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799 commits
v2.2 ... master

Author SHA1 Message Date
Pol Henarejos
16d4d0d26e
Update README with up-to-date info.
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Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2026-01-06 21:20:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
380ff7afa4
Upgrade to v6.2
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Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2026-01-05 19:54:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
60dafec2e8
Upgrade Pico Keys SDK to v8.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2026-01-05 19:51:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3207fe3451
Disable button press by default since LED may not be properly configured until it is commissioned.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2026-01-05 19:40:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6914be4fea
Fix build.
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Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-29 20:36:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7d551f6fea
Blink led three times to acknowledge proper commissioning.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-29 20:17:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d3a7ff425a
Fix pimoroni led
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Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-27 22:03:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
97e7303505
Move pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-26 20:00:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e41f2ba712
Releaser is available up to 6.7.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-26 19:54:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
710eb70af7
Update reamde & usage.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-13 23:36:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9dbd764c8c
Reset by recopying memory file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-13 21:12:45 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
feec958d10
Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-11 20:05:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9720bcfd4b
Fix build
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-11 19:59:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4bb81f5b25
Build only necessary boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-11 19:56:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c9926a71d1
Do not call pytest
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-11 19:48:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
10c25b6a3a
Update pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-11 19:36:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
629f14ab0d
Revert "Move EDDSA to another branch."
This reverts commit a0faf5308e.
2025-12-11 19:35:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d6f6e4635
Revert "Move Secure Boot to another branch."
This reverts commit 8978456524.
2025-12-11 19:35:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8e35104695
Update memory.flash for tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-10 00:20:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
82f4b2201c
Remove printf
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-09 21:38:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8978456524
Move Secure Boot to another branch.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-09 21:37:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a0faf5308e
Move EDDSA to another branch.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-09 15:49:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f4df9766b6
Fix MSOS/BOS descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-03 16:34:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a1d64d2523
Set anti-rollback version only when the binary is signed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-02 09:55:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
82c6badc48
Increase anti-rollback version to 2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-01 23:42:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2243629d58
Add anti-rollback argument.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-01 23:42:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b5b5ccd53c
Upgrade to v6.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-01 17:21:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0df97c881f
Update mbedtls only when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-01 17:20:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3c0706f7b2
Fix on AID selection. It should support shorter AID if matches.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-12-01 01:45:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0d1d77b3f6
Upgrade Pico Keys SDK to v8.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-30 18:30:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
25301f14e1
Upgrade to mbedtls v3.6.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-30 18:28:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
256e61d813
Update tests to new CA2/DV2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-28 12:14:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1fe771f074
Fix tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-28 01:13:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0588dde490
Do not use editable mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-28 00:53:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1d6cc6ff89
Do not install apt pyscard
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-28 00:21:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fde25eff2
Fix build, key generation for RP2040 and added reboot bootsel command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-28 00:13:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
634eac50b1
Moved to pypicohsm.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-18 01:05:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c4a1cf32e5
Add Pico Version Major
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-18 01:05:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
966b12ffad
Merge pull request #108 from MageDelfador/esp32pr
ESP32 Optimization
2025-11-10 00:04:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
de33124d6b
Fix test case with newer openssl.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-09 21:38:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ae61150f5c
Upgrade Dockerfile for fixing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-09 20:00:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
605819f0a3
Fix build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-11-09 19:56:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c9dc70b095
Add template for pull requests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-10-27 08:58:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7060e4df7c
Add CONTRIBUTING
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-10-27 08:53:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
28c99a21bd
Update license models and add ENTERPRISE.md
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-10-26 20:46:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
dba614ed36
Relicense project under the GNU Affero General Public License v3 (AGPLv3)
and add the Enterprise / Commercial licensing option.

Main changes:
- Replace GPLv3 headers with AGPLv3 headers in source files.
- Update LICENSE file to the full AGPLv3 text.
- Add ENTERPRISE.md describing the dual-licensing model:
  * Community Edition: AGPLv3 (strong copyleft, including network use).
  * Enterprise / Commercial Edition: proprietary license for production /
    multi-user / OEM use without the obligation to disclose derivative code.
- Update README with a new "License and Commercial Use" section pointing to
  ENTERPRISE.md and clarifying how companies can obtain a commercial license.

Why this change:
- AGPLv3 ensures that modified versions offered as a service or deployed
  in production environments must provide corresponding source code.
- The Enterprise / Commercial edition provides organizations with an
  alternative proprietary license that allows internal, large-scale, or OEM
  use (bulk provisioning, policy enforcement, inventory / revocation,
  custom attestation, signed builds) without AGPL disclosure obligations.

This commit formally marks the first release that is dual-licensed:
AGPLv3 for the Community Edition and a proprietary commercial license
for Enterprise customers.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-10-26 20:18:45 +01:00
MageDelfador
2471c747d6 Update sdkconfig.defaults 2025-10-15 23:52:34 +08:00
Pol Henarejos
c7006b6319
Merge pull request #102 from eliasnaur/push-upprymyooxrs
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implement bip32 operations in pico-hsm-tool
2025-08-12 12:29:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5f5e010a19
Stick with Espressif v5.5
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Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-08-12 00:51:24 +02:00
Elias Naur
ad5a503d36 implement bip32 operations in pico-hsm-tool 2025-08-08 16:32:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5e4f2286e6
Add autobuild for RP2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-07-05 00:52:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f0f8e4382a
Fix cross build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-06-22 20:33:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a0f6abf6a6
Remove the tweak for packets multiple of 64 bytes. It was fixed in the USB stack handling (don't remember where).
Fixes #95.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-05-23 20:18:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cbf9bb9281
Update scs3.md 2025-05-19 09:16:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bd0796b217
Update scs3.md 2025-05-18 19:34:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
defa18a5ec
Add ESPICOHSMCA00002 to scs3 docs.
Fixes #87.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-05-18 19:06:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bf06081b9c
Fix interface descriptor when HID is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-05-02 18:28:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f1a8d8bc91
Use pyscard 2.2.1 since 2.2.2 has a bug
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-24 19:11:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d6f15f8384
Fix eddsa output folder.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-10 19:56:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dce4e304bc
Upgrade to v5.6
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-10 18:41:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f97aaadd17
Update build script to automatize EdDSA builds.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-10 18:41:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
611b762a1f
Use K1 curve in emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-07 01:29:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7c1ef56799
Fix ne parameter when secure message protocol is used.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-07 01:27:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4b59bd6481
0x85 and 0x86 should return not found to avoid authentication path.
Fixes #81 and #84.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-07 01:27:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9b1dceb8da
Use K1 curve for general authentication.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-07 01:24:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c4bc346d98
Sign release builds.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-04-06 18:37:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3e1b29f72a
Add support for slot selection.
Fixes #83.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-03-23 20:03:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bb27c2324b
Only pin to core in ESP32-S3 since it is multicore.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-03-07 19:35:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8c0a7c6681
Fix commissioned values for LED.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-23 00:53:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2db265c9c8
Merge branch 'development' 2025-02-21 20:35:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c58823f9ef
Build tests for EDDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-21 20:22:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
21b6a7782a
Add EdDSA support as a conditional build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-21 20:20:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
26f9e0dd54
Fix cyw43 build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-21 18:02:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4053b22f2e
Fix cyw43 build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-21 17:32:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ef71ec6a29
Upgrade to v5.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-20 18:10:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
72f2e0a58b
Upgrade to v5.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-20 18:09:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17ca65a41b
Upgrade to v5.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-19 20:21:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
92fe26c1e1
Upgrade to v6.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-19 19:18:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5c2dce9e52
Take led_driver on build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-19 19:14:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1cbcfce23f
Use all available boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-19 19:13:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1f3cecea8b
Use fastest clk for rp2040.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-19 19:13:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ac8d05b9e9
Add support for esp32s2 autobuild.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-19 12:14:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e00e620264
Upgrade to Pico SDK 2.1.1 autobuild.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-19 12:13:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
64d8dafa2b
Fix multiple interfaces in older PCSC versions.
Fixes #74 again.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-12 13:25:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0f3bb8242c
Fix multiple interfaces in older PCSC versions.
Fixes #74 again.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-02-12 13:25:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
747e5fbe86
Added phy_save() and phy_load() to save and load PHY.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-01-29 17:09:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8eb4669c0f
Fixes #74.
LibCCID allows propietary class for CCID (ALLOW_PROPIETARY_CLASS in LibCCID). Then both interfaces are loaded but since both belong to same device, only the last is opened.

We change maxSlot value even it breaks the ICCD spec to cause a timeout in LibCCID and deactivate WebCCID interface.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-01-17 20:56:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4c636e0ce5
Upgrade to v5.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-01-15 13:07:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
297f2e6228
Upgrade to v5.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-01-15 12:06:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
12a26f8506
Merge branch 'development' 2025-01-15 12:04:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
45a96f8742
Add rollback version to 1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-01-15 12:04:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ca2e04af53
Update initial memory for tests and KDM
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-01-08 14:47:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f0a9d03ca8
Fix storing MKEK in devices with OTP_1 available.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-01-08 14:38:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2502f99aff
Add OTP for emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2025-01-08 13:26:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
71636f4d66
Use partition bounds if available.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-30 21:42:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
310bcb8092
Fix bin name.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-27 02:22:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6c5735fc4b
Fix bin name.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-27 02:21:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3430655897
Fix merge file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-27 02:09:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3d9e806409
Fix merge file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-27 02:09:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ff8b343df4
Auto generate an esp32-s3 firmware bin file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-27 02:08:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0c6b0d295f
Auto generate an esp32-s3 firmware bin file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-27 02:03:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c6b03e54ca
Fix TX/RX buffers to align them with USB buffers and avoid overflows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-24 02:06:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
991f5fc960
More uint funcs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-23 21:41:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6d516b1b78
Use BE/LE functions for packing uint16.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-23 21:01:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a3ac550ec
Pack file struct.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-23 20:40:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
73232b6de4
Add LE/BE functions for uint16, 32 and 64.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-23 20:39:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d56b540324
Add support for displaying memory usage.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-23 20:24:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
74b635fa3c
Increase TinyUSB task stack size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-23 20:12:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
07d9e225d2
Use PHY value for LED GPIO number. Fixes #71.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-16 13:12:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3d960b931a
Fix MKEK masking order. Fixes #69.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-08 01:26:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ff7ef56cda
Dev options file must be persistent, since it manipulates MKEK which is in turn persistent.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-08 01:25:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
320455815f
Only allow initialize if secure lock is disabled or has mkek mask.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-08 01:24:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
859dec7e4a
Accept mkek mask only if secure lock is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-08 01:23:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
053ccf4a89
Fix esp32 build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-03 08:47:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f88aad1e2c
Fixed buffer overflow when unlocking the device.
Fixes #68.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-12-03 08:36:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
866aac8fe3
Add reboot extra command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-27 21:48:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a242a28394
Fix disable secure aut.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-27 16:11:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c33ed9b968
Fix autobuild for Pico SDK 2.1.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-25 23:59:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
65a4474dec
Fix build for RP2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-25 23:46:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e243def565
Add UP button timeout for PHY.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-25 15:24:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
78bc34827e
Autobuild for Pico SDK 2.0.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-25 13:13:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a69cb8a95a
Add CCID SET_CLOCK_AND_FREQUENCY command for latest IFD.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-25 12:55:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bb45c9b3a8
Merge branch 'master' into development-eddsa 2024-11-12 20:10:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1ea0a91ba8
Fix initialization when initializing a RP2350 board for first time.
Fixes #60.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-12 19:25:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6f572954d5
If the board is RP2350 or ESP32, the requested certificate must be for secp256k1 key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-12 19:24:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
99a9803328
Update README.md
Fix headings
2024-11-10 19:00:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5535f3ec10
No esp32 in eddsa workflows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 18:47:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f992a04142
Fix eddsa signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 18:45:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d858a1e1d5
Upgrade to v5.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 18:10:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b7c6ca58d0
Upgrade to v5.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 15:47:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f3d70fcac
Upgrade mbedtls v3.6.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 15:16:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
91c641033a
Merge branch 'development' 2024-11-09 15:00:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f3bf3cd8f4
Do not use pico patcher script anymore.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 14:58:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e4736cc448
Upgrade Pico Keys SDK to v7.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 14:58:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bfa8891c8d
Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 14:54:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
618fdb4c1a
Do not request dev cert when performing tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 00:50:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9457433844
Add compile flags for optimization build in ESP32.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 00:20:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c239b4dd7c
Fix secure otp build for non rp2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 19:46:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
96359ebe03
Add secure boot and secure lock commands via rescue.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 19:36:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f301b2a1b1
Add --no-dev-cert to do not request a certificate and use a self-signed one. Do not use if attestation is needed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 19:13:14 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4ec1d4d891
Fix initialization and terminal certificate generation.
Fixes #59.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 17:52:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f1410bbf04
Only request and upload the device certificate if needed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 17:45:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9b9ea7cae5
Add product and mcu to info in rescue mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-07 20:00:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f5b89aed69
Use DEV key from OTP if available when initializing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-07 00:16:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f74a374c64
Fix version header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-05 19:33:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3c6684cdab
Rename CCID_ codes to PICOKEY_
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-05 19:29:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
20ef94c301
Upgrade Pico HSM Tool to v2.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:28:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
68360978d6
Use BOOTKEY instead of reading json.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:25:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1933498a33
Add optional bootkey index param for secure_boot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:24:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0ce89ae968
Add support for lock chip on secure_boot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:19:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9fa3758dad
Add support for OTP raw read/write.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:15:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d1ee43baab
Add secure_boot enable.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 02:37:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2856ec6917
Align data in case it's not.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 02:14:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ccec83dfb1
Fix otp write length check.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 01:41:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9de1b4ca5d
Fix OTP data check size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 01:24:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cbd9a5d296
Add sanitize check.
Only pages 0 and 1 are allowed for reading.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 01:24:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
eaf3d051e3
Fix sc-hsm test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-15 23:16:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8e3801e9a2
Revert "Update flash memory for tests."
This reverts commit 5388c11182.
2024-10-15 23:00:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5388c11182
Update flash memory for tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-15 22:54:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2b77519a3b
Add OTP command to Pico HSM Tool.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-15 22:12:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
812a737ff5
Fix length.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-13 20:52:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6163b870ed
Fix haders.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-13 20:51:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08d4dc58aa
Add OTP extra command to read/write OTP without bootmode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-13 20:25:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0193e55f7b
Use macros in extras.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-13 20:06:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9dc3ea3232
Fix emulation alignment.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-01 14:38:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
48d92f53a0
Update Dockerfile with latest versions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-01 14:38:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3b083f9bd7
Fix nightly build for master branch
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:27:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9cd7bc7b3e
Fix nightly build for master branch
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:26:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4bea47faca
Add nightly builds workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:25:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
954eb1d890
Add nightly builds workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:22:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f7451f56ed
Add support for led dimming and max. brightness.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:21:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1a8c8440cf
Add support for LED management
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:08:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f1e5d0abd
Update pico_sdk_import
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-24 00:44:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4b314470b4
Fix header in Linux.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-20 07:19:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d0461f81f4
Upgrade codeaction to v3
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-20 07:19:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4454c633e4
Autobuild esp32
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-20 07:16:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
15664da61d
Added ESP32 OTP support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-16 00:54:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1a2bff33a8
Added ESP32 OTP support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-16 00:51:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cf44794bb6
Fix build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-13 08:47:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
33a6a70457
Use sha256 hardware if available.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-13 00:27:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3ddfe9689
Use OTP
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-11 23:16:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
72eb5a2a69
Enable OTP to store a permanent secret key.
It can be used by HSM or Fido to protect the keys and use it as MKEK.
2024-09-11 23:16:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
95f3a464b1
Use internal TRNG of Pico.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-06 15:16:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bb37a3ddb8
Fix artifacts version
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-05 15:21:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6da49336c9
Use v4 for artifacts
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-05 09:16:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fc69f5e1b1
Upgrade upload-artifact
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-05 07:46:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3602577b6e
Merge branch 'master' into development 2024-09-05 07:45:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6a72e4ffb
Fix indent
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-05 07:44:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c889cef488
Merge pull request #52 from polhenarejos/dependabot/github_actions/dot-github/workflows/actions/download-artifact-4.1.7
Bump actions/download-artifact from 3 to 4.1.7 in /.github/workflows
2024-09-04 01:34:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d78e925d49
Parse and set binary version
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-04 01:30:38 +02:00
dependabot[bot]
bb8fcbcd3f
Bump actions/download-artifact from 3 to 4.1.7 in /.github/workflows
Bumps [actions/download-artifact](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact) from 3 to 4.1.7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/compare/v3...v4.1.7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/download-artifact
  dependency-type: direct:production
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2024-09-03 23:24:23 +00:00
Pol Henarejos
c433e131eb
Use new led color module.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-03 18:08:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11d52495d7
Upgrade to MbedTLS 3.6.1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-03 12:12:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f450279370
Add support for Edwards curves generation.
Fixes #51

