c = r1; *(d++) = r0; - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ -} - -#else -#define MULADDC_INIT \ -{ \ - mbedtls_mpi_uint s0, s1, b0, b1; \ - mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1, rx, ry; \ - b0 = ( b << biH ) >> biH; \ - b1 = ( b >> biH ); - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - s0 = ( *s << biH ) >> biH; \ - s1 = ( *s >> biH ); s++; \ - rx = s0 * b1; r0 = s0 * b0; \ - ry = s1 * b0; r1 = s1 * b1; \ - r1 += ( rx >> biH ); \ - r1 += ( ry >> biH ); \ - rx <<= biH; ry <<= biH; \ - r0 += rx; r1 += (r0 < rx); \ - r0 += ry; r1 += (r0 < ry); \ - r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ - r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ - c = r1; *(d++) = r0; - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ -} - -#endif /* C (generic) */ -#endif /* C (longlong) */ - -#endif /* bn_mul.h */ diff --git a/constant_time.c b/constant_time.c deleted file mode 100644 index d8870ae..0000000 --- a/constant_time.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,801 +0,0 @@ -/** - * Constant-time functions - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - - /* - * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those - * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. - */ - -#include "common.h" -#include "constant_time_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#include "ssl_misc.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) -#include "constant_time_invasive.h" -#endif - -#include - -int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a, - const void *b, - size_t n ) -{ - size_t i; - volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; - volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; - volatile unsigned char diff = 0; - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) - { - /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. - * This avoids IAR compiler warning: - * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ - unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; - diff |= x ^ y; - } - - return( (int)diff ); -} - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value ) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) - -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value ) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value ) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) - -/** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison: - * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 - * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 - * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero. - */ -static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( size_t x, - size_t y ) -{ - /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */ - const size_t sub = x - y; - - /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */ - const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 ); - - /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */ - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask( sub1 ); - - return( mask ); -} - -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x, - size_t y ) -{ - return( ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( x, y ) ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - -/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise. - * - * Constant flow with respect to c. - */ -MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( unsigned char low, - unsigned char high, - unsigned char c ) -{ - /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ - unsigned low_mask = ( (unsigned) c - low ) >> 8; - /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ - unsigned high_mask = ( (unsigned) high - c ) >> 8; - return( ~( low_mask | high_mask ) & 0xff ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x, - size_t y ) -{ - /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ - const size_t diff = x ^ y; - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ - const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff ); - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ - const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); - - return( 1 ^ diff1 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - -/** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison: - * return x > y - * - * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return 1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0. - */ -static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt( size_t x, - size_t y ) -{ - /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */ - return( ( y - x ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; - mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; - - /* - * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. - */ - cond = ( x ^ y ); - /* - * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and - * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> ( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 - 1 ); - - return (unsigned) ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition, - unsigned if1, - unsigned if0 ) -{ - unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( condition ); - return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -/** Select between two sign values without branches. - * - * This is functionally equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0` but uses only bit - * operations in order to avoid branches. - * - * \note if1 and if0 must be either 1 or -1, otherwise the result - * is undefined. - * - * \param condition Condition to test. - * \param if1 The first sign; must be either +1 or -1. - * \param if0 The second sign; must be either +1 or -1. - * - * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. - * */ -static int mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( unsigned char condition, - int if1, - int if0 ) -{ - /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonably assume about - * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned - * by taking advantage of the fact that if1 and if0 are either +1 or -1. */ - unsigned uif1 = if1 + 1; - unsigned uif0 = if0 + 1; - - /* condition was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are uif1 and uif0 */ - const unsigned mask = condition << 1; - - /* select uif1 or uif0 */ - unsigned ur = ( uif0 & ~mask ) | ( uif1 & mask ); - - /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */ - return( (int) ur - 1 ); -} - -void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, - unsigned char condition ) -{ - size_t i; - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */ - const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition; - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) - dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( unsigned char value ) -{ - unsigned char digit = 0; - /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with - * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, - * only at most one masking will change digit. */ - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 0, 25, value ) & ( 'A' + value ); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 26, 51, value ) & ( 'a' + value - 26 ); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 52, 61, value ) & ( '0' + value - 52 ); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 62, 62, value ) & '+'; - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 63, 63, value ) & '/'; - return( digit ); -} - -signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c ) -{ - unsigned char val = 0; - /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with - * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, - * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus - * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 'A', 'Z', c ) & ( c - 'A' + 0 + 1 ); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 'a', 'z', c ) & ( c - 'a' + 26 + 1 ); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '0', '9', c ) & ( c - '0' + 52 + 1 ); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '+', '+', c ) & ( c - '+' + 62 + 1 ); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '/', '/', c ) & ( c - '/' + 63 + 1 ); - /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is - * a digit with the value v. */ - return( val - 1 ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - -/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. - * - * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally - * equivalent to - * ``` - * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); - * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); - * ``` - * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) - * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at - * the expense of performance. - * - * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. - * \param total Total size of the buffer. - * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. - */ -static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( void *start, - size_t total, - size_t offset ) -{ - volatile unsigned char *buf = start; - size_t i, n; - if( total == 0 ) - return; - for( i = 0; i < total; i++ ) - { - unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( total - offset, i ); - /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last - * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and - * zero out the last byte. */ - for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ ) - { - unsigned char current = buf[n]; - unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; - buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, current, next ); - } - buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 ); - } -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) - -void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t len, - size_t c1, - size_t c2 ) -{ - /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ - const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( c1, c2 ); - const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask( equal ); - - /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */ - for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ ) - dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); -} - -void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t offset, - size_t offset_min, - size_t offset_max, - size_t len ) -{ - size_t offsetval; - - for( offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++ ) - { - mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( dest, src + offsetval, len, - offsetval, offset ); - } -} - -int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *add_data, - size_t add_data_len, - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_len_secret, - size_t min_data_len, - size_t max_data_len, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - /* - * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() - * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. - * - * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means - * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit - * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. - * - * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to - * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen - * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. - * - * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. - */ - const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info ); - /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, - * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ - const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; - const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; - const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; - const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); - - unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - mbedtls_md_context_t aux; - size_t offset; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - mbedtls_md_init( &aux ); - -#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \ - do { \ - ret = (func_call); \ - if( ret != 0 ) \ - goto cleanup; \ - } while( 0 ) - - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) ); - - /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, - * so we can start directly with the message */ - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) ); - - /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ - for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ ) - { - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) ); - /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ - mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size, - offset, data_len_secret ); - - if( offset < max_data_len ) - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) ); - } - - /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) ); - - /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) ); - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); - - /* Done, get ready for next time */ - MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ); - -#undef MD_CHK - -cleanup: - mbedtls_md_free( &aux ); - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) - -/* - * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information - * about whether the assignment was made or not. - * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, - const mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned char assign ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - - /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ - limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( assign );; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); - - X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( assign, Y->s, X->s ); - - mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign ); - - for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ ) - X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information - * about whether the swap was made or not. - * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to - * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, - mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned char swap ) -{ - int ret, s; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - - if( X == Y ) - return( 0 ); - - /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */ - limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( swap ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) ); - - s = X->s; - X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, Y->s, X->s ); - Y->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, s, Y->s ); - - - for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) - { - tmp = X->p[i]; - X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask ); - Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( tmp & limb_mask ); - } - -cleanup: - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Compare signed values in constant time - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, - const mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned *ret ) -{ - size_t i; - /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ - unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL ); - - if( X->n != Y->n ) - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - - /* - * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. - * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. - */ - X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1; - Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1; - - /* - * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. - * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it - * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). - */ - cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative ); - *ret = cond & X_is_negative; - - /* - * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still - * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. - */ - done = cond; - - for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) - { - /* - * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both - * X and Y are negative. - * - * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and - * the fact that we are done and continue looping. - */ - cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] ); - *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative; - done |= cond; - - /* - * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both - * X and Y are positive. - * - * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and - * the fact that we are done and continue looping. - */ - cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] ); - *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative ); - done |= cond; - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - -int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len, - size_t *olen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, plaintext_max_size; - - /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must - * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than - * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise - * this would open the execution of the function to - * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle - * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory - * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access - * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to - * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared - * branch predictor). */ - size_t pad_count = 0; - unsigned bad = 0; - unsigned char pad_done = 0; - size_t plaintext_size = 0; - unsigned output_too_large; - - plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ) ? ilen - 11 - : output_max_len; - - /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant - * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ - bad |= input[0]; - - - /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 - * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ - bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - - /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find - * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ - for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) - { - pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char)-input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; - pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; - } - - - /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 ); - - /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt( 8, pad_count ); - - /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of - * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding - * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the - * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output - * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding - * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the - * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ - plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( - bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, - (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) ); - - /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output - * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ - output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( plaintext_size, - plaintext_max_size ); - - /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: - * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). - * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted - * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. - * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ - ret = - (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if( - bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, - mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large, - - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, - 0 ) ); - - /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the - * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. - * We need to copy the same amount of data - * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to - * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or - * through memory or cache access patterns. */ - bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large ); - for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ ) - input[i] &= ~bad; - - /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. - * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because - * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity - * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ - plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large, - (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, - (unsigned) plaintext_size ); - - /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in - * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from - * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that - * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the - * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive - * information. */ - mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, - plaintext_max_size, - plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size ); - - /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output - * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer - * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined - * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the - * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext - * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other - * secrets. */ - if( output_max_len != 0 ) - memcpy( output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size ); - - /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case - * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen - * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent - * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ - *olen = plaintext_size; - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ diff --git a/constant_time_internal.h b/constant_time_internal.h deleted file mode 100644 index 053cf12..0000000 --- a/constant_time_internal.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,326 +0,0 @@ -/** - * Constant-time functions - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#include "ssl_misc.h" -#endif - -#include - - -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 - * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. - * - * \param value The value to analyze. - * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. - */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) - -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1 - * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. - * - * \param value The value to analyze. - * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. - */ -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -1 - * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. - * - * \param value The value to analyze. - * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. - */ -mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) - -/** Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison: - * - if \p x >= \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 - * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 - * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return All-bits-one if \p x is greater or equal than \p y, - * otherwise zero. - */ -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x, - size_t y ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ - -/** Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: - * return x == y - * - * This is equivalent to \p x == \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return 1 if \p x equals to \p y, otherwise 0. - */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x, - size_t y ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches. - * - * This is equivalent to \p x < \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise 0. - */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -/** Choose between two integer values without branches. - * - * This is equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param condition Condition to test. - * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition is nonzero. - * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition is zero. - * - * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. - */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition, - unsigned if1, - unsigned if0 ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -/** Conditionally assign a value without branches. - * - * This is equivalent to `if ( condition ) dest = src`, but is likely - * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param n \p dest and \p src must be arrays of limbs of size n. - * \param dest The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point - * to an initialized MPI. - * \param src The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an - * initialized MPI. - * \param condition Condition to test, must be 0 or 1. - */ -void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, - unsigned char condition ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - -/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. - * - * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII - * but not EBCDIC). - * - * \param value A value in the range 0..63. - * - * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( unsigned char value ); - -/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. - * - * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), - * return -1. - * - * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII - * but not EBCDIC). - * - * \param c A base64 digit. - * - * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. - */ -signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) - -/** Conditional memcpy without branches. - * - * This is equivalent to `if ( c1 == c2 ) memcpy(dest, src, len)`, but is likely - * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param dest The pointer to conditionally copy to. - * \param src The pointer to copy from. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. - * \param len The number of bytes to copy. - * \param c1 The first value to analyze in the condition. - * \param c2 The second value to analyze in the condition. - */ -void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t len, - size_t c1, size_t c2 ); - -/** Copy data from a secret position with constant flow. - * - * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p - * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p - * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. - * Functionally equivalent to `memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)`. - * - * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable - * buffer of at least \p len bytes. - * \param src The base of the source buffer. This must point to a - * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len - * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. - * \param offset The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. - * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater - * than \p offset_max. - * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset. - * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset. - * \param len The number of bytes to copy. - */ -void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t offset, - size_t offset_min, - size_t offset_max, - size_t len ); - -/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. - * - * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p - * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not - * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p - * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p - * max_data_len bytes from \p data. - * - * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured - * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the - * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. - * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after - * the computation is complete to prepare for the - * next computation. - * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being - * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer - * of \p add_data_len bytes. - * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. - * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the - * message. This must point to a readable buffer - * of \p max_data_len bytes. - * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. - * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no - * greater than \p max_data_len. - * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the - * message, read from \p data. - * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the - * message, read from \p data. - * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to - * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the - * HMAC value. - * - * \retval 0 on success. - * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED - * The hardware accelerator failed. - */ -int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *add_data, - size_t add_data_len, - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_len_secret, - size_t min_data_len, - size_t max_data_len, - unsigned char *output ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - -/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption - * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). - * - * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value - * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen - * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING - * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which - * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. - * - * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 - * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" - * by the terminology. - * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. - * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the - * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of - * length \p output_max_len bytes. - * \param olen The address at which to store the length of - * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. - * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE - * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING - * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. - */ -int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len, - size_t *olen ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/constant_time_invasive.h b/constant_time_invasive.h deleted file mode 100644 index 4620ca1..0000000 --- a/constant_time_invasive.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file constant_time_invasive.h - * - * \brief Constant-time module: interfaces for invasive testing only. - * - * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. - * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when - * building the library for testing. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) - -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, - * return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - * \param low The value to analyze. - * \param high The value to analyze. - * \param c The value to analyze. - * - * \return All-bits-one if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, otherwise zero. - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( unsigned char low, - unsigned char high, - unsigned char c ); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/md.c b/md.c deleted file mode 100644 index a228789..0000000 --- a/md.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,812 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md.c - * - * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for mbed TLS - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "md_wrap.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -#include -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { - "MD5", - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, - 16, - 64, -}; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { - "RIPEMD160", - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, - 20, - 64, -}; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { - "SHA1", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - 20, - 64, -}; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { - "SHA224", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, - 28, - 64, -}; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { - "SHA256", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - 32, - 64, -}; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { - "SHA384", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - 48, - 128, -}; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { - "SHA512", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - 64, - 128, -}; -#endif - -/* - * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! - */ -static const int supported_digests[] = { - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, -#endif - - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; - -const int *mbedtls_md_list( void ) -{ - return( supported_digests ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ) -{ - if( NULL == md_name ) - return( NULL ); - - /* Get the appropriate digest information */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - if( !strcmp( "MD5", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - if( !strcmp( "RIPEMD160", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - if( !strcmp( "SHA1", md_name ) || !strcmp( "SHA", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - if( !strcmp( "SHA224", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if( !strcmp( "SHA256", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - if( !strcmp( "SHA384", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - if( !strcmp( "SHA512", md_name ) ) - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); -#endif - return( NULL ); -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ) -{ - switch( md_type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return( &mbedtls_md5_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return( &mbedtls_ripemd160_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return( &mbedtls_sha1_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return( &mbedtls_sha224_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); -#endif - default: - return( NULL ); - } -} - -void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) -{ - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return; - - if( ctx->md_ctx != NULL ) - { - switch( ctx->md_info->type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - mbedtls_md5_free( ctx->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - mbedtls_ripemd160_free( ctx->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - mbedtls_sha1_free( ctx->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; - } - mbedtls_free( ctx->md_ctx ); - } - - if( ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->hmac_ctx, - 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size ); - mbedtls_free( ctx->hmac_ctx ); - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, - const mbedtls_md_context_t *src ) -{ - if( dst == NULL || dst->md_info == NULL || - src == NULL || src->md_info == NULL || - dst->md_info != src->md_info ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - switch( src->md_info->type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - mbedtls_md5_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - mbedtls_sha1_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); - break; -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#define ALLOC( type ) \ - do { \ - ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_##type##_context ) ); \ - if( ctx->md_ctx == NULL ) \ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ - mbedtls_##type##_init( ctx->md_ctx ); \ - } \ - while( 0 ) - -int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL || ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - ctx->md_info = md_info; - ctx->md_ctx = NULL; - ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL; - - switch( md_info->type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - ALLOC( md5 ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - ALLOC( ripemd160 ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - ALLOC( sha1 ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - ALLOC( sha256 ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - ALLOC( sha256 ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - ALLOC( sha512 ); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - ALLOC( sha512 ); - break; -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - if( hmac != 0 ) - { - ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 2, md_info->block_size ); - if( ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - { - mbedtls_md_free( ctx ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - } - - return( 0 ); -} -#undef ALLOC - -int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - switch( ctx->md_info->type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return( mbedtls_md5_starts( ctx->md_ctx ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( ctx->md_ctx ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return( mbedtls_sha1_starts( ctx->md_ctx ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return( mbedtls_sha256_starts( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return( mbedtls_sha256_starts( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return( mbedtls_sha512_starts( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return( mbedtls_sha512_starts( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -} - -int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - switch( ctx->md_info->type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return( mbedtls_md5_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return( mbedtls_sha1_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return( mbedtls_sha256_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return( mbedtls_sha256_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return( mbedtls_sha512_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return( mbedtls_sha512_update( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -} - -int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - switch( ctx->md_info->type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return( mbedtls_md5_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return( mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return( mbedtls_sha1_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return( mbedtls_sha256_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return( mbedtls_sha256_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return( mbedtls_sha512_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return( mbedtls_sha512_finish( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -} - -int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - switch( md_info->type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return( mbedtls_md5( input, ilen, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return( mbedtls_ripemd160( input, ilen, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return( mbedtls_sha1( input, ilen, output ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return( mbedtls_sha256( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return( mbedtls_sha256( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return( mbedtls_sha512( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return( mbedtls_sha512( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - FILE *f; - size_t n; - mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; - unsigned char buf[1024]; - - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR ); - - mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - while( ( n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) ) > 0 ) - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, buf, n ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - if( ferror( f ) != 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; - else - ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - fclose( f ); - mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - -int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char *ipad, *opad; - size_t i; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( keylen > (size_t) ctx->md_info->block_size ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, sum ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - keylen = ctx->md_info->size; - key = sum; - } - - ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; - opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; - - memset( ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size ); - memset( opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size ); - - for( i = 0; i < keylen; i++ ) - { - ipad[i] = (unsigned char)( ipad[i] ^ key[i] ); - opad[i] = (unsigned char)( opad[i] ^ key[i] ); - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, - ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sum, sizeof( sum ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, input, ilen ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char *opad; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, tmp ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, opad, - ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, tmp, - ctx->md_info->size ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - return( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *ipad; - - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, ctx->md_info->block_size ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, - const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - switch( ctx->md_info->type ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return( mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return( mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return( mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -} - -unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( 0 ); - - return md_info->size; -} - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); - - return md_info->type; -} - -const char *mbedtls_md_get_name( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) -{ - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( NULL ); - - return md_info->name; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ diff --git a/oid.c b/oid.c deleted file mode 100644 index f70ceea..0000000 --- a/oid.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,782 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file oid.c - * - * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) - -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf -#endif - -/* - * Macro to automatically add the size of #define'd OIDs - */ -#define ADD_LEN(s) s, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(s) - -/* - * Macro to generate mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) -#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s), name, description } -#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL } -#else -#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s) } -#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0 } -#endif - -/* - * Macro to generate an internal function for oid_XXX_from_asn1() (used by - * the other functions) - */ -#define FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1( TYPE_T, NAME, LIST ) \ - static const TYPE_T * oid_ ## NAME ## _from_asn1( \ - const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) \ - { \ - const TYPE_T *p = (LIST); \ - const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *cur = \ - (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ - if( p == NULL || oid == NULL ) return( NULL ); \ - while( cur->asn1 != NULL ) { \ - if( cur->asn1_len == oid->len && \ - memcmp( cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len ) == 0 ) { \ - return( p ); \ - } \ - p++; \ - cur = (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ - } \ - return( NULL ); \ - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) -/* - * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from the - * descriptor of an mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. - */ -#define FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ -int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1 ) \ -{ \ - const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ - if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ - *ATTR1 = data->descriptor.ATTR1; \ - return( 0 ); \ -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ - -/* - * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from an - * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. - */ -#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ -int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1 ) \ -{ \ - const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ - if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ - *ATTR1 = data->ATTR1; \ - return( 0 ); \ -} - -/* - * Macro to generate a function for retrieving two attributes from an - * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. - */ -#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ - ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ -int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1, \ - ATTR2_TYPE * ATTR2 ) \ -{ \ - const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ - if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ - *(ATTR1) = data->ATTR1; \ - *(ATTR2) = data->ATTR2; \ - return( 0 ); \ -} - -/* - * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on a single - * attribute from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. - */ -#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ -int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, const char **oid, size_t *olen ) \ -{ \ - const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ - while( cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL ) { \ - if( cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) ) { \ - *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ - *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ - return( 0 ); \ - } \ - cur++; \ - } \ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ -} - -/* - * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on two - * attributes from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. - */ -#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ - ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ -int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE ATTR2, const char **oid , \ - size_t *olen ) \ -{ \ - const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ - while( cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL ) { \ - if( cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) && cur->ATTR2 == (ATTR2) ) { \ - *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ - *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ - return( 0 ); \ - } \ - cur++; \ - } \ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ -} - -/* - * For X520 attribute types - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - const char *short_name; -} oid_x520_attr_t; - -static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] = -{ - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, "id-at-commonName", "Common Name" ), - "CN", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, "id-at-countryName", "Country" ), - "C", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, "id-at-locality", "Locality" ), - "L", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, "id-at-state", "State" ), - "ST", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION,"id-at-organizationName", "Organization" ), - "O", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit" ), - "OU", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, "emailAddress", "E-mail address" ), - "emailAddress", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER,"id-at-serialNumber", "Serial number" ), - "serialNumber", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS,"id-at-postalAddress", "Postal address" ), - "postalAddress", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code" ), - "postalCode", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, "id-at-surName", "Surname" ), - "SN", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, "id-at-givenName", "Given name" ), - "GN", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, "id-at-initials", "Initials" ), - "initials", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, "id-at-generationQualifier", "Generation qualifier" ), - "generationQualifier", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, "id-at-title", "Title" ), - "title", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER,"id-at-dnQualifier", "Distinguished Name qualifier" ), - "dnQualifier", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym" ), - "pseudonym", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_UID, "id-uid", "User Id" ), - "uid", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, "id-domainComponent", "Domain component" ), - "DC", - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER, "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", "Unique Identifier" ), - "uniqueIdentifier", - }, - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - NULL, - } -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x520_attr_t, x520_attr, oid_x520_attr_type) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name, oid_x520_attr_t, x520_attr, const char *, short_name) - -/* - * For X509 extensions - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - int ext_type; -} oid_x509_ext_t; - -static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = -{ - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, "id-ce-basicConstraints", "Basic Constraints" ), - MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" ), - MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, "id-ce-extKeyUsage", "Extended Key Usage" ), - MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, "id-ce-subjectAltName", "Subject Alt Name" ), - MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, "id-netscape-certtype", "Netscape Certificate Type" ), - MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, "id-ce-certificatePolicies", "Certificate Policies" ), - MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, - }, - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - 0, - }, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, oid_x509_ext) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, ext_type) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) -static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] = -{ - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH, "id-kp-serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication" ), - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH, "id-kp-clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication" ), - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING, "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" ), - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION, "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" ), - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING, "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" ), - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING, "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" ), - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN, "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)" ), - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, const char *, description) - -static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] = -{ - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, "anyPolicy", "Any Policy" ), - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, const char *, description) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -/* - * For SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; -} oid_sig_alg_t; - -static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] = -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5, "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224, "sha224WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-224" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256, "sha256WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-256" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384, "sha384WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-384" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512, "sha512WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-512" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1, "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224, "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, - }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256, "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384, "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512, "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS, "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, - }, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, oid_sig_alg) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) -FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, const char *, description) -#endif - -FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) -FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, oid_sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ - -/* - * For PublicKeyInfo (PKCS1, RFC 5480) - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; -} oid_pk_alg_t; - -static const oid_pk_alg_t oid_pk_alg[] = -{ - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA, "rsaEncryption", "RSA" ), - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED, "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key" ), - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH, "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH" ), - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, - }, - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, - }, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, oid_pk_alg) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg, oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) -FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg, oid_pk_alg_t, oid_pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * For namedCurve (RFC 5480) - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; -} oid_ecp_grp_t; - -static const oid_ecp_grp_t oid_ecp_grp[] = -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1", "secp192r1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1", "secp224r1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1", "secp256r1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1", "secp384r1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1", "secp521r1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1", "secp192k1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1", "secp224k1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1", "secp256k1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1","brainpool256r1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1","brainpool384r1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1","brainpool512r1" ), - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, - }, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, oid_ecp_grp) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) -FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp_t, oid_ecp_grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) -/* - * For PKCS#5 PBES2 encryption algorithm - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; -} oid_cipher_alg_t; - -static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = -{ - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC, "desCBC", "DES-CBC" ), - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC" ), - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, - }, - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, - }, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t, cipher_alg) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -/* - * For digestAlgorithm - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; -} oid_md_alg_t; - -static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] = -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5, "id-md5", "MD5" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, "id-sha1", "SHA-1" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, "id-sha224", "SHA-224" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, - }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, "id-sha256", "SHA-256" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, "id-sha384", "SHA-384" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, "id-sha512", "SHA-512" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160, "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, - }, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, oid_md_alg) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg, oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) -FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md, oid_md_alg_t, oid_md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) - -/* - * For HMAC digestAlgorithm - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_hmac; -} oid_md_hmac_t; - -static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] = -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1, "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224, "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, - }, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256, "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384, "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512, "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, - }, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, oid_md_hmac) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac, oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_hmac) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) -/* - * For PKCS#12 PBEs - */ -typedef struct { - mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; -} oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t; - -static const oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg[] = -{ - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC, "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, - }, - { - OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC, "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES" ), - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, - }, - { - NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, - }, -}; - -FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg) -FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pbe_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t, cipher_alg) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ - -#define OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF \ - do { \ - if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n ) \ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); \ - \ - n -= (size_t) ret; \ - p += (size_t) ret; \ - } while( 0 ) - -/* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */ -int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, - const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, n; - unsigned int value; - char *p; - - p = buf; - n = size; - - /* First byte contains first two dots */ - if( oid->len > 0 ) - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%d.%d", oid->p[0] / 40, oid->p[0] % 40 ); - OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } - - value = 0; - for( i = 1; i < oid->len; i++ ) - { - /* Prevent overflow in value. */ - if( ( ( value << 7 ) >> 7 ) != value ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); - - value <<= 7; - value += oid->p[i] & 0x7F; - - if( !( oid->p[i] & 0x80 ) ) - { - /* Last byte */ - ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ".%u", value ); - OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - value = 0; - } - } - - return( (int) ( size - n ) ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ diff --git a/platform_util.c b/platform_util.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3d5cb5b..0000000 --- a/platform_util.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,138 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS - * library. - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -/* - * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before - * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. - */ -#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) -#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L -#endif - -#include "common.h" - -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/threading.h" - -#include -#include - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) -/* - * This implementation should never be optimized out by the compiler - * - * This implementation for mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was inspired from Colin - * Percival's blog article at: - * - * http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-04-how-to-zero-a-buffer.html - * - * It uses a volatile function pointer to the standard memset(). Because the - * pointer is volatile the compiler expects it to change at - * any time and will not optimize out the call that could potentially perform - * other operations on the input buffer instead of just setting it to 0. - * Nevertheless, as pointed out by davidtgoldblatt on Hacker News - * (refer to http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-05-erratum.html for - * details), optimizations of the following form are still possible: - * - * if( memset_func != memset ) - * memset_func( buf, 0, len ); - * - * Note that it is extremely difficult to guarantee that - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers - * in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed TLS also provides the configuration - * option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their - * platform and needs. - */ -static void * (* const volatile memset_func)( void *, int, size_t ) = memset; - -void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ) -{ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( len == 0 || buf != NULL ); - - if( len > 0 ) - memset_func( buf, 0, len ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) -#include -#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ - defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ - defined(__MACH__))) -#include -#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || - * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ - -#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ - ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ - _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) -/* - * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long - * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in - * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and - * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so - * we keep it private by only defining it in this file - */ -#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) -#define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME -#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ - -#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ - ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ - _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ - -struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt, - struct tm *tm_buf ) -{ -#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) - return( ( gmtime_s( tm_buf, tt ) == 0 ) ? tm_buf : NULL ); -#elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) - return( gmtime_r( tt, tm_buf ) ); -#else - struct tm *lt; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 ) - return( NULL ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ - - lt = gmtime( tt ); - - if( lt != NULL ) - { - memcpy( tm_buf, lt, sizeof( struct tm ) ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 ) - return( NULL ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ - - return( ( lt == NULL ) ? NULL : tm_buf ); -#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) -void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)( const char *, int, const char *); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ - diff --git a/rsa.c b/rsa.c deleted file mode 100644 index 36f487f..0000000 --- a/rsa.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2511 +0,0 @@ -/* - * The RSA public-key cryptosystem - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -/* - * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation - * of the RSA algorithm: - * - * [1] A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems - * R Rivest, A Shamir, and L Adleman - * http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RSA78 - * - * [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8 - * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone - * - * [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks - * Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and - * Stefan Mangard - * https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2 - * - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "constant_time_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) -#include -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) -#define RSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) - -int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - const mbedtls_mpi *N, - const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - - if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->N, N ) ) != 0 ) || - ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 ) || - ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->Q, Q ) ) != 0 ) || - ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->D, D ) ) != 0 ) || - ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->E, E ) ) != 0 ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); - } - - if( N != NULL ) - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len, - unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len, - unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len, - unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len, - unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len ) -{ - int ret = 0; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - - if( N != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) ); - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); - } - - if( P != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) ); - - if( Q != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) ); - - if( D != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) ); - - if( E != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) ); - -cleanup: - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Checks whether the context fields are set in such a way - * that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error. - * It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters. - */ -static int rsa_check_context( mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv, - int blinding_needed ) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether - * P,Q need to be present or not. */ - ((void) blinding_needed); -#endif - - if( ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ) || - ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - /* - * 1. Modular exponentiation needs positive, odd moduli. - */ - - /* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for - * RSA public key operations. */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->N, 0 ) == 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only - * used for private key operations and if CRT - * is used. */ - if( is_priv && - ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->Q, 0 ) == 0 ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - - /* - * 2. Exponents must be positive - */ - - /* Always need E for public key operations */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) <= 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ - * as (unblinded) exponents. */ - if( is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) <= 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -#else - if( is_priv && - ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) <= 0 ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - - /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either, - * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been - * done as part of 1. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - if( is_priv && blinding_needed && - ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -#endif - - /* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied, - * but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - if( is_priv && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) <= 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) -{ - int ret = 0; - int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP; -#endif - int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - - have_N = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 ); - have_P = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 ); - have_Q = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 ); - have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 ); - have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 ); - have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 ); - have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 ); -#endif - - /* - * Check whether provided parameters are enough - * to deduce all others. The following incomplete - * parameter sets for private keys are supported: - * - * (1) P, Q missing. - * (2) D and potentially N missing. - * - */ - - n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E; - pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E; - d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E; - is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E; - - /* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */ - is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing; - - if( !is_priv && !is_pub ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided. - */ - - if( !have_N && have_P && have_Q ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, - &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); - } - - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); - } - - /* - * Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters. - */ - - if( pq_missing ) - { - ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D, - &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); - - } - else if( d_missing ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( &ctx->P, - &ctx->Q, - &ctx->E, - &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); - } - } - - /* - * Step 3: Deduce all additional parameters specific - * to our current RSA implementation. - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) ) - { - ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, - &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ); - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - - /* - * Step 3: Basic sanity checks - */ - - return( rsa_check_context( ctx, is_priv, 1 ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - unsigned char *N, size_t N_len, - unsigned char *P, size_t P_len, - unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len, - unsigned char *D, size_t D_len, - unsigned char *E, size_t E_len ) -{ - int ret = 0; - int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - - /* Check if key is private or public */ - is_priv = - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; - - if( !is_priv ) - { - /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, - * something must be wrong. */ - if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - } - - if( N != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) ); - - if( P != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) ); - - if( Q != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) ); - - if( D != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) ); - - if( E != NULL ) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) ); - -cleanup: - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, - mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - - /* Check if key is private or public */ - is_priv = - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; - - if( !is_priv ) - { - /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, - * something must be wrong. */ - if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - } - - /* Export all requested core parameters. */ - - if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( N, &ctx->N ) ) != 0 ) || - ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( P, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) || - ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) || - ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( D, &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) || - ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( E, &ctx->E ) ) != 0 ) ) - { - return( ret ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Export CRT parameters - * This must also be implemented if CRT is not used, for being able to - * write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt - * can be used in this case. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - - /* Check if key is private or public */ - is_priv = - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; - - if( !is_priv ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* Export all requested blinding parameters. */ - if( ( DP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DP, &ctx->DP ) ) != 0 ) || - ( DQ != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DQ, &ctx->DQ ) ) != 0 ) || - ( QP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( QP, &ctx->QP ) ) != 0 ) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); - } -#else - if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, - DP, DQ, QP ) ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); - } -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Initialize an RSA context - */ -void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) -{ - RSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); - - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); - - ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15; - ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been - * initialized and will need to be freed. */ - ctx->ver = 1; - mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); -#endif -} - -/* - * Set padding for an existing RSA context - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id ) -{ - switch( padding ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - break; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - break; -#endif - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); - } - - if( ( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) && - ( hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) ) - { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_id ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); - } - - ctx->padding = padding; - ctx->hash_id = hash_id; - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus - */ - -size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) -{ - return( ctx->len ); -} - - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) - -/* - * Generate an RSA keypair - * - * This generation method follows the RSA key pair generation procedure of - * FIPS 186-4 if 2^16 < exponent < 2^256 and nbits = 2048 or nbits = 3072. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - unsigned int nbits, int exponent ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; - int prime_quality = 0; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); - - /* - * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of - * the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error - * rate of 2^-80 is sufficient. - */ - if( nbits > 1024 ) - prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &H ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); - - if( nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - /* - * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that: - * 1. |P-Q| > 2^( nbits / 2 - 100 ) - * 2. GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 - * 3. E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) > 2^( nbits / 2 ) - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->E, exponent ) ); - - do - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1, - prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, - prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &H ) <= ( ( nbits >= 200 ) ? ( ( nbits >> 1 ) - 99 ) : 0 ) ) - continue; - - /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P > Q */ - if( H.s < 0 ) - mbedtls_mpi_swap( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ); - - /* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); - - /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a)) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 ) - continue; - - /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &L, NULL, &H, &G ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->D ) <= ( ( nbits + 1 ) / 2 ) ) // (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(a)) - continue; - - break; - } - while( 1 ); - - /* Restore P,Q */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); - - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* - * DP = D mod (P - 1) - * DQ = D mod (Q - 1) - * QP = Q^-1 mod P - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, - &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - - /* Double-check */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( ctx ) ); - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &H ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_rsa_free( ctx ); - - if( ( -ret & ~0x7f ) == 0 ) - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret ); - return( ret ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ - -/* - * Check a public RSA key - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) -{ - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - - if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) < 128 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - } - - if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->E, 0 ) == 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->E ) < 2 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->E, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) -{ - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - - if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) != 0 || - rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */ ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - } - - if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, - &ctx->D, &ctx->E, NULL, NULL ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - else if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, - &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - } -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Check if contexts holding a public and private key match - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, - const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv ) -{ - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); - - if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( pub ) != 0 || - mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( prv ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - } - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->N, &prv->N ) != 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->E, &prv->E ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Do an RSA public key operation - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t olen; - mbedtls_mpi T; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - - if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - olen = ctx->len; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) ); - -cleanup: -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); -#endif - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of: - * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, - * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer - * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. - */ -static int rsa_prepare_blinding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret, count = 0; - mbedtls_mpi R; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); - - if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL ) - { - /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) ); - - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */ - do { - if( count++ > 10 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - - /* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); - - /* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R - * are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know - * which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them. - * (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */ - ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ); - if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) - goto cleanup; - - } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); - - /* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); - - /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N - * (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); - - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple - * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, - * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3]. - * - * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n) - * observations on avarage. - * - * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has - * to make 2^112 observations on avarage. - * - * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048 - * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys. - * Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by - * side-channel attacks like the one in [3]) - * - * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a - * single trace. - */ -#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28 - -/* - * Do an RSA private key operation - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t olen; - - /* Temporary holding the result */ - mbedtls_mpi T; - - /* Temporaries holding P-1, Q-1 and the - * exponent blinding factor, respectively. */ - mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R; - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* Temporaries holding the results mod p resp. mod q. */ - mbedtls_mpi TP, TQ; - - /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for - * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ - mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; - - /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; - mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; -#else - /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ - mbedtls_mpi D_blind; - - /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - - /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double - * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ - mbedtls_mpi I, C; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - - if( f_rng == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, - 1 /* blinding on */ ) != 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); -#endif - - /* MPI Initialization */ - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind ); -#else - mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind ); -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_init( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TQ ); -#endif - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &I ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); - - /* End of MPI initialization */ - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &I, &T ) ); - - /* - * Blinding - * T = T * Vi mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); - - /* - * Exponent blinding - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* - * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) ); - - D = &D_blind; -#else - /* - * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind, - &ctx->DP ) ); - - DP = &DP_blind; - - /* - * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, - &ctx->DQ ) ); - - DQ = &DQ_blind; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); -#else - /* - * Faster decryption using the CRT - * - * TP = input ^ dP mod P - * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q - */ - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) ); - - /* - * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &TP, &TQ ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->QP ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &TP, &ctx->P ) ); - - /* - * T = TQ + T * Q - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->Q ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &TQ, &TP ) ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - - /* - * Unblind - * T = T * Vf mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); - - /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &C, &T, &ctx->E, - &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &C, &I ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - olen = ctx->len; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) ); - -cleanup: -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); -#endif - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &P1 ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind ); -#else - mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind ); -#endif - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TQ ); -#endif - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &I ); - - if( ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret ) ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -/** - * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer. - * - * \param dst buffer to mask - * \param dlen length of destination buffer - * \param src source of the mask generation - * \param slen length of the source buffer - * \param md_ctx message digest context to use - */ -static int mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, - size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx ) -{ - unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char counter[4]; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned int hlen; - size_t i, use_len; - int ret = 0; - - memset( mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); - memset( counter, 0, 4 ); - - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); - - /* Generate and apply dbMask */ - p = dst; - - while( dlen > 0 ) - { - use_len = hlen; - if( dlen < hlen ) - use_len = dlen; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, src, slen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, mask ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i ) - *p++ ^= mask[i]; - - counter[3]++; - - dlen -= use_len; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mask, sizeof( mask ) ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, - size_t ilen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - size_t olen; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *p = output; - unsigned int hlen; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); - - if( f_rng == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - olen = ctx->len; - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - - /* first comparison checks for overflow */ - if( ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - memset( output, 0, olen ); - - *p++ = 0; - - /* Generate a random octet string seed */ - if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); - - p += hlen; - - /* Construct DB */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, p ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - p += hlen; - p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen; - *p++ = 1; - if( ilen != 0 ) - memcpy( p, input, ilen ); - - mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ - if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen, - &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */ - if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, - &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, size_t ilen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - size_t nb_pad, olen; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *p = output; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - - olen = ctx->len; - - /* first comparison checks for overflow */ - if( ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; - - *p++ = 0; - - if( f_rng == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - - while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) - { - int rng_dl = 100; - - do { - ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 ); - } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 ); - - /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ - if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); - - p++; - } - - *p++ = 0; - if( ilen != 0 ) - memcpy( p, input, ilen ); - - return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ - -/* - * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - size_t ilen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - - switch( ctx->padding ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, - ilen, input, output ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, - ilen, input, output ); -#endif - - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, - size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t ilen, i, pad_len; - unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned int hlen; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - - /* - * Parameters sanity checks - */ - if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - ilen = ctx->len; - - if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - - // checking for integer underflow - if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * RSA operation - */ - ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - /* - * Unmask data and generate lHash - */ - mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - goto cleanup; - } - - /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */ - if( ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, - &md_ctx ) ) != 0 || - /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */ - ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen, - &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - goto cleanup; - } - - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - - /* Generate lHash */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - /* - * Check contents, in "constant-time" - */ - p = buf; - bad = 0; - - bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ - - p += hlen; /* Skip seed */ - - /* Check lHash */ - for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ ) - bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++; - - /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer - * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */ - pad_len = 0; - pad_done = 0; - for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ ) - { - pad_done |= p[i]; - pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; - } - - p += pad_len; - bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01; - - /* - * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not - * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the - * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between - * the different error conditions. - */ - if( bad != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; - goto cleanup; - } - - *olen = ilen - (p - buf); - if( *olen != 0 ) - memcpy( output, p, *olen ); - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( lhash, sizeof( lhash ) ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t ilen; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - - ilen = ctx->len; - - if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( buf, ilen, - output, output_max_len, olen ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ - -/* - * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len) -{ - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); - - switch( ctx->padding ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen, - input, output, output_max_len ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, - olen, input, output, - output_max_len ); -#endif - - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - int saltlen, - unsigned char *sig ) -{ - size_t olen; - unsigned char *p = sig; - unsigned char *salt = NULL; - size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t msb; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0 ) || - hash != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); - - if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( f_rng == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - olen = ctx->len; - - if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - { - /* Gather length of hash to sign */ - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - - if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) - { - /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. - * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length - * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not - * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is - * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most - * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 - * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */ - min_slen = hlen - 2; - if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 ) - slen = hlen; - else - slen = olen - hlen - 2; - } - else if ( (saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen) ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - else - { - slen = (size_t) saltlen; - } - - memset( sig, 0, olen ); - - /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */ - msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; - p += olen - hlen - slen - 2; - *p++ = 0x01; - - /* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */ - salt = p; - if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); - - p += slen; - - mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, p ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ - if( msb % 8 == 0 ) - offset = 1; - - /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ - if( ( ret = mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, - &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; - sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb ); - - p += hlen; - *p++ = 0xBC; - -exit: - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - return mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ); -} - -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with - * the option to pass in the salt length. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - int saltlen, - unsigned char *sig ) -{ - return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig ); -} - - -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig ) -{ - return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function - */ - -/* Construct a PKCS v1.5 encoding of a hashed message - * - * This is used both for signature generation and verification. - * - * Parameters: - * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; - * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. - * - hashlen: Length of hash. Must match md_alg if that's not NONE. - * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. - * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. - * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. - * - * Assumptions: - * - hash has size hashlen. - * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. - * - */ -static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - size_t dst_len, - unsigned char *dst ) -{ - size_t oid_size = 0; - size_t nb_pad = dst_len; - unsigned char *p = dst; - const char *oid = NULL; - - /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */ - if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a - * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ - if( 8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 || - 10 + hashlen < hashlen || - 10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Static bounds check: - * - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs. - * (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of - * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification) - * - Need hashlen bytes for hash - * - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID. - */ - if( nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size; - } - else - { - if( nb_pad < hashlen ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - nb_pad -= hashlen; - } - - /* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes), - * and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */ - if( nb_pad < 3 + 8 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - nb_pad -= 3; - - /* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled - * with padding, and at least 8 bytes long. */ - - /* Write signature header and padding */ - *p++ = 0; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad ); - p += nb_pad; - *p++ = 0; - - /* Are we signing raw data? */ - if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - { - memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); - return( 0 ); - } - - /* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure - * - * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { - * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, - * digest Digest } - * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier - * Digest ::= OCTET STRING - * - * Schematic: - * TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-OID + LEN [ OID ] - * TAG-NULL + LEN [ NULL ] ] - * TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ] - */ - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen ); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x04 + oid_size ); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - *p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size; - memcpy( p, oid, oid_size ); - p += oid_size; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - *p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen; - memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); - p += hashlen; - - /* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic - * after the initial bounds check. */ - if( p != dst + dst_len ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( dst, dst_len ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0 ) || - hash != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); - - if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* - * Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier) - */ - - if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, - ctx->len, sig ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* Private key operation - * - * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a - * temporary buffer and check it before returning it. - */ - - sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len ); - if( sig_try == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); - - verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len ); - if( verif == NULL ) - { - mbedtls_free( sig_try ); - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) ); - - if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sig_try, ctx->len ); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( verif, ctx->len ); - mbedtls_free( sig_try ); - mbedtls_free( verif ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - memset( sig, '!', ctx->len ); - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ - -/* - * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig ) -{ - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0 ) || - hash != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); - - switch( ctx->padding ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, - md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig ); -#endif - - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id, - int expected_salt_len, - const unsigned char *sig ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t siglen; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *hash_start; - unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char zeros[8]; - unsigned int hlen; - size_t observed_salt_len, msb; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0 ) || - hash != NULL ); - - siglen = ctx->len; - - if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf ); - - if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - p = buf; - - if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); - - if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - { - /* Gather length of hash to sign */ - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id ); - if( md_info == NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); - - memset( zeros, 0, 8 ); - - /* - * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits - */ - msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; - - if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ - if( msb % 8 == 0 ) - { - p++; - siglen -= 1; - } - - if( siglen < hlen + 2 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1; - - mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); - if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - ret = mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb ); - - while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 ) - p++; - - if( *p++ != 0x01 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto exit; - } - - observed_salt_len = hash_start - p; - - if( expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && - observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto exit; - } - - /* - * Generate H = Hash( M' ) - */ - ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ); - if ( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 ); - if ( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ); - if ( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len ); - if ( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, result ); - if ( ret != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - const unsigned char *sig ) -{ - mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0 ) || - hash != NULL ); - - mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) - ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id - : md_alg; - - return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, - md_alg, hashlen, hash, - mgf1_hash_id, - MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, - sig ) ); - -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) -/* - * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - const unsigned char *sig ) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t sig_len; - unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0 ) || - hash != NULL ); - - sig_len = ctx->len; - - /* - * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. - */ - - if( ( encoded = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL || - ( encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len, - encoded_expected ) ) != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - /* - * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. - */ - - ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto cleanup; - - /* - * Compare - */ - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected, - sig_len ) ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - -cleanup: - - if( encoded != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded, sig_len ); - mbedtls_free( encoded ); - } - - if( encoded_expected != NULL ) - { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded_expected, sig_len ); - mbedtls_free( encoded_expected ); - } - - return( ret ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ - -/* - * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - const unsigned char *sig ) -{ - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0 ) || - hash != NULL ); - - switch( ctx->padding ) - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig ); -#endif - - default: - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); - } -} - -/* - * Copy the components of an RSA key - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); - - dst->len = src->len; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->N, &src->N ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->E, &src->E ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->D, &src->D ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->P, &src->P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Q, &src->Q ) ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DP, &src->DP ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DQ, &src->DQ ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->QP, &src->QP ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RP, &src->RP ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RQ, &src->RQ ) ); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RN, &src->RN ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vi, &src->Vi ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vf, &src->Vf ) ); - - dst->padding = src->padding; - dst->hash_id = src->hash_id; - -cleanup: - if( ret != 0 ) - mbedtls_rsa_free( dst ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Free the components of an RSA key - */ -void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RN ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->D ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->E ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->N ); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DP ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - /* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */ - if( ctx->ver != 0 ) - { - mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); - ctx->ver = 0; - } -#endif -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" - -/* - * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes - */ -#define KEY_LEN 128 - -#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \ - "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \ - "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \ - "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \ - "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \ - "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \ - "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \ - "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79" - -#define RSA_E "10001" - -#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \ - "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \ - "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \ - "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \ - "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \ - "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \ - "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \ - "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D" - -#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \ - "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \ - "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \ - "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57" - -#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \ - "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \ - "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \ - "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF" - -#define PT_LEN 24 -#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \ - "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) -static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) -{ -#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) - size_t i; - - if( rng_state != NULL ) - rng_state = NULL; - - for( i = 0; i < len; ++i ) - output[i] = rand(); -#else - if( rng_state != NULL ) - rng_state = NULL; - - arc4random_buf( output, len ); -#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */ - - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int ret = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - size_t len; - mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; - unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN]; - unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN]; - unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - unsigned char sha1sum[20]; -#endif - - mbedtls_mpi K; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_N ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_P ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_Q ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_D ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_E ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K ) ); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) ); - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " RSA key validation: " ); - - if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &rsa ) != 0 || - mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : " ); - - memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN ); - - if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, - PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, - rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " ); - - if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, - &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, - sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " PKCS#1 data sign : " ); - - if( mbedtls_sha1( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - return( 1 ); - } - - if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, - sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " ); - - if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, - sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - - ret = 1; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); - mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); -#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ - ((void) verbose); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/rsa_alt_helpers.c b/rsa_alt_helpers.c deleted file mode 100644 index dff2d93..0000000 --- a/rsa_alt_helpers.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,486 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Helper functions for the RSA module - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" - -/* - * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents - * - * Summary of algorithm: - * Setting F := lcm(P-1,Q-1), the idea is as follows: - * - * (a) For any 1 <= X < N with gcd(X,N)=1, we have X^F = 1 modulo N, so X^(F/2) - * is a square root of 1 in Z/NZ. Since Z/NZ ~= Z/PZ x Z/QZ by CRT and the - * square roots of 1 in Z/PZ and Z/QZ are +1 and -1, this leaves the four - * possibilities X^(F/2) = (+-1, +-1). If it happens that X^(F/2) = (-1,+1) - * or (+1,-1), then gcd(X^(F/2) + 1, N) will be equal to one of the prime - * factors of N. - * - * (b) If we don't know F/2 but (F/2) * K for some odd (!) K, then the same - * construction still applies since (-)^K is the identity on the set of - * roots of 1 in Z/NZ. - * - * The public and private key primitives (-)^E and (-)^D are mutually inverse - * bijections on Z/NZ if and only if (-)^(DE) is the identity on Z/NZ, i.e. - * if and only if DE - 1 is a multiple of F, say DE - 1 = F * L. - * Splitting L = 2^t * K with K odd, we have - * - * DE - 1 = FL = (F/2) * (2^(t+1)) * K, - * - * so (F / 2) * K is among the numbers - * - * (DE - 1) >> 1, (DE - 1) >> 2, ..., (DE - 1) >> ord - * - * where ord is the order of 2 in (DE - 1). - * We can therefore iterate through these numbers apply the construction - * of (a) and (b) above to attempt to factor N. - * - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( mbedtls_mpi const *N, - mbedtls_mpi const *E, mbedtls_mpi const *D, - mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q ) -{ - int ret = 0; - - uint16_t attempt; /* Number of current attempt */ - uint16_t iter; /* Number of squares computed in the current attempt */ - - uint16_t order; /* Order of 2 in DE - 1 */ - - mbedtls_mpi T; /* Holds largest odd divisor of DE - 1 */ - mbedtls_mpi K; /* Temporary holding the current candidate */ - - const unsigned char primes[] = { 2, - 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, - 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, - 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, - 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, - 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, - 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, - 229, 233, 239, 241, 251 - }; - - const size_t num_primes = sizeof( primes ) / sizeof( *primes ); - - if( P == NULL || Q == NULL || P->p != NULL || Q->p != NULL ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 1 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( D, N ) >= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 1 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( E, N ) >= 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - /* - * Initializations and temporary changes - */ - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); - - /* T := DE - 1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, D, E ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &T, &T, 1 ) ); - - if( ( order = (uint16_t) mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &T ) ) == 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - /* After this operation, T holds the largest odd divisor of DE - 1. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &T, order ) ); - - /* - * Actual work - */ - - /* Skip trying 2 if N == 1 mod 8 */ - attempt = 0; - if( N->p[0] % 8 == 1 ) - attempt = 1; - - for( ; attempt < num_primes; ++attempt ) - { - mbedtls_mpi_lset( &K, primes[attempt] ); - - /* Check if gcd(K,N) = 1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( P, &K, N ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) != 0 ) - continue; - - /* Go through K^T + 1, K^(2T) + 1, K^(4T) + 1, ... - * and check whether they have nontrivial GCD with N. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &K, &K, &T, N, - Q /* temporarily use Q for storing Montgomery - * multiplication helper values */ ) ); - - for( iter = 1; iter <= order; ++iter ) - { - /* If we reach 1 prematurely, there's no point - * in continuing to square K */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 1 ) == 0 ) - break; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( P, &K, N ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) == 1 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( P, N ) == -1 ) - { - /* - * Have found a nontrivial divisor P of N. - * Set Q := N / P. - */ - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( Q, NULL, N, P ) ); - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, &K, &K ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, N ) ); - } - - /* - * If we get here, then either we prematurely aborted the loop because - * we reached 1, or K holds primes[attempt]^(DE - 1) mod N, which must - * be 1 if D,E,N were consistent. - * Check if that's the case and abort if not, to avoid very long, - * yet eventually failing, computations if N,D,E were not sane. - */ - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 1 ) != 0 ) - { - break; - } - } - - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Given P, Q and the public exponent E, deduce D. - * This is essentially a modular inversion. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( mbedtls_mpi const *P, - mbedtls_mpi const *Q, - mbedtls_mpi const *E, - mbedtls_mpi *D ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_mpi K, L; - - if( D == NULL || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 0 ) != 0 ) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( Q, 1 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) == 0 ) - { - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - } - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); - - /* Temporarily put K := P-1 and L := Q-1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, Q, 1 ) ); - - /* Temporarily put D := gcd(P-1, Q-1) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( D, &K, &L ) ); - - /* K := LCM(P-1, Q-1) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &K, NULL, &K, D ) ); - - /* Compute modular inverse of E in LCM(P-1, Q-1) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( D, E, &K ) ); - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); - - return( ret ); -} - -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, - mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_mpi K; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - - /* DP = D mod P-1 */ - if( DP != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DP, D, &K ) ); - } - - /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ - if( DQ != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DQ, D, &K ) ); - } - - /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ - if( QP != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( QP, Q, P ) ); - } - -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Check that core RSA parameters are sane. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, - const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, - const mbedtls_mpi *E, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ) -{ - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_mpi K, L; - - mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); - - /* - * Step 1: If PRNG provided, check that P and Q are prime - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) - /* - * When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error - * rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as - * well. - */ - if( f_rng != NULL && P != NULL && - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( P, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - if( f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL && - ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } -#else - ((void) f_rng); - ((void) p_rng); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ - - /* - * Step 2: Check that 1 < N = P * Q - */ - - if( P != NULL && Q != NULL && N != NULL ) - { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, P, Q ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &K, N ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - /* - * Step 3: Check and 1 < D, E < N if present. - */ - - if( N != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL ) - { - if ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 1 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 1 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( D, N ) >= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( E, N ) >= 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - /* - * Step 4: Check that D, E are inverse modulo P-1 and Q-1 - */ - - if( P != NULL && Q != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL ) - { - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) <= 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( Q, 1 ) <= 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Compute DE-1 mod P-1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, D, E ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Compute DE-1 mod Q-1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, D, E ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, Q, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); - - /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ - if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ) - { - ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - } - - return( ret ); -} - -/* - * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, - const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ) -{ - int ret = 0; - - mbedtls_mpi K, L; - mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); - - /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ - if( DP != NULL ) - { - if( P == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DP, D ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ - if( DQ != NULL ) - { - if( Q == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DQ, D ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); - - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - } - - /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ - if( QP != NULL ) - { - if( P == NULL || Q == NULL ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, QP, Q ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, P ) ); - if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - } - -cleanup: - - /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ - if( ret != 0 && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) - { - ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - } - - mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); - mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/rsa_alt_helpers.h b/rsa_alt_helpers.h deleted file mode 100644 index d6fc8e5..0000000 --- a/rsa_alt_helpers.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,220 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file rsa_alt_helpers.h - * - * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions - * - * This module declares some RSA-related helper functions useful when - * implementing the RSA interface. These functions are provided in a separate - * compilation unit in order to make it easy for designers of alternative RSA - * implementations to use them in their own code, as it is conceived that the - * functionality they provide will be necessary for most complete - * implementations. - * - * End-users of Mbed TLS who are not providing their own alternative RSA - * implementations should not use these functions directly, and should instead - * use only the functions declared in rsa.h. - * - * The interface provided by this module will be maintained through LTS (Long - * Term Support) branches of Mbed TLS, but may otherwise be subject to change, - * and must be considered an internal interface of the library. - * - * There are two classes of helper functions: - * - * (1) Parameter-generating helpers. These are: - * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes - * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent - * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt - * Each of these functions takes a set of core RSA parameters and - * generates some other, or CRT related parameters. - * - * (2) Parameter-checking helpers. These are: - * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_params - * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt - * They take a set of core or CRT related RSA parameters and check their - * validity. - * - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H - -#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" - -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - - -/** - * \brief Compute RSA prime moduli P, Q from public modulus N=PQ - * and a pair of private and public key. - * - * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on - * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not - * overwrite it. - * - * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ, with P, Q to be found - * \param E RSA public exponent - * \param D RSA private exponent - * \param P Pointer to MPI holding first prime factor of N on success - * \param Q Pointer to MPI holding second prime factor of N on success - * - * \return - * - 0 if successful. In this case, P and Q constitute a - * factorization of N. - * - A non-zero error code otherwise. - * - * \note It is neither checked that P, Q are prime nor that - * D, E are modular inverses wrt. P-1 and Q-1. For that, - * use the helper function \c mbedtls_rsa_validate_params. - * - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( mbedtls_mpi const *N, mbedtls_mpi const *E, - mbedtls_mpi const *D, - mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q ); - -/** - * \brief Compute RSA private exponent from - * prime moduli and public key. - * - * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on - * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not - * overwrite it. - * - * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus - * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus - * \param E RSA public exponent - * \param D Pointer to MPI holding the private exponent on success. - * - * \return - * - 0 if successful. In this case, D is set to a simultaneous - * modular inverse of E modulo both P-1 and Q-1. - * - A non-zero error code otherwise. - * - * \note This function does not check whether P and Q are primes. - * - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( mbedtls_mpi const *P, - mbedtls_mpi const *Q, - mbedtls_mpi const *E, - mbedtls_mpi *D ); - - -/** - * \brief Generate RSA-CRT parameters - * - * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on - * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not - * overwrite it. - * - * \param P First prime factor of N - * \param Q Second prime factor of N - * \param D RSA private exponent - * \param DP Output variable for D modulo P-1 - * \param DQ Output variable for D modulo Q-1 - * \param QP Output variable for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. - * - * \return 0 on success, non-zero error code otherwise. - * - * \note This function does not check whether P, Q are - * prime and whether D is a valid private exponent. - * - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, - mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ); - - -/** - * \brief Check validity of core RSA parameters - * - * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on - * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not - * overwrite it. - * - * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ - * \param P First prime factor of N - * \param Q Second prime factor of N - * \param D RSA private exponent - * \param E RSA public exponent - * \param f_rng PRNG to be used for primality check, or NULL - * \param p_rng PRNG context for f_rng, or NULL - * - * \return - * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied - * if all relevant parameters are provided: - * - P prime if f_rng != NULL (%) - * - Q prime if f_rng != NULL (%) - * - 1 < N = P * Q - * - 1 < D, E < N - * - D and E are modular inverses modulo P-1 and Q-1 - * (%) This is only done if MBEDTLS_GENPRIME is defined. - * - A non-zero error code otherwise. - * - * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments - * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with - * (-,P,-,-,-) and a PRNG amounts to a primality check for P. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, - const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, - const mbedtls_mpi *E, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ); - -/** - * \brief Check validity of RSA CRT parameters - * - * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on - * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not - * overwrite it. - * - * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus - * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus - * \param D RSA private exponent - * \param DP MPI to check for D modulo P-1 - * \param DQ MPI to check for D modulo P-1 - * \param QP MPI to check for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. - * - * \return - * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied: - * - D = DP mod P-1 if P, D, DP != NULL - * - Q = DQ mod P-1 if P, D, DQ != NULL - * - QP = Q^-1 mod P if P, Q, QP != NULL - * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if check failed, - * potentially including \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX if some - * MPI calculations failed. - * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if insufficient - * data was provided to check DP, DQ or QP. - * - * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments - * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with the - * parameters (P, -, D, DP, -, -) will check DP = D mod P-1. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, - const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* rsa_alt_helpers.h */ diff --git a/sha256.c b/sha256.c deleted file mode 100644 index c3573f8..0000000 --- a/sha256.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,557 +0,0 @@ -/* - * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-256 implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The SHA-256 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. - * - * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#define SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) -#define SHA256_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) - -void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) -{ - SHA256_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); - - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, - const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ) -{ - SHA256_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); - SHA256_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); - - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * SHA-256 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) -{ - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); -#else - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 ); -#endif - - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - if( is224 == 0 ) - { - /* SHA-256 */ - ctx->state[0] = 0x6A09E667; - ctx->state[1] = 0xBB67AE85; - ctx->state[2] = 0x3C6EF372; - ctx->state[3] = 0xA54FF53A; - ctx->state[4] = 0x510E527F; - ctx->state[5] = 0x9B05688C; - ctx->state[6] = 0x1F83D9AB; - ctx->state[7] = 0x5BE0CD19; - } - else - { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - /* SHA-224 */ - ctx->state[0] = 0xC1059ED8; - ctx->state[1] = 0x367CD507; - ctx->state[2] = 0x3070DD17; - ctx->state[3] = 0xF70E5939; - ctx->state[4] = 0xFFC00B31; - ctx->state[5] = 0x68581511; - ctx->state[6] = 0x64F98FA7; - ctx->state[7] = 0xBEFA4FA4; -#endif - } - - ctx->is224 = is224; - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) -static const uint32_t K[] = -{ - 0x428A2F98, 0x71374491, 0xB5C0FBCF, 0xE9B5DBA5, - 0x3956C25B, 0x59F111F1, 0x923F82A4, 0xAB1C5ED5, - 0xD807AA98, 0x12835B01, 0x243185BE, 0x550C7DC3, - 0x72BE5D74, 0x80DEB1FE, 0x9BDC06A7, 0xC19BF174, - 0xE49B69C1, 0xEFBE4786, 0x0FC19DC6, 0x240CA1CC, - 0x2DE92C6F, 0x4A7484AA, 0x5CB0A9DC, 0x76F988DA, - 0x983E5152, 0xA831C66D, 0xB00327C8, 0xBF597FC7, - 0xC6E00BF3, 0xD5A79147, 0x06CA6351, 0x14292967, - 0x27B70A85, 0x2E1B2138, 0x4D2C6DFC, 0x53380D13, - 0x650A7354, 0x766A0ABB, 0x81C2C92E, 0x92722C85, - 0xA2BFE8A1, 0xA81A664B, 0xC24B8B70, 0xC76C51A3, - 0xD192E819, 0xD6990624, 0xF40E3585, 0x106AA070, - 0x19A4C116, 0x1E376C08, 0x2748774C, 0x34B0BCB5, - 0x391C0CB3, 0x4ED8AA4A, 0x5B9CCA4F, 0x682E6FF3, - 0x748F82EE, 0x78A5636F, 0x84C87814, 0x8CC70208, - 0x90BEFFFA, 0xA4506CEB, 0xBEF9A3F7, 0xC67178F2, -}; - -#define SHR(x,n) (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (n)) -#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR(x,n) | ((x) << (32 - (n)))) - -#define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 7) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ SHR(x, 3)) -#define S1(x) (ROTR(x,17) ^ ROTR(x,19) ^ SHR(x,10)) - -#define S2(x) (ROTR(x, 2) ^ ROTR(x,13) ^ ROTR(x,22)) -#define S3(x) (ROTR(x, 6) ^ ROTR(x,11) ^ ROTR(x,25)) - -#define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) -#define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) - -#define R(t) \ - ( \ - local.W[t] = S1(local.W[(t) - 2]) + local.W[(t) - 7] + \ - S0(local.W[(t) - 15]) + local.W[(t) - 16] \ - ) - -#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ - do \ - { \ - local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ - local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ - (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ - } while( 0 ) - -int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64] ) -{ - struct - { - uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; - uint32_t A[8]; - } local; - - unsigned int i; - - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) - for( i = 0; i < 64; i++ ) - { - if( i < 16 ) - local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 * i ); - else - R( i ); - - P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], - local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); - - local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; - local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; - local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; - local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; - local.A[0] = local.temp1; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 * i ); - - for( i = 0; i < 16; i += 8 ) - { - P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], - local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i+0], K[i+0] ); - P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], - local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i+1], K[i+1] ); - P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], - local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i+2], K[i+2] ); - P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], - local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i+3], K[i+3] ); - P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], - local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i+4], K[i+4] ); - P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], - local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i+5], K[i+5] ); - P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], - local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i+6], K[i+6] ); - P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], - local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i+7], K[i+7] ); - } - - for( i = 16; i < 64; i += 8 ) - { - P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], - local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], R(i+0), K[i+0] ); - P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], - local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], R(i+1), K[i+1] ); - P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], - local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], R(i+2), K[i+2] ); - P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], - local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], R(i+3), K[i+3] ); - P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], - local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], R(i+4), K[i+4] ); - P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], - local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], R(i+5), K[i+5] ); - P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], - local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], R(i+6), K[i+6] ); - P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], - local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], R(i+7), K[i+7] ); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; - - /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * SHA-256 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t fill; - uint32_t left; - - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - - if( ilen == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) - ctx->total[1]++; - - if( left && ilen >= fill ) - { - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while( ilen >= 64 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if( ilen > 0 ) - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * SHA-256 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - uint32_t used; - uint32_t high, low; - - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); - - /* - * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length - */ - used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - - ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; - - if( used <= 56 ) - { - /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ - memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); - } - else - { - /* We'll need an extra block */ - memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); - } - - /* - * Add message length - */ - high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) - | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); - low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* - * Output final state - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 20 ); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 24 ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - if( ctx->is224 == 0 ) -#endif - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 28 ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ - -/* - * output = SHA-256( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, - int is224 ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); -#else - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 ); -#endif - - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); - - mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts( &ctx, is224 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * FIPS-180-2 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char sha256_test_buf[3][57] = -{ - { "abc" }, - { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, - { "" } -}; - -static const size_t sha256_test_buflen[3] = -{ - 3, 56, 1000 -}; - -static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = -{ - /* - * SHA-224 test vectors - */ - { 0x23, 0x09, 0x7D, 0x22, 0x34, 0x05, 0xD8, 0x22, - 0x86, 0x42, 0xA4, 0x77, 0xBD, 0xA2, 0x55, 0xB3, - 0x2A, 0xAD, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xF7, - 0xE3, 0x6C, 0x9D, 0xA7 }, - { 0x75, 0x38, 0x8B, 0x16, 0x51, 0x27, 0x76, 0xCC, - 0x5D, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xA1, 0xFD, 0x89, 0x01, 0x50, - 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x45, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0xF5, 0x8B, 0x19, - 0x52, 0x52, 0x25, 0x25 }, - { 0x20, 0x79, 0x46, 0x55, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xD8, - 0xBB, 0xB4, 0xC1, 0xEA, 0x97, 0x61, 0x8A, 0x4B, - 0xF0, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x58, 0x19, 0x48, 0xB2, 0xEE, - 0x4E, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67 }, - - /* - * SHA-256 test vectors - */ - { 0xBA, 0x78, 0x16, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0x01, 0xCF, 0xEA, - 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xDE, 0x5D, 0xAE, 0x22, 0x23, - 0xB0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xA3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7A, 0x9C, - 0xB4, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x61, 0xF2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xAD }, - { 0x24, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0x61, 0xD2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xB8, - 0xE5, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0C, 0x3E, 0x60, 0x39, - 0xA3, 0x3C, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xFF, 0x21, 0x67, - 0xF6, 0xEC, 0xED, 0xD4, 0x19, 0xDB, 0x06, 0xC1 }, - { 0xCD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0x5C, 0x99, 0x14, 0xFB, 0x92, - 0x81, 0xA1, 0xC7, 0xE2, 0x84, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0x67, - 0xF1, 0x80, 0x9A, 0x48, 0xA4, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0E, - 0x04, 0x6D, 0x39, 0xCC, 0xC7, 0x11, 0x2C, 0xD0 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char sha256sum[32]; - mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; - - buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1024, sizeof(unsigned char) ); - if( NULL == buf ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "Buffer allocation failed\n" ); - - return( 1 ); - } - - mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx ); - - for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) - { - j = i % 3; - k = i < 3; - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - k * 32, j + 1 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) - goto fail; - - if( j == 2 ) - { - memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); - - for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) - { - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx, buf, buflen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - } - - } - else - { - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx, sha256_test_buf[j], - sha256_test_buflen[j] ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish( &ctx, sha256sum ) ) != 0 ) - goto fail; - - - if( memcmp( sha256sum, sha256_test_sum[i], 32 - k * 4 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - goto exit; - -fail: - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - -exit: - mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx ); - mbedtls_free( buf ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ diff --git a/sha512.c b/sha512.c deleted file mode 100644 index 2b4cc54..0000000 --- a/sha512.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,618 +0,0 @@ -/* - * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-384/512 implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The SHA-512 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. - * - * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__WATCOMC__) - #define UL64(x) x##ui64 -#else - #define UL64(x) x##ULL -#endif - -#include - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#else -#include -#include -#define mbedtls_printf printf -#define mbedtls_calloc calloc -#define mbedtls_free free -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#define SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) -#define SHA512_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) -static void sha512_put_uint64_be( uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i ) -{ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, b, i); -} -#else -#define sha512_put_uint64_be MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ - -void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) -{ - SHA512_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); - - memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) -{ - if( ctx == NULL ) - return; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); -} - -void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, - const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ) -{ - SHA512_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); - SHA512_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); - - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * SHA-512 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) -{ - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); -#else - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); -#endif - - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - if( is384 == 0 ) - { - /* SHA-512 */ - ctx->state[0] = UL64(0x6A09E667F3BCC908); - ctx->state[1] = UL64(0xBB67AE8584CAA73B); - ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x3C6EF372FE94F82B); - ctx->state[3] = UL64(0xA54FF53A5F1D36F1); - ctx->state[4] = UL64(0x510E527FADE682D1); - ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x9B05688C2B3E6C1F); - ctx->state[6] = UL64(0x1F83D9ABFB41BD6B); - ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x5BE0CD19137E2179); - } - else - { -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); -#else - /* SHA-384 */ - ctx->state[0] = UL64(0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8); - ctx->state[1] = UL64(0x629A292A367CD507); - ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x9159015A3070DD17); - ctx->state[3] = UL64(0x152FECD8F70E5939); - ctx->state[4] = UL64(0x67332667FFC00B31); - ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511); - ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7); - ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - ctx->is384 = is384; -#endif - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) - -/* - * Round constants - */ -static const uint64_t K[80] = -{ - UL64(0x428A2F98D728AE22), UL64(0x7137449123EF65CD), - UL64(0xB5C0FBCFEC4D3B2F), UL64(0xE9B5DBA58189DBBC), - UL64(0x3956C25BF348B538), UL64(0x59F111F1B605D019), - UL64(0x923F82A4AF194F9B), UL64(0xAB1C5ED5DA6D8118), - UL64(0xD807AA98A3030242), UL64(0x12835B0145706FBE), - UL64(0x243185BE4EE4B28C), UL64(0x550C7DC3D5FFB4E2), - UL64(0x72BE5D74F27B896F), UL64(0x80DEB1FE3B1696B1), - UL64(0x9BDC06A725C71235), UL64(0xC19BF174CF692694), - UL64(0xE49B69C19EF14AD2), UL64(0xEFBE4786384F25E3), - UL64(0x0FC19DC68B8CD5B5), UL64(0x240CA1CC77AC9C65), - UL64(0x2DE92C6F592B0275), UL64(0x4A7484AA6EA6E483), - UL64(0x5CB0A9DCBD41FBD4), UL64(0x76F988DA831153B5), - UL64(0x983E5152EE66DFAB), UL64(0xA831C66D2DB43210), - UL64(0xB00327C898FB213F), UL64(0xBF597FC7BEEF0EE4), - UL64(0xC6E00BF33DA88FC2), UL64(0xD5A79147930AA725), - UL64(0x06CA6351E003826F), UL64(0x142929670A0E6E70), - UL64(0x27B70A8546D22FFC), UL64(0x2E1B21385C26C926), - UL64(0x4D2C6DFC5AC42AED), UL64(0x53380D139D95B3DF), - UL64(0x650A73548BAF63DE), UL64(0x766A0ABB3C77B2A8), - UL64(0x81C2C92E47EDAEE6), UL64(0x92722C851482353B), - UL64(0xA2BFE8A14CF10364), UL64(0xA81A664BBC423001), - UL64(0xC24B8B70D0F89791), UL64(0xC76C51A30654BE30), - UL64(0xD192E819D6EF5218), UL64(0xD69906245565A910), - UL64(0xF40E35855771202A), UL64(0x106AA07032BBD1B8), - UL64(0x19A4C116B8D2D0C8), UL64(0x1E376C085141AB53), - UL64(0x2748774CDF8EEB99), UL64(0x34B0BCB5E19B48A8), - UL64(0x391C0CB3C5C95A63), UL64(0x4ED8AA4AE3418ACB), - UL64(0x5B9CCA4F7763E373), UL64(0x682E6FF3D6B2B8A3), - UL64(0x748F82EE5DEFB2FC), UL64(0x78A5636F43172F60), - UL64(0x84C87814A1F0AB72), UL64(0x8CC702081A6439EC), - UL64(0x90BEFFFA23631E28), UL64(0xA4506CEBDE82BDE9), - UL64(0xBEF9A3F7B2C67915), UL64(0xC67178F2E372532B), - UL64(0xCA273ECEEA26619C), UL64(0xD186B8C721C0C207), - UL64(0xEADA7DD6CDE0EB1E), UL64(0xF57D4F7FEE6ED178), - UL64(0x06F067AA72176FBA), UL64(0x0A637DC5A2C898A6), - UL64(0x113F9804BEF90DAE), UL64(0x1B710B35131C471B), - UL64(0x28DB77F523047D84), UL64(0x32CAAB7B40C72493), - UL64(0x3C9EBE0A15C9BEBC), UL64(0x431D67C49C100D4C), - UL64(0x4CC5D4BECB3E42B6), UL64(0x597F299CFC657E2A), - UL64(0x5FCB6FAB3AD6FAEC), UL64(0x6C44198C4A475817) -}; - -int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128] ) -{ - int i; - struct - { - uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; - uint64_t A[8]; - } local; - - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); - -#define SHR(x,n) ((x) >> (n)) -#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR((x),(n)) | ((x) << (64 - (n)))) - -#define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 1) ^ ROTR(x, 8) ^ SHR(x, 7)) -#define S1(x) (ROTR(x,19) ^ ROTR(x,61) ^ SHR(x, 6)) - -#define S2(x) (ROTR(x,28) ^ ROTR(x,34) ^ ROTR(x,39)) -#define S3(x) (ROTR(x,14) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ ROTR(x,41)) - -#define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) -#define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) - -#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ - do \ - { \ - local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ - local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ - (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ - } while( 0 ) - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) - for( i = 0; i < 80; i++ ) - { - if( i < 16 ) - { - local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, i << 3 ); - } - else - { - local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + - S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; - } - - P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], - local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); - - local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; - local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; - local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; - local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; - local.A[0] = local.temp1; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ - for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) - { - local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, i << 3 ); - } - - for( ; i < 80; i++ ) - { - local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + - S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; - } - - i = 0; - do - { - P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], - local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], - local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], - local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], - local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], - local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], - local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], - local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], - local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; - } - while( i < 80 ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ - - for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) - ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; - - /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * SHA-512 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t fill; - unsigned int left; - - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - - if( ilen == 0 ) - return( 0 ); - - left = (unsigned int) (ctx->total[0] & 0x7F); - fill = 128 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += (uint64_t) ilen; - - if( ctx->total[0] < (uint64_t) ilen ) - ctx->total[1]++; - - if( left && ilen >= fill ) - { - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while( ilen >= 128 ) - { - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - input += 128; - ilen -= 128; - } - - if( ilen > 0 ) - memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); - - return( 0 ); -} - -/* - * SHA-512 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char *output ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned used; - uint64_t high, low; - - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); - - /* - * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length - */ - used = ctx->total[0] & 0x7F; - - ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; - - if( used <= 112 ) - { - /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ - memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 112 - used ); - } - else - { - /* We'll need an extra block */ - memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 128 - used ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 112 ); - } - - /* - * Add message length - */ - high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 61 ) - | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); - low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); - - sha512_put_uint64_be( high, ctx->buffer, 112 ); - sha512_put_uint64_be( low, ctx->buffer, 120 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) - return( ret ); - - /* - * Output final state - */ - sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); - sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[1], output, 8 ); - sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[2], output, 16 ); - sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[3], output, 24 ); - sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[4], output, 32 ); - sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[5], output, 40 ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - if( ctx->is384 == 0 ) -#endif - { - sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[6], output, 48 ); - sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[7], output, 56 ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ - -/* - * output = SHA-512( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, - int is384 ) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); -#else - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); -#endif - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); - - mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts( &ctx, is384 ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) - goto exit; - -exit: - mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * FIPS-180-2 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char sha512_test_buf[3][113] = -{ - { "abc" }, - { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu" }, - { "" } -}; - -static const size_t sha512_test_buflen[3] = -{ - 3, 112, 1000 -}; - -static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - /* - * SHA-384 test vectors - */ - { 0xCB, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3F, 0x45, 0xA3, 0x5E, 0x8B, - 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3D, 0x69, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x07, - 0x27, 0x2C, 0x32, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xD1, 0x63, - 0x1A, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x5A, 0x43, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xED, - 0x80, 0x86, 0x07, 0x2B, 0xA1, 0xE7, 0xCC, 0x23, - 0x58, 0xBA, 0xEC, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC8, 0x25, 0xA7 }, - { 0x09, 0x33, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xF7, 0x11, 0x47, 0xE8, - 0x3D, 0x19, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x82, 0xCD, 0x1B, 0x47, - 0x53, 0x11, 0x1B, 0x17, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x05, 0xD2, - 0x2F, 0xA0, 0x80, 0x86, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0x12, - 0xFC, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0x1A, 0x55, 0x7E, 0x2D, 0xB9, - 0x66, 0xC3, 0xE9, 0xFA, 0x91, 0x74, 0x60, 0x39 }, - { 0x9D, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x71, 0x64, 0x74, 0xCB, - 0x08, 0x6E, 0x83, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x0A, 0x4A, 0x1C, - 0xED, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF2, 0x48, 0x52, - 0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B, - 0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB, - 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ - - /* - * SHA-512 test vectors - */ - { 0xDD, 0xAF, 0x35, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7A, 0xBA, - 0xCC, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xAE, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31, - 0x12, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0x4E, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x7E, 0xA2, - 0x0A, 0x9E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, - 0x21, 0x92, 0x99, 0x2A, 0x27, 0x4F, 0xC1, 0xA8, - 0x36, 0xBA, 0x3C, 0x23, 0xA3, 0xFE, 0xEB, 0xBD, - 0x45, 0x4D, 0x44, 0x23, 0x64, 0x3C, 0xE8, 0x0E, - 0x2A, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0x4F, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA4, 0x9F }, - { 0x8E, 0x95, 0x9B, 0x75, 0xDA, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xDA, - 0x8C, 0xF4, 0xF7, 0x28, 0x14, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x3F, - 0x8F, 0x77, 0x79, 0xC6, 0xEB, 0x9F, 0x7F, 0xA1, - 0x72, 0x99, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0xB6, 0x88, 0x90, 0x18, - 0x50, 0x1D, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x49, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xE4, - 0x33, 0x1B, 0x99, 0xDE, 0xC4, 0xB5, 0x43, 0x3A, - 0xC7, 0xD3, 0x29, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0xDD, 0x26, 0x54, - 0x5E, 0x96, 0xE5, 0x5B, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xE9, 0x09 }, - { 0xE7, 0x18, 0x48, 0x3D, 0x0C, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x64, - 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x42, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x15, 0xB4, 0x63, - 0x8E, 0x1F, 0x98, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x20, 0x44, 0x28, - 0x56, 0x32, 0xA8, 0x03, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0x73, 0xEB, - 0xDE, 0x0F, 0xF2, 0x44, 0x87, 0x7E, 0xA6, 0x0A, - 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x43, 0x2C, 0xE5, 0x77, 0xC3, 0x1B, - 0xEB, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0x49, 0xAA, 0x2E, - 0x4E, 0xAD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0xC0, 0x9B } -}; - -#define ARRAY_LENGTH( a ) ( sizeof( a ) / sizeof( ( a )[0] ) ) - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ) -{ - int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char sha512sum[64]; - mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; - - buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1024, sizeof(unsigned char) ); - if( NULL == buf ) - { - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "Buffer allocation failed\n" ); - - return( 1 ); - } - - mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); - - for( i = 0; i < (int) ARRAY_LENGTH(sha512_test_sum); i++ ) - { - j = i % 3; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) - k = i < 3; -#else - k = 0; -#endif - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - k * 128, j + 1 ); - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) - goto fail; - - if( j == 2 ) - { - memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); - - for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) - { - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx, buf, buflen ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - } - } - else - { - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update( &ctx, sha512_test_buf[j], - sha512_test_buflen[j] ); - if( ret != 0 ) - goto fail; - } - - if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish( &ctx, sha512sum ) ) != 0 ) - goto fail; - - if( memcmp( sha512sum, sha512_test_sum[i], 64 - k * 16 ) != 0 ) - { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); - } - - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); - - goto exit; - -fail: - if( verbose != 0 ) - mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); - -exit: - mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx ); - mbedtls_free( buf ); - - return( ret ); -} - -#undef ARRAY_LENGTH - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ diff --git a/ssl_misc.h b/ssl_misc.h deleted file mode 100644 index 40e4aaf..0000000 --- a/ssl_misc.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1746 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file ssl_misc.h - * - * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H - -#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" - -#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -/* Legacy minor version numbers as defined by: - * - RFC 2246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 1 }; // TLS v1.0 - * - RFC 4346: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 2 }; // TLS v1.1 - * - * We no longer support these versions, but some code still references those - * constants as part of negotiating with the peer, so keep them available - * internally. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 - -/* Determine minimum supported version */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -/* Determine maximum supported version */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ - -/* - * Mask of TLS 1.3 handshake extensions used in extensions_present - * of mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_NONE 0 - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SERVERNAME ( 1 << 0 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ( 1 << 1 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST ( 1 << 2 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS ( 1 << 3 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SIG_ALG ( 1 << 4 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_USE_SRTP ( 1 << 5 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_HEARTBEAT ( 1 << 6 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ALPN ( 1 << 7 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SCT ( 1 << 8 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE ( 1 << 9 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE ( 1 << 10 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PADDING ( 1 << 11 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY ( 1 << 12 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_EARLY_DATA ( 1 << 13 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS ( 1 << 14 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_COOKIE ( 1 << 15 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES ( 1 << 16 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_CERT_AUTH ( 1 << 17 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_OID_FILTERS ( 1 << 18 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH ( 1 << 19 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT ( 1 << 20 ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE ( 1 << 21 ) - -/* - * Helper macros for function call with return check. - */ -/* - * Exit when return non-zero value - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( f ) \ - do { \ - ret = ( f ); \ - if( ret != 0 ) \ - { \ - goto cleanup; \ - } \ - } while( 0 ) -/* - * Exit when return negative value - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( f ) \ - do { \ - ret = ( f ); \ - if( ret < 0 ) \ - { \ - goto cleanup; \ - } \ - } while( 0 ) - -/* - * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 - * - * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, - * but is distinct for resends. - * - * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 - -/* - * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: - * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256). - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - -/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a - * stream cipher can be used. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) -/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ -#endif -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ -/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ - ) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) ) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ) - -/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 - -/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for - RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes - (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ - ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \ - : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \ - ) - -/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 - -/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 - -/* - * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds - */ - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 -#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 -#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." -#endif - -/* Calculate buffer sizes */ - -/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes - long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the - implicit sequence number. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ - + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) ) -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ - + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) ) -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 -#define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -/** - * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for - * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured - * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the - * configured value and the negotiated one. - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * - * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. - */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/** - * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for - * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment - * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. - * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function - * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * - * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. - */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) -{ -#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD - + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; -#else - return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; -#endif -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) -{ -#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD - + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; -#else - return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; -#endif -} -#endif - -/* - * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content - * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because - * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) - -/** - * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is - * greater or equal than a needed space. - * - * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. - * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. - * \param need Needed space in bytes. - * - * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero - * otherwise. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur, - const uint8_t *end, size_t need ) -{ - return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) ); -} - -/** - * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is - * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, - * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. - * - * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. - * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. - * \param need Needed space in bytes. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \ - do { \ - if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \ - { \ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ - } \ - } while( 0 ) - -/** - * \brief This macro checks if the remaining length in an input buffer is - * greater or equal than a needed length. If it is not the case, it - * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR error and pends a - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR alert message. - * - * This is a function-like macro. It is guaranteed to evaluate each - * argument exactly once. - * - * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. - * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. - * \param need Needed length in bytes. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( cur, end, need ) \ - do { \ - if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \ - { \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, \ - ( "missing input data in %s", __func__ ) ); \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, \ - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); \ - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); \ - } \ - } while( 0 ) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* - * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t -{ - /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable - * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's - * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - - * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures - * to hash algorithms. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; - mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); - -/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from - * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those - * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled - * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is - * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. - * - * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, - * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} - * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into - * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. - * - * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH - * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here - * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations - * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the - * computation of the maximum key length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 - -/** - * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) - * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set -{ - /*! The key for client->server records. */ - unsigned char client_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; - /*! The key for server->client records. */ - unsigned char server_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; - /*! The IV for client->server records. */ - unsigned char client_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; - /*! The IV for server->client records. */ - unsigned char server_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; - - size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and - * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ - size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and - * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ -}; -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; - -typedef struct -{ - unsigned char binder_key [ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; - unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret [ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; - unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; -} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets; - -typedef struct -{ - unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; - unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; -} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets; - -/* - * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params -{ - /* Frequently-used boolean or byte fields (placed early to take - * advantage of smaller code size for indirect access on Arm Thumb) */ - uint8_t max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/ - uint8_t max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/ - uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ - uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - unsigned char group_list_heap_allocated; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ - enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ - ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ - ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ - ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ - ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ - ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ - } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ - size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ -#endif - - size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ - - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; - - void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); - void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); - mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; - - /* - * Handshake specific crypto variables - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - int tls13_kex_modes; /*!< key exchange modes for TLS 1.3 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - const uint16_t *group_list; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ -#endif - -/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due - * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap - * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for - * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type; - uint16_t ecdh_bits; - psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey; - unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; - size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ - size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ - size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ - mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - struct - { - size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated - * buffers used for message buffering. */ - - uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has - * been seen in the current flight. */ - - struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer - { - unsigned is_valid : 1; - unsigned is_fragmented : 1; - unsigned is_complete : 1; - unsigned char *data; - size_t data_len; - } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; - - struct - { - unsigned char *data; - size_t len; - unsigned epoch; - } future_record; - - } buffering; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ - unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ - - unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie - Srv: unused */ - unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length - Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ - - uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ - unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ - unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the - flight being received */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for - resending messages */ - unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter - for resending messages */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ - - uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension - * has been negotiated. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ - unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */ - uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of - * \c peer_cid. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - - uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - /*! TLS 1.3 transforms for 0-RTT and encrypted handshake messages. - * Those pointers own the transforms they reference. */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake; - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - - /* - * Checksum contexts - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; -#else - mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256; -#endif -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; -#else - mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512; -#endif -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group - * that is being used for ephemeral - * key exchange. - * - * On the client: Defaults to the first - * entry in the client's group list, - * but can be overwritten by the HRR. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - - /* - * State-local variables used during the processing - * of a specific handshake state. - */ - union - { - /* Outgoing Finished message */ - struct - { - uint8_t preparation_done; - - /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to - * but excluding the outgoing finished message. */ - unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - size_t digest_len; - } finished_out; - - /* Incoming Finished message */ - struct - { - uint8_t preparation_done; - - /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but - * excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */ - unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - size_t digest_len; - } finished_in; - - } state_local; - - /* End of state-local variables. */ - - unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + - MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; - /*!< random bytes */ - unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; - /*!< premaster secret */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - int extensions_present; /*!< extension presence; Each bitfield - represents an extension and defined - as \c MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_XXX */ - - union - { - unsigned char early [MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char app [MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - } tls13_master_secrets; - - mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the - * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). - * The library does not use it internally. */ - void *user_async_ctx; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -}; - -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; - -/* - * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records - * - * There are the following general types of record transformations: - * - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only) - * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher - * to the authenticated message. - * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) - * For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every - * encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was - * encrypted. - * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) - * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one - * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second - * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. - * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained - * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte - * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number - * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation - * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction - * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the - * latter to the encrypted record. - * - * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext - * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true - * content type. - * - * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: - * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. - * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. - * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. - * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. - * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, - * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. - * - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static - * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- - * -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). - * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. - * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. - * - The length of the authentication tag. - * - * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: - * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in - * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the - * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines - * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if - * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM - * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. - * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but - * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. - * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts - * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts - * are unused for AEAD transformations. - * - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly - * but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}. - * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations. - * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within - * the transformation context, its contents are stored within - * iv_{enc/dec}. - * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. - * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations - * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the - * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be - * different from the underlying cipher's block length - * in this case. - * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only - * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is - * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in - * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. - * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version - * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the - * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. - * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the - * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. - * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the - * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused - * in other transformations. - * - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_transform -{ - /* - * Session specific crypto layer - */ - size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ - size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ - size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ - size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ - size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ - - unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ - unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) - - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ - - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ - int minor_ver; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t in_cid_len; - uint8_t out_cid_len; - unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; - unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the - * Master Secret and other session info, - * see ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */ - unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + - MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; - /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ -}; - -/* - * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. - * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( - const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) - return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 ); -#else - (void) transform; - return( 1 ); -#endif -} - -/* - * Internal representation of record frames - * - * Instances come in two flavors: - * (1) Encrypted - * These always have data_offset = 0 - * (2) Unencrypted - * These have data_offset set to the amount of - * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, - * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV - * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used - * (e.g. for stream ciphers). - * - * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case - * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to - * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the - * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to - * make space for the fixed IV. - * - */ -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX -#endif - -typedef struct -{ - uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. - * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by - * the 6-byte sequence number. - * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array - * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely - * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do - * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of - * MAC computations. */ - uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ - uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. - * Convert to internal presentation of versions - * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and - * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). - * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ - - unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ - size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ - size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ - size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ - unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -} mbedtls_record; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -/* - * List of certificate + private key pairs - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert -{ - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ - mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -/* - * List of handshake messages kept around for resending - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item -{ - unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ - size_t len; /*!< length of p */ - unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - -/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ); -/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); -/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); - -/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ -static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -/** - * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear - * memory - * - * \param transform SSL transform context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); - -/** - * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear - * memory - * - * \param ssl SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/* set inbound transform of ssl context */ -void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); - -/* set outbound transform of ssl context */ -void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -int mbedtls_ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen ); -#endif - -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/** - * \brief Update record layer - * - * This function roughly separates the implementation - * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation - * of the secure transport. - * - * \param ssl The SSL context to use. - * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest - * should be automatically updated in case - * a handshake message is found. - * - * \return 0 or non-zero error code. - * - * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here - * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: - * - * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying - * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into - * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which - * conceptually provides the following: - * - * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports - * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. - * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport - * for application data. - * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform - * securing the contents. - * - * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: - * - * a Updating - * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] - * - * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: - * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application - * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers - * provide access to the data for the user to process it. - * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically - * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers - * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application - * data (2) is user-controlled. - * - * b Reading of application data - * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] - * - * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data - * is different from the automatic consumption of control - * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. - * - * c Tracking availability of application data - * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] - * - * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for - * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer - * provides functionality for checking how much application - * data is still available in the internal buffer. - * - * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. - * - * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the - * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic - * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything - * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. - * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the - * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. - * - * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the - * record layer, but the current implementation deviates - * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of - * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record - * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which - * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility - * following the above definition. - * - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned update_hs_digest ); -int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int update_checksum ); -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext( ssl, 1 /* update checksum */ ) ); -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ); -int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ); - -/** - * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: - * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback - * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() - * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len ) -{ - if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 ) - { - *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; - *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; - } - - else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 ) - { - *psk = ssl->conf->psk; - *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; - } - - else - { - *psk = NULL; - *psk_len = 0; - return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); - } - - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/** - * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: - * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK - * callback - * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() - * Return an opaque PSK - */ -static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) - return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ); - - if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) - return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ); - - return( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ); -#endif - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ); -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ); -int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_md_type_t md ); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) -static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value - ( const uint16_t srtp_profile_value ) -{ - switch( srtp_profile_value ) - { - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: - return srtp_profile_value; - default: break; - } - return( MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; - - if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) - key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; - else - key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; - - return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key ); -} - -static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; - - if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) - key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; - else - key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; - - return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert ); -} - -/* - * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: - * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). - * - * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we - * check a cert we received from them)! - * - * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, - int cert_endpoint, - uint32_t *flags ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, - unsigned char ver[2] ); -void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, - const unsigned char ver[2] ); - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ((void) ssl); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - { - return( 13 ); - } - else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - { - return( 5 ); - } -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) ); -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - return( 12 ); -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return( 4 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif - -/* Visible for testing purposes only */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif - -int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, - const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); -int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, - mbedtls_record *rec, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng ); -int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, - mbedtls_record *rec ); - -/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) - return( 2 ); -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return( 0 ); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ); -int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ); - -/* - * Send pending alert - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/* - * Set pending fatal alert flag. - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char alert_type, - int alert_reason ); - -/* Alias of mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( type, user_return_value ) \ - mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl, type, user_return_value ) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -/** - * ssl utils functions for checking configuration. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) -{ - if( conf->min_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 && - conf->max_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 && - conf->min_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 && - conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) - { - return( 1 ); - } - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) -{ - if( conf->min_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 && - conf->max_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 && - conf->min_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) - { - return( 1 ); - } - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) -{ - if( conf->min_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 && - conf->max_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 && - conf->min_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) - { - return( 1 ); - } - return( 0 ); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) - -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); -void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/** - * \brief TLS 1.3 client side state machine entry - * - * \param ssl SSL context - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/** - * \brief TLS 1.3 server side state machine entry - * - * \param ssl SSL context - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - - -/* - * Helper functions around key exchange modes. - */ -static inline unsigned mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int kex_mode_mask ) -{ - return( ( ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes & kex_mode_mask ) != 0 ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK ) ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL ) ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL ) ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL ) ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL ) ); -} - -/** - * Given a list of key exchange modes, check if at least one of them is - * supported. - * - * \param[in] ssl SSL context - * \param kex_modes_mask Mask of the key exchange modes to check - * - * \return 0 if at least one of the key exchange modes is supported, - * !=0 otherwise. - */ -static inline unsigned mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int kex_modes_mask ) -{ - return( ( ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes & kex_modes_mask ) == 0 ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK ) ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_psk_ephemeral_enabled( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL ) ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL ) ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL ) ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_some_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL ) ); -} - -/* - * Helper functions for NamedGroup. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( uint16_t named_group ) -{ - return( named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || - named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || - named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 || - named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || - named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 ); -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_dhe( uint16_t named_group ) -{ - return( named_group >= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 && - named_group <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192 ); -} - -static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_states state ) -{ - ssl->state = ( int ) state; -} - -/* - * Fetch TLS 1.3 handshake message header - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned hs_type, - unsigned char **buf, - size_t *buf_len ); - -/* - * Write TLS 1.3 handshake message header - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned hs_type, - unsigned char **buf, - size_t *buf_len ); - -/* - * Handler of TLS 1.3 server certificate message - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/* - * Generic handler of Certificate Verify - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/* - * Write of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); - -/* - * Write TLS 1.3 handshake message tail - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finish_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - size_t buf_len, - size_t msg_len ); - -void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned hs_type, - size_t total_hs_len ); - -/* - * Update checksum of handshake messages. - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned hs_type, - unsigned char const *msg, - size_t msg_len ); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* - * Write TLS 1.3 Signature Algorithm extension - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *end, - size_t *out_len); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - -/* Get handshake transcript */ -int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_md_type_t md, - unsigned char *dst, - size_t dst_len, - size_t *olen ); - -/* - * Return supported groups. - * - * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->group_list - * when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() is deleted. - * - * ssl->handshake->group_list is either a translation of curve_list to IANA TLS group - * identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() has been used, or a pointer to - * ssl->conf->group_list when mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() has been more recently invoked. - * - */ -static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) -{ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - return( ssl->conf->group_list ); - #else - if( ( ssl->handshake != NULL ) && ( ssl->handshake->group_list != NULL ) ) - return( ssl->handshake->group_list ); - else - return( ssl->conf->group_list ); - #endif -} - -#endif /* ssl_misc.h */