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-03 11:50:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b571b0b945
Upgrade to version 4.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 20:00:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5ae63959d5
Fix LED blink.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 18:21:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8e8bd32b44
Upgrade to version 4.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 12:04:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
68d2909653
Add RP2350 boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 12:04:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e64eb2157c
Fix emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 10:15:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
af23b401cb
Fix BOOT button in RP2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 09:55:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1da29f22c1
Fix emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 09:55:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f458750c91
Removed unused extern declaration.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 09:53:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5143df212
Fix emulation with mutexes
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-01 18:30:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
60f471cdd7
Update Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-01 18:17:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5c3c45a189
Add pthread lib to emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-30 13:13:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3b92ce0597
Use mutex/semaphores for emulation, like in Pico and ESP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-30 13:01:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
56ab770a26
Fix partition 0 boot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-29 16:29:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
09f7ed6640
Add support for RP2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-28 18:47:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aaf1bc2bbd
Add partitions to RP2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-28 18:46:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f7e8359835
Add pico_aon_timer lib.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-28 18:45:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1c45295d28
Move ESP32 partitions file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-28 18:44:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
af099cd416
Add support to RP2350.
RP2350 does not support RTC, so we use AON timer instead.
2024-08-28 16:42:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36d1011471
Fix USB/CCID writes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-26 22:42:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5714a91ab
Fix AES key generation for 192 and 256.
Fixes #48.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-26 02:39:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b8002a1a08
Update ESP32 sdkdefaults
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-26 02:33:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
604fc1aa45
Fix long writes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-26 02:19:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
39a5af8649
Free hd_context if error.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 20:00:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
28c63a500c
Revert "Fix non-free'd context."
This reverts commit 9335b088cf.
2024-08-25 19:55:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ef03ce4020
ADd latests changes in CCID interface memory management.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 19:40:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9335b088cf
Fix non-free'd context.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 19:39:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9cc934282c
Fix memory boundaries check.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 19:39:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2ad67e5e17
Fix new Pico Keys SDK selection callback.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 18:30:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7493f9eb3e
Upgrade to version 4.0.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-15 00:03:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d44b780970
Fix PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 16:57:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e7080d6f82
Upgrade to MbedTLS 3.6 with EdDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 15:32:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9258c9ff70
Fix merge.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 15:32:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ad18577e98
Merge branch 'master' into development-eddsa
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 13:34:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3cae928de8
Fix for Pico Patcher.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-07-15 14:41:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b429616895
Fix potential infinite loop when bad ASN1 is processed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-07-08 10:53:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0c2e728c35
Add EF.DIR list aid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:59:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5630043a4d
Fix binary read permission.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:59:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c1a47ed023
Fix EF.DIR selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:05:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bf2f961b85
Fix windows compatibility. Fixes #44.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-27 21:02:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0811b8022e
Update README.md 2024-06-24 20:37:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fd12758551
Upgrade to version 4.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-24 19:44:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c65f921188
Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-24 19:44:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55cf9292d2
Update ESP32 CMake
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 02:09:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
db5c7adef4
Update tests for OpenSC 0.25.1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:59:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d3751e3918
Upgrade opensc version in workflows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:18:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d708158fea
Fix key unwrap with latest OpenSC. Fixes #41.
SC-HSM driver in OpenSC has changed the procedure for unwraping. It stores the wrap into a temporary file (0x2F10) and then it calls unwrap cmd.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:17:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dc979194fa
Fix crash in mbedtls 3.6
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:00:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
237e687c3b
Upgrade to Pico Keys SDK v6.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-22 20:57:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ed89175edc
Fix rare overflow (never happens).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-22 19:03:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9a7be98e6e
Settings proper phy options
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 22:08:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c4a08aff0f
Upgrade to Mbedtls 3.6
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:29:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
223fc117dd
Enable patch only for RPI
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:15:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d1fb4d0c65
Merge branch 'master' into development
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:14:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
47acef71c8
Only when not emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:11:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bb641ee134
Merge pull request #43 from al-heisner/master
Fix for multiples of 64 bytes on cmd_list_keys
2024-06-21 21:05:27 +02:00
al heisner
99c777c780 Fix for multiples of 64 bytes on cmd_list_keys 2024-06-21 11:35:05 -05:00
Pol Henarejos
79f76a176d
Fix time.h header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 23:36:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dd68554782
Added support for enable/disable Web CCID on the fly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 23:29:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f20fdc9bda
Add missing header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:42:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e7d4a5dd3d
Fix tusb initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:35:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b4671c2ecb
Merge branch 'esp32' into development 2024-06-19 22:03:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
50a29519bd
First release to support ESP32.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:03:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
54cdbfc22c
Add PHY OPTS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:01:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4a40cebe1f
Merge pull request #40 from fastchain/extras-button-check
Security fix for issue 39
2024-06-17 11:30:31 +02:00
fastchain
87ffd21543
Update cmd_extras.c
This security fix ensures that the extra settings, cannot be silently disabled, if button control enabled. So the button control setting cannot be silently (without button push) disabled, even if the user's PC is fully compromised.
2024-06-13 16:09:54 +09:00
Pol Henarejos
7cb0bbf982
Merge branch 'development' into esp32
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-03 13:06:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
07079b6ba1
Add descriptive message.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-05-30 19:19:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
294ca81d7d
Upgrade patch_vidpid with newer Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-05-30 19:18:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
218660e694
Only allow change PHY without PIN. PIN is required for other extra options.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-22 23:47:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
de89d61359
Use new file methods.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-22 23:44:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8e8192362c
Use macros for referring system fids.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:43:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
25c93c279f
Fix potential crash on loading dkek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:42:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
001d076fdf
Better check for XKEK content.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:42:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
35d5d5e94e
Use search_file() method.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:19:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b034303193
Use new methods search_file() and file_put_data().
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 16:36:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
623cf10dba
Add phy command to pico-hsm-tool to change VIDPID dynamically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:51:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fdc41e5856
Add support for PHY command to store and change VIDPID and LED no. dynamically on reboot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:50:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5d0dc210da
Use external unique ID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:48:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a674410826
Remove carriage return \r for better debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:46:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
920d22212a
Add phy command to pico-hsm-tool to change VIDPID dynamically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 23:23:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aeeb540a2f
Add support for PHY command to store and change VIDPID and LED no. dynamically on reboot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 23:22:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
be071b0bc1
Add support for dynamic VID / PID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:05:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8bbbdb4dd8
Build WCID interface.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:04:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
45b633cc9d
More defaults.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:04:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
842919a26b
Use external unique ID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-15 23:45:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3dbcefea85
Upate build parameters.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-11 15:15:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
60038f9345
Fix flash issues.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-10 20:29:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d8c7fb0856
Remove carriage return \r for better debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-10 18:16:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d6456b4dde
First attempt to add support to ESP32.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-08 19:41:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ac781c1db6
Fix asn1 struct initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-03-13 21:21:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c3b66773e8
Use new asn1 structs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-03-13 18:11:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3ca23b932c
Fix Windows emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:43:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9fad920c3b
Fix Windows emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:43:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
38bef5b43f
Fix error message
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:26:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2034e436d1
Fix CVC outer signature length.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-08 10:59:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
215221b30e
Let's add pico and local CodeQL modes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:51:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
de4d95beb8
Fix Pico build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:43:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
963b6f4f87
Fix CodeQL build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:36:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fa9b244c42
Fix LE computation in a wrapped APDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 19:57:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2b92d89ab7
Fix size_t casting.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 19:56:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a1d7733b95
Fix key exchange.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:44:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
39f1041dbb
Fix byte overwrite for long chained RAPDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:36:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2e4fc568db
Fix new return format for import_kek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:36:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4f4e6e09a2
Fix size var load.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:31:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
08c0aaee6f
Fix SM wrap for large RAPDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 01:03:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
de98e79c99
Try to fix CodeQL build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 21:09:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
481cd5fd69
Some fixes for emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 20:58:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d9a8826a32 Stupid bug integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 02:01:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d82affa880 Added support for building emulation in Windows.
It has not been tested but it should not break any linux build.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 01:55:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab31a6615c
Fix ATR overwrite.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-29 19:07:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
677cceb130
Update to latest PicoHSM.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-29 19:07:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
29967c067a
Add -DVIDPID=<VALUE> to build a project with a known VID/PID. Supported values: NitroHSM, NitroFIDO2, NitroStart, NitroPro, Nitro3, Yubikey5, YubikeyNeo, YubiHSM, Gnuk, GnuPG
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-11 18:14:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2974aa234a
Added required for subparsers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 16:59:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d90b296237
Added keygen command to generate AES, X25519 and X448 keys.
It replaces x25519/x448 commands and cipher keygen subcommand.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 16:57:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e98b26fee5
Flush stderr.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:34:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2086a68c53
Key id not needed on keygen.
It also returns the fresh new generated key id.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:34:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
74afa07512
Do not make a PRKD on key unwrap since it is already done when storing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:33:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e96e1d0097
When a key is generated and stored, it creates its PRKD.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:33:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d47f0224e
Fix emulation in apple.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 14:26:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
58692b2711
Fix PRKD cert on key unwrap.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 14:14:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5ab1cabc5
Add support for AES-ECB, AES-CBC with custom IV, AES-OFB, AES-CFB, AES-GCM, AES-CCM, AES-CTR and AES-XTS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 21:19:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c7cdc8564
Added support for CMAC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 20:28:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d74b3418bc
Fix typo
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 20:13:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fb5be153ed
Fix merge.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:51:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0ac71f2fff
Removed old SDK
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:47:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6ec5235cc3
Upgrade Pico Keys SDK and mbedtls 3.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:38:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ff74d6306e
mbedtls 3.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:27:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ba562da00e
Merge branch 'development' into development-eddsa
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:11:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
98e9b72b42
Upgrade version to 3.6.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:26:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1b0d23cf24
Add two new boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:26:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3ccff7881f
Upgrade to Pico Keys SDK 5.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:25:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a3bf2e9e14
If no key is found, generate a new one.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:10:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
88ff27f354
Fix mbedTLS 3.5 build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:01:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ed2925cfb6
Use new Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:25:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cc19f8f061
Use new pico-keys-sdk submodule.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:20:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b6831a4650
Rename pico-hsm-sdk submodule to new name.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:20:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
652a0f0d21
Fix managing spaces.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 21:04:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9dbf4b3172
Removing pkcs11-tool test for EC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 19:03:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
76522829ef
User must log in after DKEK import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:42:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6b1eeb4004
Fix DKEK import when no logged.
DKEK shall accept import even if it is not logged in. However, to store the DKEK, the PIN is used for MKEK, which is not available if it is nog logged in. I added a queueing system to store a pending DKEK after login.

Therefore, to import a DKEK, the user must import it AND call VERIFY command if it is not already logged in.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:42:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2693ab4926
Fix applet selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:40:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5d21e39aa6
Fix deleting key domain.
It only checks if contains keys and no other files.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:40:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1bf0d6337b
Added backup and restore tests (pkcs11 wrap/unwrap).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:12:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1950b03d35
Add more pkcs11-tool tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:11:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4be258f4c7
Fix applet loading.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:04:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
eddb1baf7b
Use new applet selection format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:03:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11bb00e186
Default key domain is 0.
It allows to wrap keys not associated to any key domain.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:03:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aaed6bd7b6
New format for applet selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:02:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2853b38b08
Add PKCS11 tool test
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 13:00:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
654cb1e4e0
Added AES pkcs11 tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 12:13:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
185d19504f
Add plaintext debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 12:12:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dbe0ef19de
Fix store binary test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 22:17:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3b57b229f
Add sc-hsm-pkcs11-test to test matrix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:56:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
43c46e9112
Add sc-hsm-embedd pkcs11 driver and test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:56:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d5af9160c1
Build in docker with for CI flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:55:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e27c8d4ff6
Added flag for compile for CI or production.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:55:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2ecfff0ebb
Add store binary data tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:15:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3057aba041
Fix redundant line.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:15:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
011a594fe4
Also use artifacts@v3 on upload.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:18:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
448d61dd2d
Use artifact@v3
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:00:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fa821c43c8
Prune images autom.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:00:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9db3e78d32
Not necessary rmi
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:41:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b74c4070d1
When build, it copies generated binaries to image, which will be used later by other jobs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:26:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a7770a7e57
Check Pico HSM PCSC connectivity.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:25:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
78cbe59e64
Fix startup
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:58:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
42a9434c50
Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:46:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11a3472941
Refactor test workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:45:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2f177eb8df
Build image only during build
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:46:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c97680772d
Use artifacts
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:36:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
345ae2be69
Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:36:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ba036f4c0f
Add EC derive tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:35:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4493afa84d
Fix workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:46:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d118b787a2
Try using reusable workflows
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:44:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
205356b848
Let's try different jobs
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:21:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c435764978
Add PKCS11 asymmetric ciphering tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 13:10:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2e633abb2c
Use dynamic dd size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 13:09:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3514c7ad82
Fix pkcs11 runner test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 09:30:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4bba3c6f64
Merge branch 'master' into development 2023-10-09 08:30:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8321996a14
Fix +x flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 08:30:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3af303468
Split pytest and pkcs11 test suites.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 00:58:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c44d7db4e1
Refactor tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 00:34:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cb1bba4f13
Enable pytest tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 01:12:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
48301a5d71
Fix chunking
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 00:50:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1105a1263c
Add signature and verification tests for RSA and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 00:48:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
37421d9aad
Added pkcs11 keygen test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-26 20:09:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d906df2809
Add initialization test script with pkcs11
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-24 10:30:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08e7d74a81
Fix sending binary when ne=0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-24 10:30:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
433e509c94
Add initialize with pkcs11-tool test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f08d612ae
Add base58 to dockerfile.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
173ca7678d
Accept arbitrary SO-PIN length on reset retry.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3d7f714936
Fix initialization with so-pin.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f4a537f156
Added NO_DELAY in emulation env.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f09654ccf4
Added --silent flag to initialization to avoid prompt display.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7506ccd263
Update usage.md 2023-09-05 19:45:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ee442ac084
Get vpcd from repo instead of building it.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:39:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b94810d31d
Added triggers to development-eddsa branch.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:17:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2c4be41ecf
Remove print.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:12:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
447d223de4
Fix mbedtls ed448 bugs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:12:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4f9f7f14fe
Add support for Edwards cvc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:08:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6699913eff
Add edwards signature test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:06:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b0057bc3fe
Add edwards key import test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e3a773d145
Add edwards key generation test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
10a47f9177
Uniform ec key loading.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f49a144ac
Add support for Edwards key import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e67a7091ff
Add support for Edwards key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:04:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1d3232df36
Fix loading and saving Montgomery keys.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:01:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7376817724
Fix G export.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:00:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5e801fbae7
Merge branch 'development' into development-eddsa 2023-08-24 10:35:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e18c413268
Added X25519 and X448 exchange test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:42:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e1c82196a
Added test for Curve25519 and Curve448 key import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:39:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6a5272340
Added test for Curve25519 and Curve448 keypair generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:39:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a6072b4ce8
Curve25519 and Curve448 are encoded using ECDH template.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:38:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5bdba8e1e8
Move to ecp_keypair instead of ecdsa.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:20:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5df4e62f81
Revert previous fix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:20:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
685c7f25fc
Revert previous fix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:19:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
faef2dc278
Added support for EdDSA signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:10:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
22d8793683
Add fix in EdDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 15:29:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
32c8bc4a24
Enable EdDSA for curves Ed25519 and Ed448 in config file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-16 15:05:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5174d64af
Using SDK with EdDSA support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-14 02:45:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
235bf342b3
Update README.md
Added description for hierarchical deterministic key generation.
2023-08-02 14:34:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
57188ff877
Added some tests for HD ciphering.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-24 11:45:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f631e4a5f3
Code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-17 12:56:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f880ee6c93
Added support for HD symmetric ciphering.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-17 12:55:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6af4cc7fec
Fix getting RTC with pico-hsm-tool.
Closes #25.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-06-20 13:32:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e3f1f45a9f
Added more tests for HD Signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-27 19:00:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fe315e7326
Fix AES derivation (HKDF).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-27 19:00:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
02903bbc65
Added tests for HD signatures.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 18:07:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ee3ee21e40
Added support for signatures based on HD BIP/SLIP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 18:07:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6c00e7e43
Added tests for SLIP-0021 node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 17:15:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
29544a3f17
Added support for SLIP-0021 node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 17:15:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5135404083
Fix node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 15:17:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55520ce184
Added support for master key generation for symmetric derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 14:07:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
525b05b7ef
Small refactoring to avoid unnecessary casts from uint32 to byte strings.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 12:18:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b61a34d415
Added more tests for secp256r1 curves.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:47:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0eea0fb096
Fix deriving nodes with retries (invalid first key).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:47:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
82c03ee6c4
Fix memory free on error.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:40:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
20dfbcaaed
Fix xpub for masters.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 11:25:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a9fb170c58
Added tests for BIP and SLIP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-23 20:40:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
46d85c029e
Added first commit with BIP and SLIP support for cryptowallets.
Needs more work.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-23 20:40:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1c6f4cfd7f
Update FUNDING.yml 2023-05-17 09:44:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
526869bc06
Create FUNDING.yml 2023-05-17 09:42:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
279df32acc
Update README.md
Added link to Pico Patcher tool.
2023-05-11 20:05:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c402b884cc
Upgrade to mbedtls 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-10 00:17:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8316196b42
Using forked vsmartcard just in case
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-04 11:10:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7a6dafd7b6
Moving HSM SDK pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-04 09:13:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6d3809a792
Allow signatures with device key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-06 14:09:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f22f58f983
Fix returning EOF when reading an element outside the size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-06 14:08:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
405bf92e18
Added support for TokenInfo and StaticTokenInfo files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-04 09:53:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5b6dcd2e6
Fix conditional build for WS2812.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-26 20:16:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d637dbec01
Added CMAC and AES generation to README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-26 18:42:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ebcac9dfdc
Upgrade to pico-hsm-tool to use the newer PicoHSM python package.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 20:19:53 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
510b148adf
Update README with latest AES algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 20:19:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
371ae93fcd
Added support for AES CCM.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 19:20:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f5e875a6b7
Added support for AES CTR.
Note: the OID used by CTR does not exist.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 18:47:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ad3304a384
Added AES XTS tests, with and without IV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:29:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d647ba3c8
Add sanity check if wrong oid is provided.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:28:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
008db87fa7
Fix AES XTS call.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:28:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1d80b45439
Add tests for AES extended.
It tests ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB and GCM.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:25:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17560034ec
Fix AES extended encoding call.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:23:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8b0d85fbd4
Fix PRKD generation for AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:57:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3dcb2e9d70
A PRKD is generated on every key import, regardless it might be replaced later.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:56:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0f12ff1c48
Added support for PRKD for AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:07:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a5fe1cc6d
Added initialization with self-signed certificate.
It will allow the initialization with OpenSC tool (sc-hsm-tool --initialize). However, it will not allow the use of card with SCS3, as it needs a PKI with trust chain. In this case, pico-hsm-tool.py shall be used for initialization.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 01:04:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5e0f62265d
Fix key size of terminal cert.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 21:41:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0990805fb6
More code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 20:08:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
18bcf532e7
PicoHSM always returns bytes().
No need for casting.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 20:07:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9f0316aedd
Add chachapoly tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:08:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
088002863c
Before cloning, it should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:03:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7876f4b32a
pypicohsm is built everytime that test is run, since it could implement more features used by tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:02:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5e3d4e0e5
Added dockerfile for debian.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:01:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0c842773d2
Move to debian docker.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0aaf339353
Fix error message.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
efba39adc5
Add SW_WRONG_DATA return on bad tag for Chachapoly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
13755cb4d5
Fix buffer overflow when importing AES 512 key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:06:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
11a30863e8
Using new package pypicohsm.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a69d06b2d9
Fixed chachapoly crypt algorithm.
It missed setkey function. So, no key was used at any moment.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 20:24:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c7bc18161
Added support for AES 512 bit key size.
AES XTS uses two keys. Therefore, XTS with 2 AES 256 implies 64 bytes key length.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 20:22:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
86ce01cac2
Added AES XTS via AES_EXT command.
Note that it requires 32 bytes or 64 bytes key length.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 19:42:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9cb60ba420
Added AES ECB (insecure), CBC (with custom IV), OFB, CFB and GCM (with 16-byte tag) via AES_EXT command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 19:34:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
99f1620e7d
Fixes #22.
SC-HSM returns the result with a 0x04 prepended. This comes from OpenSC but it is not clear the exact reason. 0x04 is usually for encoding uncompressed EC points but in that case it does not seem to make sense.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-18 18:40:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
755570e01a
Fix deletion key in test 50.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-18 18:38:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4b264597d6
Fix race condition.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-14 09:58:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
67e3d908b3
Fix test key deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-14 09:57:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7ae76354ef
Added more tests for key_export.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:03:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9291c2b4e3
delete_file() supports p1/p2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:02:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
657ee18730
Added assert on deletion
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:02:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
132054c9b9
Public point is calculated everytime a private key is loaded.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:01:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a3b9b7474
Fix wrapping points.
Now it uses mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary() for better control.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4e73723747
Fix checking key domain set.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-10 15:59:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
09724d95db
Fix XKEK key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-10 07:34:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c1bfb597bc
Added first tests of key wrapping.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:10:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fd53b88397
Added more tests to key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
11e5338736
Check if key domain is not already initialized when initializing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3660120b11
Before wrapping, check if DKEK is properly configured.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
75ca1b57d9
Added support of counter, algorithms and key domain to AES too.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:39:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7af67713e7
Add support for counter, algorithms and key domain in key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:38:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63c465138b
Added delete XKEK tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:28:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d569df108
Added dkek import in key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:28:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bee6a7bb92
Return error if a non-initialized key domain is deleted.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:27:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e4583eb9c0
Fix potential crash on delete file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:16:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c8582365d
Add manual trigger
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 08:48:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
daf71678c5
Added first XKEK tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 22:15:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
26f0775772
Move some certs to common place.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 22:15:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ed674b379c
Zeroize ecdh key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 11:15:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6aa8d37d07
If a key does not belong to any key domain, it cannot be wrapped.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:45:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
963456051e
If public point is not found, it is computed automatically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:45:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1e90699a3f
Added more PKA tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:16:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f8110a9d75
Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:16:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d81b21695f
If no key domain is found, 0 is used by default.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:15:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
51e9e6722e
Reset puk status on failed authentication.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:14:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
dba4630895
Add Public Key Authorization tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 17:28:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ee73c6e781
Code style
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 17:28:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f63966c60
Fix checking status of PUK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 15:55:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e624f9ff72
Fix checking if PKU is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:15:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fb4ff9424e
Call reset puk store on init.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:14:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63b245b858
Fix initialize with PUK store memory.
Now it is cleared.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:14:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cd525d91a3
Updated base flash memory for emulation to include CA CVC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 01:09:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fd3b4d858
CA cert is also uploaded to perform PKA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 01:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3c160f69c0
Add DV cert to PUK store.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 00:40:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2c9fa8b19f
Add two new boards for build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 00:39:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ccfe7ca8a8
Upgrade to version 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:38:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d2d038f14d
Upgrade to version 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:35:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1a05d7b51f
Fix conditional interface compilation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:16:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fa60ed5049
Update code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:05:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
35aec06391
Adding support for CCID GET, SET and RESET PARAMS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-20 13:17:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
61359c7ebd
Add key derivation tests (HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 23:54:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
20c01eb08d
Fix name of x963 function.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 23:54:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0b71bf693d
Added CMAC tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:46:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a1f478239d
Added HMAC tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:43:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
420e55901c
Fix HMAC computation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:43:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
414cab78e3
Enabling entropy and ctr_drbg for emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 23:43:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
36e5282d19
Update codeql.yml
Enable CodeQL to development branch.
2023-02-16 23:36:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
367651fe75
Upgrade to mbedtls v3.3.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 23:34:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7b62ca5327
Upgrade to mbedtls v3.3.0 2023-02-16 23:33:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9be176e523
Fixes for Pico SDK 1.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 22:55:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b24e109a3c
Fix error message when no card is detected.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 22:50:53 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f61d0dd677
Update codeql.yml
Added development branch to CodeQL workflow.
2023-02-15 19:55:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
215fdca9f8
Added AES cipher tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 19:47:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9279773073
Removed printf
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 19:46:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d5b718ca58
Move pointer again...
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 00:14:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cd6e280f4f
Switching to new style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 00:10:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e7495d11f2
Moving pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:25:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
daaa5bf402
Harmonize coding style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:13:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cab72f200a
Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:12:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
380d47faa1
Renaming for avoiding confusions
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:05:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
962d1c6916
When runing a test, load a initial flash image that contains KEYDEV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 22:53:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d81d51d6fc
Fix get public key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 21:51:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
319000df1a
Add challenge tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 21:38:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5508e531a0
Added key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:52:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1e846600dd
Add test info
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:51:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
43a49d2a14
Return reference not found when deleting a key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:51:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3b9c2d159b
Fix returning existing key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:47:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
14c7852143
Fix returning shared secret.
I do not know why a 0x04 was prepended.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 11:28:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
407110def4
Added ECDH tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 11:25:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
79d86a335c
Adding more tests and renaming old ones.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:54:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0685be5f1e
EE_CERTIFICATE is added when importing key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:53:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8f6ae52c70
Added routines for import key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:52:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
af16be64a2
Adding checks on ec import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:30:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
68071825c2
Fix EC public key computation when importing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:24:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fbabb81acd
Fix asymmetric decrypt for OAEP. It only supports SHA256.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8bc4b133ca
Adding routine for asymmetric decryption.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2ce458dad5
Adding BP curves and RSA 4k to signature test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
478b186094
Finally it seems to work.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 16:09:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab71b3163b
Adding sleep just in case.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 16:07:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c4de88e6c6
Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 15:39:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3b0e34f465
More tries...
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:23:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9077e78315
More flags to debug
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:15:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f5fcd1f14
Start pcscd with debug flag to get more debug info.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:09:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
24d430a3ac
Updating pointer to include aesni
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:04:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
307eb63ee5
Init submodules in actions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:59:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
07f85dc4b8
Add warning removal
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:18:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a4026e0ca0
Submodules must be pulled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:09:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ebd8dc7bb8
Add apt-utils package.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:08:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bac15d5472
Removing TTY from docker.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:05:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8540fdcf19
Updating pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fc8d39882f
Add missing build file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:00:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ca093eb81e
Add emulation and test workflow.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 11:59:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
35c42bccb4
List PRKD if exist.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:25:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
52114b2d85
Added initialization on each keypairgen.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:25:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8f593f6357
Added support for build emulation in Apple and Linux.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:24:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6f8769ee8d
Added scripts for testing in a docker container.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:24:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1af461c206
Add first battery of tests.
It contains keypair generation for ECC and RSA, PIN blocking and signature generation and verification.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 13:41:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8976dc1f79
Added support for RSA-PKCSv15-SHA224, SHA384 and SHA512. Also added support for RSA-PSS-SHA224, SHA384 and SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:41:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9d47e62041
Fix signature for secp521r1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0daddfd477
Fix ECDSA-SHA384 and ECDSA-SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:05:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
89d617110f
Add asn1_build_prkd_rsa()
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-16 18:54:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17941397e9
Fix exporting large ECC key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-16 18:54:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f2aa4aae79
Moving pointer to latest bug fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-14 00:41:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e29b3143ed
Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-13 18:49:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5419ff74ee
Using file_has_data() to check contents.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-13 18:07:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
723011078c
Using file_has_data() instead of data directly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:06:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fe7c0333ab
Some emulation fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:06:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c01940b62b
Fix accessing way to data.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7195a8f3ec
Fix headers in emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7764de4e10
Unused headers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e05c526b4d
Fix printf format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bc20f98b44
In emulation, return always 1mb of memory.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
742c3f3e3c
RTC command is not available in emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9793977ffc
Fixed double counter increment.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6c85772fff
Added emulated build capability.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:03:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9ff3254a4c
Update to latest HSM SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-22 22:50:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7d906851dd
Updating to newer version of Pico HSM SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-20 23:51:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
691aa3308c
Fix when importing a dkek and it fails.
Now the dkek state is returned to the previous one.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:11:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6a57e67629
Fix importing dkek twice.
It is not allowed anymore.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:04:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
202c8a4b22
Credentials are not necessary when importing DKEK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:00:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f2874ae3ef
Fix when ping is provided during the initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:00:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9e9cf9b768
Upgrading version to v3.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 19:00:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c95dee84f2
Changing backend service url.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 19:00:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
65cde9960f
Upgrading version to v3.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-04 17:42:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7ca96178fb
Moving HSM SDK pointer to latest release.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-28 18:54:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
020feaf325
Update README.md
Fix header
2022-11-15 22:42:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e70461e551
Merge branch 'master' into development 2022-11-15 17:40:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0e918434a2
Update README.md 2022-11-15 17:38:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63c85000d0
Added support for kdf.
It supports HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963, with multiple MD (SHA family), salt/nonces and configurable output size.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-15 00:15:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4113f6a65d
Fix parsing PBKDF2 params.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-15 00:14:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f98d744076
Add apdu.ne check for large buffers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 18:04:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bb4c293736
Adding subparsers for subcommands.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 16:27:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
aa8b1e6efe
Added support for X963 KDF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 15:38:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0cb2e8ec2e
Added PBES2 key derivation with encryption and decryption support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 13:07:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0e96753ccb
Added support for PBKDF2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 12:01:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2b2df22d75
Added support for configurable HKDF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 10:14:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f65167e3c7
Adding support for keypair generation for Curve25519 and Curve448.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:10:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fe2677a56
Fix cofactor return with cvc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:08:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d09a7cf9c8
If self-signature fails, puts all-0.
When generating a keypair and returns a self-signed CVREQ, the signature might fail for Curve25519 and Curve448. Instead of returning null, it puts zeros in order to return what is expected to return.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:04:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6bf72e5a59
Added support for HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-08 17:26:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7c877ebea2
Using file_out parameter.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 22:31:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e1983f7bcc
Now is possible pipe encrypt & decrypt commands.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 22:16:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5e025a4e5
If no applet is selected, then select it.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 21:37:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a7682d2639
Adding Extended Cipher feature.
With this new subcommand, Pico HSM will support newer cipher algorithms.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is the first. It will be based on a custom P2 subcommand to support an arbitrary structure with multiple parameters (AAD, IV, etc.)

pico-hsm-tool.py shall be used.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 21:37:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
30301c68f1
Linux uses the generic interface. Needs deep testing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 13:14:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
abf980d84e
Fixes in windows backend.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 18:41:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8718f55df2
Adding secure_key for windows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 18:26:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d1a3a24527
Import secure_key only when needed.
Now, it does not block anymore the entire execution of pico tool.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 16:09:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f363b77a07
Adding secure_key for macOS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 16:06:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d5899a90c1
Merge pull request #10 from rrottmann/small-fixes
Small fixes
2022-11-03 16:05:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f1058ea611
Merge branch 'master' into small-fixes 2022-11-03 15:48:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
00279da8d5
Adding Secure Lock to lock the device with a random 256 bit key.
This is an extra layer of security to avoid brute force attacks if PIN is too weak.
At every hard reset (on device plug), the device must be unlocked prior any other command. Once unlocked, the device can be used as usual.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 15:09:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
eda8b53949
Memory cleanup on ECDH.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 12:54:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cfc0cc8f6e
Some optimizations.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 00:38:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab61b2a2d5
Fix returning public key of koblitz curve secp_k1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 00:38:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f79a6ed30a
Do not override Ne.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 23:42:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4313722b06
Fix memory free on keygen ecc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 23:15:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
eec4612a6f
Fix when secure message cannot be correctly processed.
It is discarded.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 21:11:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b2ac893efc
Fix general authentication with AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 21:09:41 +01:00
Reiner Rottmann
14e8d9cd04 Fixing typo in command. 2022-10-30 08:52:28 +01:00
Reiner Rottmann
1a6cfd17cb Small fix in ModuleNotFoundError handling. 2022-10-30 08:51:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3835507e00
Fix displaying error message if pycvc is missing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-29 11:35:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4536589e2c
Added error message if package is missing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 11:02:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1e39558fbc
Typo
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:39:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a089cc279b
Adding support for changing SO-PIN.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:37:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84f646dbad
Fix storing SO-PIN session when checking PIN with SO-PIN.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:37:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b9ec473aaa
Fix critical bug saving SO-PIN securely.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:27:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b7eb0dff02
Upgrade to Version 3.0.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:27:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
06f550cc04
Update usage.md 2022-10-09 22:26:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1752b1aec7
Update usage.md 2022-10-09 22:25:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
67ea640a14
Fix endianness of patcher (again)
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:20:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f593060007
Moving delete_file() outside.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:07:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8504eed35c
Adding fixes and moving to Mbedtls 3.2.1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:07:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8b29b137a8
Small fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:04:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08d3ca6d27
Update README.md 2022-10-09 19:57:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e6767f4c0a
Moving pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-09-25 23:25:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9e5d65706e
Merge pull request #2 from rrottmann/master
Building pico-hsm using Linux containers
2022-09-25 18:42:37 +02:00
Reiner Rottmann
61d7b6da38 Added Dockerfile for building pico-hsm and updated README.md with instructions. 2022-09-23 20:36:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6affe64ec5
Adding missing file to pico-hsm-sdk. 2022-08-31 14:19:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ab75718927
Using pico_hsm_sdk library instead. 2022-08-31 14:10:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9e1747e539
Upgrading pico-hsm-sdk version to v3.0 2022-08-31 14:09:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a7396dc698
Fix the endianness of vid/pid patcher. 2022-08-31 14:08:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
67699bd24c
Before initializing, we select the applet. 2022-08-30 17:55:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
62c72c48a5
Moving to new pico-hsm-sdk. 2022-08-30 17:55:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3944c8437a
Moving to pico-hsm-sdk 2022-08-30 17:54:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b7d603342e
Upgrading pico-ccid 2022-08-29 11:32:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6e5db3c292
Upgrading pico-ccid to version 2.2 2022-08-29 11:31:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4fb26559f4
Adding --so-pin flag for initialize command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 13:47:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c366c1d1a3
Added datetime and options menu to manipulate the RTC and options (press-to-confirm button and optional counter for each key).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 13:38:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e8cc6a169e
Try to recover MKEK twice: with previous PIN/SO-PIN or after setting the new PIN/SO-PIN just in case some is the same as previous.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7d7b6b88ba
Trying to recover MKEK to preserver device private key. If not, all are generated again.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
138af5c113
Adding --pin parameter for initialization.
If provided, it unlocks MKEK before initialization.
If not, it will generate a new MKEK and device certificate.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b3bcad9ce6
Making MKEK persistent.
It must be persistent as it encrypts device private key and therefore it must survive across reinitializations.
However, if no PIN is provided to unlock it, it will be lost, as with device private key.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cd6f898f8e
Fix storing certs in DER format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9ef088971b
Integrate all commands to a single script
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e399b1c0b1
Renaming the tools and moving to tools/ folder.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
59bacaf5b4
Update scs3.md
Updated patch.
2022-08-24 14:11:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d872a156c1
Update scs3.md
Updated CA certs.
2022-08-24 14:04:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5e4583762
Add a tool for attestation of a private key.
It looks for a particular private key and generates a report with some useful information and validates the source of the private key, whether it is generated in this device or outside.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 14:54:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
38b9c06138
Reformat oids.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 14:52:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
df18a1e917
Added header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 00:50:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2bc40771ca
Fix generating CVC REQ.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 00:50:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5696c7a5da
Update public_key_authentication.md 2022-08-22 14:24:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5f980fc98
Fix curve for ECDH key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-22 01:13:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aebb68724a
Removing trailing spaces.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 01:44:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1f2ccd8c1c
Not used.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 01:40:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
874058d86a
Pull last changes in pico-ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 00:03:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8fccb80295
New burn-certs is called after compilation, not before. Not needed anymore.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:58:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c9c60575c7
Removed 3DES as it is unsecure.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:55:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7e6ed20b26
Not downloading nested submodules for tinyusb
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:53:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
52c7be4e16
Also clone nested submodules
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:38:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36d250fc2b
Github does not clone submodules. So, let's do it
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:33:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84ba0e03de
Fix missing TinyUSB submodule
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:31:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7d27c4b546
Fix autobuild
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:28:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
80b2bab0f8
Granting root to apt
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:23:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
79372ced2f
Just install the SDK in the workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:21:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6fc91962bd
Update codeql.yml 2022-08-18 23:13:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fb76c23694
Let's try our autobuild
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:00:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fc6c852e09
When used this tool, the device is always reset to default state.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:09:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
82f61ff1d4
When initialized, the device key (EF_KEY_DEV) is only generated if not found.
To generate a new device key, it must be wiped.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:08:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
64052f4f70
Marked EF_DEV files as persistent to remain permanent.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:08:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36c8150f25
Enhanced the procedure for burning the device certificate.
When initialized, the device generates a private key in place and stores it encrypted. The publick key is recovered and sent to our PKI, which generates a CV certificate. This CV certificate is stored inside the device, jointly with the DV CVC.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cb492728ec
Device key now uses SECP256R1 curve.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fec02ca733
Removing cvcerts.h dependency.
A python script gets the public key of the device (EF_EE_DEV) and requests to our PKI for a CVC. Once got, it is updated to EF_TERMCA (0x2f02).
termca_pk is now on EF_KEY_DEV and termca is on EF_TERMCA (concat with DICA).

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4e01a78286
Fix OID names.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
538b39386b
List keys returns the DEV key if exists.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
977aced343
Fix OID names.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
83b5753bb5
Fix saving DEV key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a57c3b691f
Fix passing DEBUG_APDU flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
648a374ebb
Create codeql.yml 2022-08-17 18:27:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3568e1211
Create the terminal private key with id = 0.
This is the terminal private key, which will be signed by our PKI.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:20:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6a16d4d55c
Fix returning store_keys();
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:17:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ab2e71cc40
By default, all CVC are self-generated (chr=car).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:16:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f79fe9f7d0
Fix when no DKEK is present.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:16:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6956587106
Add newline at the end of file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 23:31:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
349df56b09
Missing header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 15:00:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e6f082d512
Splitting cmd_xxx() functions in separate files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 14:59:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
87feed1222
Renaming KEK files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 13:47:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55c8a66613
Fix wrap/unwrap keys with specific allowed algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 02:58:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2e88422c86
Fix deleting KEK when a key is present in the key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:50:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
da841b82d4
Fix deleting KEK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:48:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9256a72c3e
Added XKEK derivation to save the KEK from XKEK key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:43:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
69120cc961
Added cvc_get_ext() to find CVC extensions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:43:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
06aaf58f0b
Added extension optional parameter to be included in the CVC body.
This field should be a concatenation of tag 73, which should include an OID and a context.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:07:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
12e5a586d2
Adding support for XKEK CVC extension.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 22:18:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e76ed7077
Adding OID for CVC extensions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 21:12:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
be911a7aa7
Clearing hash, just in case.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:55:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0556a528f3
Fix DKEK key domain creation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:51:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
de789cef66
Fix Key Domain deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:46:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7208d01547
Adding XKEK Key Domain creation.
It validates the membership and creates a XKEK Key Domain. XKEK Key Domains can only be created based on memberships for THAT device. A device can only create XKEK Key Domains with memberships issued for itself.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:36:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
46cb0a455d
Fix DKEK are only created when requested and not by default.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 14:01:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
300e19b612
Moving to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() for better zeroization.
Also added more zeroization when a private/secret key is loaded in memory.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 01:52:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2666573050
Fix dkek status report when device is initialized without dkek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 01:00:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5506b46c9d
Fix finding MKEK file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:57:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b27cb7a1c
MKEK is also stored with SO encryption.
A copy of MKEK is also stored but encrypted with SO-PIN. Thus, we always ensure that we have an operative copy of MKEK, either with PIN and/or SO-PIN. If user resets PIN, the MKEK is loaded with SO-PIN and stored with the derived key from new PIN.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:41:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84a70a1de0
Adding MKEK_SO file descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:39:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1756ec49ad
When user resets retry counter and sends the SO-PIN (P1=0x0) it becomes authenticated in this session.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:29:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b286b04b1
Introducing MKEK (Master Key Encryption Key).
MKEK is used to encrypt all keys in the device, regardless of Key Domains or DKEK. From now on, all keys are encrypted using an AES 256-bit secret key. MKEK is also encrypted and stored based on a derived key from PIN. When user introduces the PIN, the MKEK can be unlocked to load the stored private/secret keys.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:20:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a731e88c78
Adding MKEK ef id.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-11 22:59:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ffd31f2ea7
Memset kcv to 0 always when called.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:58:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
356eeea505
Added support for ECDH_XKEK.
Note that it is unfinished. ECDH_XKEK is utilized for deriving and setting the KEK, based on the calc DH secret. It should not return anything, just SW_OK (this is not what is happening right now).

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:51:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
34d9469157
When creating XKEK domain, it returns key domain UID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:29:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36b1bf9875
Added ECDH algorithms for XKEK and AUT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:28:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7badd19a07
Upgrading PICO SDK to v1.4 and adding new boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 01:28:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f122a9ab28
Upgrade to version 2.6.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 00:42:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
14dbad4dd7
Do not return PIN unitialized if PKA is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 00:27:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cdce9ab50b
Adding pka_enabled() to check whether the device is configured with PKA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 00:26:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
30d3270e1d
Adding clarification on setting PKA and PIN with SCS3.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 00:26:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
157923decc
Clafiricate docs about PKA and PIN
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-06 01:44:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7bbcbc57eb
Removing unnecessary debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-06 01:36:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9074463f4e
Added clarification on PKA and PIN
DKEK is protected in the device with a derived key from the PIN number. Unfortunately, SCS3 does not support the combination of PKA and PIN but OpenSC does. This is explained here.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-06 01:27:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3ebf4fdff5
User authentication is unlinked from session_pin
Due to PUK Authentication, user authentication is not linked to having a valid session_pin anymore. In case of enabled PUK Auth, session_pin is used only for unlocking DKEK, but not for granting auth privileges, as they only are granted when PUK Auth succeeds.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-06 01:13:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
77e5fa2d2b Added static files for device key and certiticate.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-15 15:57:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6bd2e65459 Add function for building PrKD asn1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-15 15:38:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3363e9ad0c
Updating ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 19:12:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d1f0f45525
Added support for native PKCS1.5 and OEP decryption.
It is not tested, as it is not supported by pkcs11 modules. For instance, OpenSSL implements OEP in local side, calling a RAW decryption on the device.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 17:00:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
efc1b4a4ae
Fix meta deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 16:45:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a45303d9e6
Added support for specific purposes. Added support for SHA512 operations.
Keys can only be used for the specific purpose provided during the keypair generation.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 16:12:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
871ff69f56
Fix critical bug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 11:46:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d4b4289c0b
Update extra_command.md
Added explanation for Key usage counter.
2022-06-14 11:27:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
32af000435
Upgrading to version 2.4.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-13 19:39:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
64178192ad
Update README.md
Added PKA description.
2022-06-13 15:03:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
598752956f
Update scs3.md
Added macOS notes.
2022-06-13 14:58:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4dce0e5958
Update public_key_authentication.md
Added screenshots.
2022-06-13 14:33:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f02aef930
Add PKA doc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-13 14:28:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0c25b0968b
Update scs3.md
Added a patch.
2022-06-13 11:59:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ddc0bd7202
Updated SCS3 doc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-13 11:57:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
20727e1508
Point to last checkout.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-12 18:10:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3afc1964dc
Store in dynamic memory PUK authentication.
When a PUK is authenticated, session PIN is set to true.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-12 18:10:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
914020fd36
Added PUK authentication.
Surprisingly, it works from the very beginning.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-12 17:43:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
168a8cd5a6
Fix selecting PUK for AUT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-12 17:42:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
eb94ed7806
Separated routines for verifying and parsing CV certificates.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 20:04:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
db6b3ec427
Added select MSE for puk AUT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 20:04:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
32d0cdcea7
Save cached challenge length.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 18:58:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
332fe8c884
Generated challenges are cached and dev_name (ESTERMXXXXX) based on terminal certificate.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:40:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
59f0cf7732
Fix CA certificates selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:33:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b803505287
When a certificate is verified, the corresponding certificate description and the certificate are cached and saved.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:30:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3542062ecd
Added function to write the ASN1 certificate description.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:29:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
824c327a2c
Added function to obtain EC params from root CA cert.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:28:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
76a41dffa1 Store all verified certificates (INS MSE) into CA_PREFIX files.
When a certificate is sent for verification, it is always cached and saved onto a CA_PREFIX.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 11:59:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
65482cad9c Added dynamic public key references.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 11:09:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a17a4c0a3c Finished key public registration.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 11:09:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2437cf09d1 Added EF for PUKs
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 11:08:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c4c394845d
Updated pico-ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 21:25:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a4d4f9a944
Fix outer CAR value.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 21:25:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5eb086935e
Added INS_PSO.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 19:02:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
83a583a33f
Fix CVC verification.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 19:02:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
143c2d279b Added cvc_verify to verify a cvcert with other CA cvcert.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 14:16:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08dd596883 Added cvc_get_pub().
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 14:15:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a4ffcebb0f Added variable puk_store.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 14:15:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8a14c22056 Added OID compilation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 11:53:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
39f7b5284a Added OID definitions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 11:53:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4f58cd255b
Adding PUK store.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 20:01:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d96d7a533e
Added procedure for verifying CVC (unfinished).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 20:01:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e59166c64 Added MSE for B6 CRT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 17:35:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6d8161de73 Added functions to retrieve CAR and CHR from certs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 17:34:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
494df64674 Added CVCA to burnt certificates.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 17:33:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d057729675
Fix returning the status of PIN1 when it is not initialized.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-07 19:58:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b14a323ef8
Added INS PUK with status query.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-07 19:44:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f2b66468ec
Adding Public Key Authentication file template.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-07 19:44:33 +02:00
118 changed files with 12330 additions and 3154 deletions

4
.github/FUNDING.yml vendored Normal file
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# These are supported funding model platforms
github: polhenarejos
custom: ["https://www.paypal.me/polhenarejos"]

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.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md vendored Normal file
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## Summary
Describe in plain language what this PR does and why.
- What problem does it solve?
- Is it a bug fix, a new feature, a cleanup/refactor…?
## Details / Impact
Please include any relevant details:
- Hardware / board(s) tested:
- Firmware / commit/base version:
- Security impact (if any):
- e.g. changes PIN handling, touches key storage, affects attestation, etc.
- Behavior changes:
- e.g. new command, new API surface, different defaults, etc.
## Testing
How did you test this change?
- Steps to reproduce / validate:
- Expected vs actual results:
- Any logs / traces (please remove secrets):
## Licensing confirmation (required)
By checking the box below, you confirm ALL of the following:
- You are the author of this contribution, or you have the right to contribute it.
- You have read `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
- You agree that this contribution may be merged, used, modified, and redistributed:
- under the AGPLv3 Community Edition, **and**
- under any proprietary / commercial / Enterprise editions of this project,
now or in the future.
- You understand that submitting this PR does not create any support obligation,
SLA, or guarantee of merge.
**I confirm the above licensing terms:**
- [ ] Yes, I agree
## Anything else?
Optional: mention known limitations, follow-ups, or if this is related to an existing Issue.

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.github/workflows/codeql.yml vendored Normal file
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# For most projects, this workflow file will not need changing; you simply need
# to commit it to your repository.
#
# You may wish to alter this file to override the set of languages analyzed,
# or to provide custom queries or build logic.
#
# ******** NOTE ********
# We have attempted to detect the languages in your repository. Please check
# the `language` matrix defined below to confirm you have the correct set of
# supported CodeQL languages.
#
name: "CodeQL"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
analyze:
name: Analyze
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
actions: read
contents: read
security-events: write
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
language: [ 'cpp', 'python' ]
# CodeQL supports [ 'cpp', 'csharp', 'go', 'java', 'javascript', 'python', 'ruby' ]
# Learn more about CodeQL language support at https://aka.ms/codeql-docs/language-support
mode: [ 'pico', 'local' ]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v3
# Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning.
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
# If you wish to specify custom queries, you can do so here or in a config file.
# By default, queries listed here will override any specified in a config file.
# Prefix the list here with "+" to use these queries and those in the config file.
# Details on CodeQL's query packs refer to : https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/configuring-code-scanning#using-queries-in-ql-packs
# queries: security-extended,security-and-quality
# Autobuild attempts to build any compiled languages (C/C++, C#, or Java).
# If this step fails, then you should remove it and run the build manually (see below)
# - name: Autobuild
# uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2
# Command-line programs to run using the OS shell.
# 📚 See https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#jobsjob_idstepsrun
# If the Autobuild fails above, remove it and uncomment the following three lines.
# modify them (or add more) to build your code if your project, please refer to the EXAMPLE below for guidance.
- run: |
echo "Run, Build Application using script"
./workflows/autobuild.sh ${{ matrix.mode }}
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3

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.github/workflows/nightly.yml vendored Normal file
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name: "Nightly deploy"
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 2 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
nightly:
name: Deploy nightly
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
refs: [master, development]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: ${{ matrix.refs }}
submodules: 'recursive'
- name: Restore private key
run: |
echo "${{ secrets.PRIVATE_KEY_B64 }}" | base64 -d > private.pem
chmod 600 private.pem
- name : Build
env:
PICO_SDK_PATH: ../pico-sdk
SECURE_BOOT_PKEY: ../private.pem
run: |
./workflows/autobuild.sh pico
./build_pico_hsm.sh --no-eddsa
./workflows/autobuild.sh esp32
- name: Delete private key
run: rm private.pem
- name: Update nightly release
uses: pyTooling/Actions/releaser@v6.7.0
with:
tag: nightly-${{ matrix.refs }}
rm: true
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
files: release/*.*

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.github/workflows/test.yml vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
# For most projects, this workflow file will not need changing; you simply need
# to commit it to your repository.
#
# You may wish to alter this file to override the set of languages analyzed,
# or to provide custom queries or build logic.
#
# ******** NOTE ********
# We have attempted to detect the languages in your repository. Please check
# the `language` matrix defined below to confirm you have the correct set of
# supported CodeQL languages.
#
name: "Emulation and test"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Build in container
run: ./tests/build-in-docker.sh
- name: Export image
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts
docker save pico-hsm-test:bullseye -o artifacts/docker-image.tar
- name: Temporarily save image
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: docker-artifact
path: artifacts
retention-days: 1
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
strategy:
matrix:
suite: ["pkcs11", "pytest", "sc-hsm-pkcs11"]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Retrieve saved image
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: docker-artifact
path: artifacts
- name: Load image
run: |
cd artifacts
docker load -q -i docker-image.tar
- name: Test ${{ matrix.suite }}
run: ./tests/run-test-in-docker.sh ${{ matrix.suite }}

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.gitmodules vendored
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@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
[submodule "pico-ccid"]
path = pico-ccid
url = https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-ccid
[submodule "pico-keys-sdk"]
path = pico-keys-sdk
url = https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-keys-sdk

317
.uncrustify.cfg Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
#
# Uncrustify Configuration File
# File Created With UncrustifyX 0.4.3 (252)
#
# Code-Modifying
# --------------
## Braces
# Braces on single-line do statement
mod_full_brace_do = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line else statement
mod_full_brace_if = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line for statement
mod_full_brace_for = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line while statement
mod_full_brace_while = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Parentheses
# Remove unnecessary parentheses on return statement
mod_paren_on_return = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Comments
# --------
## Other
# Remove leading spaces from multi-line comments
cmt_multi_check_last = false # boolean (false/true)
# General
# -------
## Other
# Input tab size
input_tab_size = 4 # number
# Indentation
# -----------
## Indentation Size
# Indentation column size
indent_columns = 4 # number
# Indentation size between case and switch
indent_switch_case = 4 # number
## Other
# Align strings broken by backslash
indent_align_string = true # boolean (false/true)
# Indent with tabs
indent_with_tabs = 0 # number
# Line-Splitting
# --------------
## Splitting
# Code width
code_width = 100 # number
# Split long for statements at semicolons
ls_for_split_full = true # boolean (false/true)
# Split long function prototypes/calls at commas
ls_func_split_full = true # boolean (false/true)
# Newlines
# --------
## Newline Between
# Newline between assignment and open brace
nl_assign_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between close brace and else
nl_brace_else = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between close brace and while
nl_brace_while = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between do and open brace
nl_do_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between else and open brace
nl_else_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between enum and open brace
nl_enum_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between for and open brace
nl_for_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between function call and open brace
nl_fcall_brace = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between function signature and open brace
nl_fdef_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between if and open brace
nl_if_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between struct and open brace
nl_struct_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between switch and open brace
nl_switch_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between union and open brace
nl_union_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between while and open brace
nl_while_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Other
# Newline count at end of file
nl_end_of_file_min = 1 # number
# Newlines at end of file
nl_end_of_file = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newlines at start of file
nl_start_of_file = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Spacing
# -------
## Space After
# Space after address-of operator
sp_addr = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after cast
sp_after_cast = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after comma
sp_after_comma = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after dereference operator
sp_deref = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after final semicolon in empty for statement
sp_after_semi_for_empty = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after invert operator
sp_inv = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after not operator
sp_not = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after pointer star
sp_after_ptr_star = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after pointer star followed by function
sp_after_ptr_star_func = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after semicolon
sp_after_semi = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after semicolon in non-empty for statements
sp_after_semi_for = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after sign in assignment
sp_sign = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after type
sp_after_type = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Around
# Space around arithmetic operators
sp_arith = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around assignment operator
sp_assign = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around boolean operators
sp_bool = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around compare operators
sp_compare = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around increment/decrement operators
sp_incdec = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around member operators
sp_member = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around preprocessor concatenation operator
sp_pp_concat = ignore # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around ternary condition colon
sp_cond_colon = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around ternary condition question mark
sp_cond_question = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Before
# Space before backslash-newline at end of line
sp_before_nl_cont = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before case colon
sp_before_case_colon = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before comma
sp_before_comma = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before if/for/switch/while open parenthesis
sp_before_sparen = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before pointer star
sp_before_ptr_star = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon
sp_before_semi = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon in empty for statement
sp_before_semi_for_empty = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon in for statements
sp_before_semi_for = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Between
# Space between __attribute__ and open parenthesis
sp_attribute_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between close brace and else
sp_brace_else = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between close brace and typedef name
sp_brace_typedef = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between closing parenthesis and open brace
sp_fparen_brace = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between defined and open parenthesis
sp_defined_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between else and open brace
sp_else_brace = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis
sp_func_call_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis in declaration
sp_func_proto_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis in function definition
sp_func_def_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between if/for/switch/while close parenthesis and open brace
sp_sparen_brace = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between macro and value
sp_macro = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between macro function close parenthesis and value
sp_macro_func = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between nested parentheses
sp_paren_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between pointer stars
sp_between_ptr_star = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between preprocessor else and comment
sp_endif_cmt = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between return type and function name
sp_type_func = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between sizeof and open parenthesis
sp_sizeof_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Inside
# Space inside braces
sp_inside_braces = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside cast parentheses
sp_inside_paren_cast = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside empty function parentheses
sp_inside_fparens = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside enum braces
sp_inside_braces_enum = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside function parentheses
sp_inside_fparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside if-condition parentheses
sp_inside_sparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside non-empty square brackets
sp_inside_square = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside parentheses
sp_inside_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside parentheses in function type
sp_inside_tparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside struct/union braces
sp_inside_braces_struct = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)

View file

@ -1,128 +1,131 @@
#
# This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
# Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
#
# This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
# Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.13)
include(pico_sdk_import.cmake)
if(ESP_PLATFORM)
set(EXTRA_COMPONENT_DIRS src pico-keys-sdk/src)
include($ENV{IDF_PATH}/tools/cmake/project.cmake)
else()
if(NOT ENABLE_EMULATION)
set(PICO_USE_FASTEST_SUPPORTED_CLOCK 1)
include(pico_sdk_import.cmake)
endif()
project(pico_hsm C CXX ASM)
project(pico_hsm C CXX ASM)
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 11)
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 17)
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 11)
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 17)
pico_sdk_init()
if(NOT DEFINED __FOR_CI)
set(__FOR_CI 0)
endif()
if(__FOR_CI)
add_definitions(-D__FOR_CI)
endif()
add_executable(pico_hsm)
if (NOT DEFINED USB_VID)
set(USB_VID 0xFEFF)
add_executable(pico_hsm)
endif()
add_definitions(-DUSB_VID=${USB_VID})
if (NOT DEFINED USB_PID)
set(USB_PID 0xFCFD)
set(USB_ITF_CCID 1)
set(USB_ITF_WCID 1)
include(pico-keys-sdk/pico_keys_sdk_import.cmake)
if(NOT ESP_PLATFORM)
set(SOURCES ${PICO_KEYS_SOURCES})
endif()
add_definitions(-DUSB_PID=${USB_PID})
find_package( PythonInterp 3.7 REQUIRED )
if (NOT EXISTS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvcerts.h)
execute_process(COMMAND ${PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/burn-cvcerts.py ${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR})
message("Burning CVCert")
endif()
configure_file(${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/config/mbedtls_config.h ${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/include/mbedtls COPYONLY)
target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/usb/usb.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/usb/usb_descriptors.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid/ccid2040.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid/asn1.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/fs/file.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/fs/flash.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/fs/low_flash.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/rng/random.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/rng/neug.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid/crypto_utils.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid/eac.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/sc_hsm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvc.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/files.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/dkek.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/aes.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/cmac.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ecp.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/md.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/md5.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/oid.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/sha1.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/sha256.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/sha512.c
)
target_include_directories(pico_hsm PUBLIC
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/fs
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/rng
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/usb
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/include
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library
)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wall
-Werror
set(SOURCES ${SOURCES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/sc_hsm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_select.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_list_keys.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_read_binary.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_verify.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_reset_retry.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_challenge.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_external_authenticate.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_mse.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_initialize.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_domain.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_wrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_keypair_gen.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_update_ef.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_delete_file.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_change_pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_gen.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_signature.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_unwrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_decrypt_asym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_cipher_sym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_derive_asym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_extras.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_general_authenticate.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_session_pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_puk_auth.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_pso.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_bip_slip.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvc.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/files.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/kek.c
)
pico_add_extra_outputs(pico_hsm)
SET_VERSION(ver_major ver_minor "${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/version.h" 2)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pico_stdlib pico_multicore hardware_flash hardware_sync hardware_adc pico_unique_id hardware_rtc tinyusb_device tinyusb_board)
if(ESP_PLATFORM)
project(pico_hsm)
endif()
#
#project(flash_nuke C CXX ASM)
#add_executable(flash_nuke nuke.c)
#target_link_libraries(flash_nuke
# pico_stdlib
# hardware_flash
# )
#pico_set_binary_type(flash_nuke no_flash)
#
#pico_add_extra_outputs(flash_nuke)
set(INCLUDES ${INCLUDES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm
)
if(NOT ESP_PLATFORM)
target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC ${SOURCES})
target_include_directories(pico_hsm PUBLIC ${INCLUDES})
#project(memory C CXX ASM)
#add_executable(memory memory.c)
#target_link_libraries(memory
# pico_stdlib
# hardware_flash
# )
#pico_set_binary_type(memory no_flash)
#
#pico_add_extra_outputs(memory)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wall
)
if(NOT MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Werror
)
endif()
if(ENABLE_EMULATION)
if(NOT MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-fdata-sections
-ffunction-sections
)
endif()
if(APPLE)
target_link_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wl,-dead_strip
)
elseif(MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-WX
)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PUBLIC wsock32 ws2_32 Bcrypt)
else()
target_link_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wl,--gc-sections
)
endif(APPLE)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pthread m)
else()
pico_add_extra_outputs(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME})
endif()
endif()

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CONTRIBUTING.md Normal file
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# Contributing
Thank you for your interest in contributing to this project.
This repository is published in two forms:
- a Community Edition released under AGPLv3, and
- a proprietary / commercial / Enterprise Edition offered to organizations.
To keep that model legally clean, we need to be explicit about how contributions can be used.
By opening a pull request, you agree to all of the following:
1. **You have the right to contribute this code.**
You are either the original author of the contribution, or you have obtained the necessary rights/permissions to contribute it under these terms.
2. **Dual licensing permission.**
You agree that your contribution may be:
- merged into this repository, and
- used, copied, modified, sublicensed, and redistributed
- under the AGPLv3 Community Edition, and
- under any proprietary / commercial / Enterprise editions of this project,
now or in the future.
In other words: you are granting the project maintainer(s) the right to include
your contribution in both the open-source (AGPLv3) codebase and in closed-source /
commercially licensed builds, without any additional approval or payment.
3. **Attribution.**
The maintainers may keep or add attribution lines such as
`Copyright (c) <your name>` or an AUTHORS / CONTRIBUTORS list.
The maintainers may also make changes for clarity, style, security, refactoring,
or integration reasons.
4. **No automatic SLA.**
Submitting a pull request does *not* create any support obligation,
service-level agreement, warranty, or guarantee that the contribution
will be reviewed, merged, or maintained.
5. **Potential rejection for business reasons.**
Features that fall under "Enterprise / Commercial" functionality
(e.g. multi-tenant provisioning at scale, centralized audit trails,
corporate policy enforcement, attestation/branding flows, key escrow / dual-control,
etc.) may be declined for the public AGPLv3 tree even if technically valid.
That is normal: some functionality is intentionally offered only
under commercial terms.
If you are not comfortable with these terms, **do not open a pull request yet.**
Instead, please open an Issue to start a discussion.
## How to contribute (technical side)
### 1. Bug reports / issues
- Please include:
- hardware / board revision
- firmware / commit hash
- exact steps to reproduce
- expected vs actual behavior
- logs / traces if available (strip secrets)
Security-sensitive findings: do **not** post publicly.
Send a short report by email instead so it can be triaged responsibly.
### 2. Small fixes / minor improvements
- You can open a PR directly for:
- bug fixes
- portability fixes / new board definitions
- clarifications in code comments
- build / tooling cleanup
- documentation of existing behavior
Please keep PRs focused (one logical change per PR if possible).
### 3. Larger features / behavior changes
- Please open an Issue first and describe:
- what problem you're solving (not just "add feature X")
- impact on existing flows / security model
- any new dependencies
This helps avoid doing a bunch of work on something that won't be accepted
in the Community Edition.
### 4. Coding style / security posture
- Aim for clarity and small, auditable changes. This code runs in places
where secrets live.
- No debug backdoors, no "just for testing" shortcuts left enabled.
- Keep external dependencies minimal and license-compatible
(MIT / Apache 2.0 / similarly permissive is usually fine).
### 5. Commit / PR format
- Use descriptive commit messages ("Fix PIN retry counter wrap" is better than "fix stuff").
- In the PR description, please include a short summary of what was changed and why.
- At the bottom of the PR description, **copy/paste and confirm the licensing line below**:
> I confirm that I have read `CONTRIBUTING.md` and I agree that this contribution may be used under both the AGPLv3 Community Edition and any proprietary / commercial / Enterprise editions of this project, now or in the future.
A PR without that confirmation may be delayed or closed without merge.
## Thank you
This project exists because people build on it, break it, fix it,
and push it into places it wasn't originally designed to go.
Whether you are here for research, hacking on hardware,
rolling out secure keys for a team, or building a commercial product:
thank you for helping improve it.

54
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FROM debian:bullseye
ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND noninteractive
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
build-essential \
git \
cmake \
gcc-arm-none-eabi \
libnewlib-arm-none-eabi \
libstdc++-arm-none-eabi-newlib \
python3 \
python3-pip
RUN useradd -m builduser
USER builduser
WORKDIR /home/builduser
VOLUME /home/builduser/release
ARG VERSION_PICO_SDK 2.0.0
RUN mkdir -p /home/builduser/Devel/pico
RUN cd /home/builduser/Devel/pico \
&& git clone https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk.git \
&& cd pico-sdk \
&& git checkout $VERSION_PICO_SDK \
&& git submodule update --init --recursive
RUN pip install cryptography
ARG VERSION_MAJOR 4
ARG VERSION_MINOR 2
RUN cd /home/builduser \
&& git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm.git \
&& cd pico-hsm \
&& git checkout v${VERSION_MAJOR}.${VERSION_MINOR} \
&& git submodule update --init --recursive \
&& mkdir build_release
ENV PICO_SDK_PATH /home/builduser/Devel/pico/pico-sdk
ARG USB_VID 0xfeff
ARG USB_PID 0xfcfd
ARG PICO_BOARD waveshare_rp2040_zero
RUN cd /home/builduser/pico-hsm \
&& cd build_release \
&& cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$PICO_BOARD -DUSB_VID=${USB_VID} -DUSB_PID=${USB_PID} \
&& make -kj20

116
ENTERPRISE.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
# Enterprise / Commercial Edition
This project is offered under two editions:
## 1. Community Edition (FOSS)
The Community Edition is released under the GNU Affero General Public License v3 (AGPLv3).
Intended for:
- individual users and researchers
- evaluation / prototyping
- internal lab / security testing
You are allowed to:
- read and study the source code
- modify it
- run it internally
Obligations under AGPLv3:
- If you distribute modified firmware/binaries/libraries to third parties, you must provide the corresponding source code of your modifications.
- If you run a modified version of this project as a network-accessible service (internal or external), you must offer the source code of those modifications to the users of that service.
- No warranty, no support, no SLA.
- Enterprise features (bulk provisioning, multi-user policy enforcement, device inventory / revocation, corporate PIN rules, custom attestation/identity, etc.) are NOT included.
The Community Edition will continue to exist.
## 2. Enterprise / Commercial Edition
The Enterprise / Commercial Edition is a proprietary license for organizations that need to:
- deploy this in production at scale (multiple devices / multiple users / multiple teams)
- integrate it into their own physical product or appliance
- run it as an internal service (VM / container / private cloud "HSM / auth backend") for multiple internal teams or tenants
- enforce internal security policy (admin vs user roles, mandatory PIN rules, secure offboarding / revocation)
- avoid any AGPLv3 disclosure obligations for their own modifications and integration code
### What the Enterprise Edition provides
**Base license package (always included):**
- **Commercial license (proprietary).**
You may run and integrate the software/firmware in production — including virtualized / internal-cloud style deployments — without being required to disclose derivative source code under AGPLv3.
- **Official signed builds.**
You receive signed builds from the original developer so you can prove integrity and provenance.
- **Onboarding call (up to 1 hour).**
A live remote session to get you from "we have it" to "its actually running in our environment" with minimal guesswork.
**Optional enterprise components (available on demand, scoped and priced per customer):**
- **Production / multi-user readiness.**
Permission to operate the system with multiple users, multiple devices and multiple teams in real environments.
- **Bulk / fleet provisioning.**
Automated enrollment for many tokens/devices/users at once (CSV / directory import), scripted onboarding of new users, initial PIN assignment / reset workflows, and role-based access (admin vs user).
- **Policy & lifecycle tooling.**
Corporate PIN policy enforcement, per-user / per-team access control, device inventory / traceability, and secure revocation / retirement when someone leaves.
- **Custom attestation / per-organization identity.**
Per-company certificate chains and attestation keys so devices can prove "this token/HSM is officially ours," including anti-cloning / unique device identity for OEM and fleet use.
- **Virtualization / internal cloud deployment support.**
Guidance and components to run this as an internal service (VM, container, private-cloud HSM/auth backend) serving multiple internal teams or tenants under your brand.
- **Post-quantum (PQC) key material handling.**
Integration/roadmap support for PQC algorithms (auth / signing) and secure PQC key storage inside the device or service.
- **Hierarchical deterministic key derivation (HD).**
Wallet-style hierarchical key trees (BIP32-like concepts adapted to this platform) for issuing per-user / per-tenant / per-purpose subkeys without exporting the root secret — e.g. embedded wallet logic, tenant isolation, firmware signing trees, large fleets.
- **Cryptographically signed audit trail / tamper-evident event logging.**
High-assurance logging of sensitive actions (key use, provisioning, PIN resets, revocations) with integrity protection for forensic / compliance needs.
- **Dual-control / two-person approval ("four-eyes").**
Require multi-party authorization for high-risk actions such as firmware signing, key export, or critical configuration changes — standard in high-assurance / regulated environments.
- **Secure key escrow / disaster recovery design.**
Split-secret or escrowed backup strategies so you dont lose critical signing keys if a single admin disappears or hardware is lost.
- **Release-signing / supply-chain hardening pipeline.**
Reference tooling and process so every production firmware/binary is signed with hardware-backed keys, proving origin and preventing tampering in transit or at manufacturing.
- **Policy-locked hardened mode ("FIPS-style profile").**
Restricted algorithms, debug disabled, no raw key export, tamper-evident configuration for regulated / high-assurance deployments.
- **Priority support / security response SLA.**
A direct line and guaranteed response window for production-impacting security issues.
- **White-label demo / pre-sales bundle.**
Branded demo firmware + safe onboarding script so you can show "your product" to your own customers without exposing real production secrets.
These components are NOT automatically bundled. They are available case-by-case depending on your use case and are priced separately.
### Licensing models
- **Internal Use License**
Internal production use within one legal entity (your company), including internal private cloud / virtualized deployments for multiple internal teams.
Optional enterprise components can be added as needed.
- **OEM / Redistribution / Service License**
Integration into a product/appliance you ship to customers, OR operating this as a managed service / hosted feature for external clients or third parties.
Optional enterprise components (attestation branding, PQC support, HD key derivation, multi-tenant service hardening, audit trail, etc.) can be added as required.
Pricing depends on scope, fleet size, number of users/tenants, regulatory requirements, and which optional components you select.
### Request a quote
Email: pol@henarejos.me
Subject: `ENTERPRISE LICENSE <your company name>`
Please include:
- Company name and country
- Intended use:
- Internal private deployment
- OEM / external service to third parties
- Approximate scale (number of devices/tokens, number of users/tenants)
- Which optional components you are interested in (bulk provisioning, policy & lifecycle tooling, attestation branding / anti-cloning, virtualization/cloud, PQC, HD key derivation, audit trail, dual-control, key escrow, supply-chain signing, hardened mode, SLA, white-label demo)
You will receive:
1. A short commercial license agreement naming your company.
2. Access to the base package (and any optional components agreed).
3. Scheduling of the onboarding call.
## Why Enterprise exists
- Companies often need hardware-backed security (HSM, FIDO2, OpenPGP, etc.) under their own control, but cannot or will not open-source their internal security workflows.
- They also need multi-user / fleet-management features that hobby users do not.
- The commercial license funds continued development, maintenance and new hardware support.
The Community Edition remains AGPLv3.
The Enterprise Edition is for production, scale, and legal clarity.

143
LICENSE
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 29 June 2007
GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 19 November 2007
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <https://fsf.org/>
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
@ -7,17 +7,15 @@
Preamble
The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
software and other kinds of works.
The GNU Affero General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
software and other kinds of works, specifically designed to ensure
cooperation with the community in the case of network server software.
The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast,
the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to
our General Public Licenses are intended to guarantee your freedom to
share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains free
software for all its users. We, the Free Software Foundation, use the
GNU General Public License for most of our software; it applies also to
any other work released this way by its authors. You can apply it to
your programs, too.
software for all its users.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
@ -26,44 +24,34 @@ them if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you
want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new
free programs, and that you know you can do these things.
To protect your rights, we need to prevent others from denying you
these rights or asking you to surrender the rights. Therefore, you have
certain responsibilities if you distribute copies of the software, or if
you modify it: responsibilities to respect the freedom of others.
Developers that use our General Public Licenses protect your rights
with two steps: (1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer
you this License which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute
and/or modify the software.
For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
gratis or for a fee, you must pass on to the recipients the same
freedoms that you received. You must make sure that they, too, receive
or can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they
know their rights.
A secondary benefit of defending all users' freedom is that
improvements made in alternate versions of the program, if they
receive widespread use, become available for other developers to
incorporate. Many developers of free software are heartened and
encouraged by the resulting cooperation. However, in the case of
software used on network servers, this result may fail to come about.
The GNU General Public License permits making a modified version and
letting the public access it on a server without ever releasing its
source code to the public.
Developers that use the GNU GPL protect your rights with two steps:
(1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer you this License
giving you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify it.
The GNU Affero General Public License is designed specifically to
ensure that, in such cases, the modified source code becomes available
to the community. It requires the operator of a network server to
provide the source code of the modified version running there to the
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For the developers' and authors' protection, the GPL clearly explains
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Some devices are designed to deny users access to install or run
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Finally, every program is threatened constantly by software patents.
States should not allow patents to restrict development and use of
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avoid the special danger that patents applied to a free program could
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patents cannot be used to render the program non-free.
An older license, called the Affero General Public License and
published by Affero, was designed to accomplish similar goals. This is
a different license, not a version of the Affero GPL, but Affero has
released a new version of the Affero GPL which permits relicensing under
this license.
The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
modification follow.
@ -72,7 +60,7 @@ modification follow.
0. Definitions.
"This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU General Public License.
"This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License.
"Copyright" also means copyright-like laws that apply to other kinds of
works, such as semiconductor masks.
@ -549,35 +537,45 @@ to collect a royalty for further conveying from those to whom you convey
the Program, the only way you could satisfy both those terms and this
License would be to refrain entirely from conveying the Program.
13. Use with the GNU Affero General Public License.
13. Remote Network Interaction; Use with the GNU General Public License.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, if you modify the
Program, your modified version must prominently offer all users
interacting with it remotely through a computer network (if your version
supports such interaction) an opportunity to receive the Corresponding
Source of your version by providing access to the Corresponding Source
from a network server at no charge, through some standard or customary
means of facilitating copying of software. This Corresponding Source
shall include the Corresponding Source for any work covered by version 3
of the GNU General Public License that is incorporated pursuant to the
following paragraph.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have
permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed
under version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License into a single
under version 3 of the GNU General Public License into a single
combined work, and to convey the resulting work. The terms of this
License will continue to apply to the part which is the covered work,
but the special requirements of the GNU Affero General Public License,
section 13, concerning interaction through a network will apply to the
combination as such.
but the work with which it is combined will remain governed by version
3 of the GNU General Public License.
14. Revised Versions of this License.
The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of
the GNU General Public License from time to time. Such new versions will
be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to
the GNU Affero General Public License from time to time. Such new versions
will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to
address new problems or concerns.
Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the
Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU General
Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU Affero General
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If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future
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versions of the GNU Affero General Public License can be used, that proxy's
public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you
to choose that version for the Program.
@ -635,40 +633,29 @@ the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short
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<program> Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
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For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU AGPL, see
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

367
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@ -1,135 +1,201 @@
# Raspberry Pico HSM
This is a project to create a Hardware Security Module (HSM) with a Raspberry Pico. It converts your Pico board into a HSM which is able to generate and store private keys, encrypt or decrypt with AES or signing data without to disclose the private key. In detail, the private key never leaves the board and it cannot be retrieved as it is encrypted in the flash memory.
# Pico HSM
This project aims to transform a Raspberry Pi Pico or ESP32 microcontroller into a Hardware Security Module (HSM). The modified Pico or ESP32 board will be capable of generating and storing private keys, performing AES encryption or decryption, and signing data without exposing the private key. Specifically, the private key remains securely on the board and cannot be retrieved since it is encrypted within the flash memory.
## Capabilities
### Key generation and encrypted storage
Private and secret keys are stored with a master AES 256 key (DKEK). The DKEK is, at the same time, encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
### > Key generation and encrypted storage
Private and secret keys are secured using a master AES 256 key (MKEK). The MKEK is encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
**No private/secret keys, DKEK or PIN are stored in plain text ever. Never.**
### RSA key generation from 1024 to 4096 bits
RSA key generation in place for 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits. Private keys never leave the device.
### > RSA Key Generation (1024 to 4096 Bits)
RSA key generation is supported for 1024, 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits. Private keys never leave the device.
### ECDSA key generation from 192 to 521 bits
ECDSA key generation in place for different curves, from 192 to 521 bits.
### > ECDSA Key Generation (192 to 521 Bits)
ECDSA key generation supports various curves from 192 to 521 bits.
### ECC curves
It supports secp192r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, secp192k1 (insecure), secp256k1 curves.
### > ECC Curves
Supported ECC curves include secp192r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, secp192k1 (insecure), secp256k1, Curve25519, and Curve448.
### SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 digests
ECDSA and RSA signature can be combined with SHA digest in place.
### > SHA Digests
ECDSA and RSA signatures can be combined with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 digests.
### Multiple RSA signature algorithms
It supports RSA-PSS, RSA-PKCS and raw RSA signatures.
### > Multiple RSA Signature Algorithms
Supported RSA signature algorithms include RSA-PSS, RSA-PKCS, and raw RSA signatures.
### ECDSA raw and hash signature
ECDSA signatures can be in raw or pre-hashed formats.
### > ECDSA Signatures
ECDSA signatures can be raw or pre-hashed.
### ECDH key derivation
It supports the calculation of shared secrets with ECDH algorithm.
### > ECDH Key Derivation
Supports the ECDH algorithm for calculating shared secrets.
### EC private key derivation
It allows ECDSA key derivation.[^1]
### > EC Private Key Derivation
Allows ECDSA key derivation.
### RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 decryption
It allows private decryption in place with RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 algorithms.
### > RSA Decryption
Supports RSA-OEP and RSA-X.509 decryption.
### AES key generation
It supports AES key generation in place with keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
### > AES Key Generation
Supports AES key generation with keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
### AES-CBC encryption/decryption
AES encryption and decryption is performed in place.
### > AES-CBC Encryption/Decryption
Performs AES-CBC encryption and decryption.
### CMAC
It supports AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
### > Advanced AES Modes
Supports AES encryption and decryption in ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, XTS, CTR, GCM, and CCM modes, with customizable IV/nonce and additional authenticated data (AAD).[^4]
### AES derivation
It supports AES secret key derivation.[^1]
### > AES Key Generation (128, 192, 256, 512 Bits)
Supports AES key generation up to 512 bits, useful for AES XTS where two 256-bit keys are concatenated.
### PIN authorization
Private and secret keys cannot be used without prior PIN authentication. It supports alphanumeric PIN.
### > CMAC
Supports AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
### PKCS11 compliant interface
The module can be interfaced with PKCS11 standard.
### > AES Secret Key Derivation
Supports AES secret key derivation.[^1]
### HRNG (hardware random number generator)
It contains a harware random number generator properly modeled to guarantee maximum entropy.
### > PIN Authorization
Private and secret keys require prior PIN authentication. Supports alphanumeric PINs.
### Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) shares
It supports DKEK share imports. DKEK are used to wrap, unwrap and encrypt private and secret keys in the device.
### > PKCS11 Compliant Interface
Interfacing with the PKCS11 standard is supported.
### DKEK n-of-m threshold scheme
It supports a n-of-m threshold scheme to minimize outage when a DKEK custodian is not available during the import process.
### > Hardware Random Number Generator (HRNG)
Contains an HRNG designed for maximum entropy.
### USB/CCID support with OpenSC, openssl, etc.
Pico HSM has a full USB CCID stack to communicate with the host via OpenSC and PCSC. It allows the use of frontend applications such as OpenSSL via PKCS11 module.
### > Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) Shares
Supports importing DKEK shares to wrap, unwrap, and encrypt keys.
### Extended APDU support
It supports extended APDU packets, which allows up to 65535 bytes.
### > DKEK n-of-m Threshold Scheme
Supports an n-of-m threshold scheme to prevent outages when a DKEK custodian is unavailable.
### CVC certificates
Pico HSM manipulates CVC certificates and requests to minimize the storage of internal certificates.
### > USB/CCID Support
Full USB CCID stack for communication with the host via OpenSC and PCSC, allowing the use of frontend applications like OpenSSL via the PKCS11 module.
### Attestation
Every generated key is attached to a certificate, signed by an external PKI to ensure that a particular key is effectively generated by this specific device.
### > Extended APDU Support
Supports extended APDU packets, allowing up to 65535 bytes.
### Import external private keys and certificates
It allows private key and certificates import via WKY or PKCS#12 files.[^2][^3]
### > CV Certificates
Handles CVC certificates and requests to minimize internal certificate storage.
### Tranport PIN
It allows transport PIN for provisioning and forcing to set a new PIN.[^2] It is a tampered mechanism that ensures the device has not been unsealed during the transportation from the issuer to the legitimate user.
### > Attestation
Each generated key is attached to a certificate signed by an external PKI, ensuring the key was generated by the specific device.
### Press-to-confirm button
It allows the use of BOOTSEL button to confirm operations with private/secret keys, such as signatures and decryption. When a private/secret key is loaded, the user has 15 seconds to press the button to confirm the operation.
This feature protects the user from unwanted uses from background applications that may sign data without user notice.
### > Import External Keys and Certificates
Allows importing private keys and certificates via WKY or PKCS#12 files.[^2][^3]
### Store and retrieve binary data
It allows the storage of arbitrary files with binary data.
### > Transport PIN
Allows a transport PIN for provisioning, ensuring the device has not been tampered with during transportation.[^2]
### Real time clock (RTC)
Pico HSM has a RTC with external datetime setting and getting.
### > Press-to-Confirm Button
Uses the BOOTSEL button to confirm operations with private/secret keys, providing a 15-second window to confirm the operation to protect against unauthorized use.
### Secure Messaging (secure channel)
Pico HSM supports secure channel, where the data packets between the host and device are encrypted to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.
### > Store and Retrieve Binary Data
Allows the storage of arbitrary binary data files.
### Session PIN
A specific session PIN can be set during the session opening to avoid the systemmatic use of PIN.
### > Real-Time Clock (RTC)
Includes an RTC with external date and time setting and retrieval.
### PKI CVCert remote issuing for Secure Message
### > Secure Messaging
Supports secure channels to encrypt data packets between the host and device, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.
### > Session PIN
A specific session PIN can be set during session opening to avoid systematic PIN usage.
### > PKI CVCert Remote Issuing for Secure Messaging
Secure channel messages are secured with a certificate issued by an external PKI.
### Multiple key domains
Key domains are domains to store separate private/secret keys. Each domain is protected by a DKEK, independent from the other domains. Private/secret keys can be generated in different key domains to be used with separated DKEK.
Therefore, a single device may contain different domains with independent keys.
### > Multiple Key Domains
Supports separate key domains protected by independent DKEKs, allowing different keys in different domains.
### Key usage counter
A key usage counter is a counter that is reduced by 1 everytime that the private/secret key is used for signing, decrypting, derivation, etc. When it reaches 0, the key is disabled and cannot be used anymore.
### > Key Usage Counter
Tracks and limits the usage of private/secret keys, disabling keys once their usage counter reaches zero.
Key usage can also be used to perform and auditory and track the usage of a particular key.
### > Public Key Authentication (PKA)
Supports PKA for enhanced security, requiring a secondary device for authentication using a challenge-response mechanism.
### > Secure Lock
Adds an extra layer of security by locking the Pico HSM to a specific computer using a private key.
### > ChaCha20-Poly1305
Supports the ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption algorithm for secure data encryption.[^4]
### > X25519 and X448
Supports DH X25519 and X448 for key agreement, though these cannot be used for signing.
### > Key Derivation Functions
Supports HKDF, PBKDF2, and X963-KDF for symmetric key derivation.
### > HMAC
Supports HMAC generation with SHA digest algorithms.
### > CMAC
Supports CMAC with AES for keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
### > XKEK
Supports an advanced key sharing scheme (XKEK) for securely wrapping and unwrapping keys within authorized domains.
### > Master Key Encryption Key (MKEK)
Uses an MKEK to securely store all keys, encrypted with an ephemeral key derived from the hashed PIN.
### > Hierarchical Deterministic Key Generation
Supports BIP32 for asymmetric key derivation and SLIP10 for symmetric key derivation, enabling crypto wallet deployment with infinite key generation. Supports NIST 256 and Koblitz 256 curves for master key generation.[^4]
### > One Time Programming (OTP) Storage
The OTP securely stores the MKEK (Master Key Encryption Key) and Device Key permanently, making it inaccessible from external interfaces. This ensures that the key is protected against unauthorized access and tampering.
### > Secure Boot
Secure Boot ensures only authenticated firmware can run on the device, verifying each firmwares digital signature to block unauthorized code.
### > Secure Lock
Secure Lock restricts the device to the manufacturers firmware only, locking out debug access and preventing any further boot key installations.
### > Rescue Interface
A built-in rescue interface allows recovery of the device if it becomes unresponsive or undetectable. This feature provides a way to restore the device to operational status without compromising security.
### > LED Customization
The LED can be customized to reflect device status and user preferences, offering flexible color and brightness options for an enhanced user experience.
[^1]: PKCS11 modules (`pkcs11-tool` and `sc-tool`) do not support CMAC and key derivation. It must be processed through raw APDU command (`opensc-tool -s`).
[^2]: Available via SCS3 tool. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") for more information.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and the DKEK shares are available during the import process.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and DKEK shares are available during the import process.
[^4]: Available by using PicoHSM python tool.
### > ESP32-S3 support
Pico HSM also supports ESP32-S3 boards, which add secure storage, flash encryption and secure boot.
### > Dynamic VID/PID
Supports setting VID & PID on-the-fly. U
### > Rescue Pico HSM
Pico HSM Tool implements a new CCID stack to rescue the Pico HSM in case it has wrong VID/PID values and it is not recognized by the OS.
## Security considerations
All secret keys (asymmetric and symmetric) are stored encrypted in the flash memory of the Raspberry Pico. DKEK is used as a 256 bit AES key to protect private and secret keys. Keys are never stored in RAM except for signature and decryption operations and only during the process. All keys (including DKEK) are loaded and cleared every time to avoid potential security flaws.
All secret keys (both asymmetric and symmetric) are encrypted and stored in the flash memory. The MKEK, a 256-bit AES key, is used to protect these private and secret keys. Keys are held in RAM only during signature and decryption operations, and are loaded and cleared each time to avoid potential security vulnerabilities.
At the same time, DKEK is encrypted with doubled salted and hashed PIN. Also, the PIN is hashed in memory during the session. Hence, PIN is never stored in plain text neither in flash nor in memory. Note that PIN is conveyed from the host to the HSM in plain text if no secure channel is provided.
The MKEK itself is encrypted using a doubly salted and hashed PIN, and the PIN is hashed in memory during sessions. This ensures that the PIN is never stored in plaintext, neither in flash memory nor in RAM. However, if no secure channel is used, the PIN may be transmitted in plaintext from the host to the HSM.
If the Pico is stolen the contents of private and secret keys cannot be read without the PIN, even if the flash memory is dumped.
DKEKs are used during the export and import of private/secret keys and are part of a Key Domain. A Key Domain is a set of secret/private keys that share the same DKEK. These are also shared by the custodians and are not specific to Pico HSM. Therefore, if a key does not belong to a Key Domain (and thus lacks a DKEK), it cannot be exported.
In the event that the Pico is stolen, the private and secret key contents cannot be accessed without the PIN, even if the flash memory is dumped.
### RP2350 and ESP32-S3
RP2350 and ESP32-S3 microcontrollers are equipped with advanced security features, including Secure Boot and Secure Lock, ensuring that firmware integrity and authenticity are tightly controlled. Both devices support the storage of the Master Key Encryption Key (MKEK) in an OTP (One-Time Programmable) memory region, making it permanently inaccessible for external access or tampering. This secure, non-volatile region guarantees that critical security keys are embedded into the hardware, preventing unauthorized access and supporting robust defenses against code injection or firmware modification. Together, Secure Boot and Secure Lock enforce firmware authentication, while the MKEK in OTP memory solidifies the foundation for secure operations.
## Download
Please, go to the Release page and download the UF2 file for your board.
**If you own an ESP32-S3 board, go to [ESP32 Flasher](https://www.picokeys.com/esp32-flasher/) for flashing your Pico HSM.**
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you are planning to use it with OpenSC or similar, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the VID/PID patcher as follows:
`./patch_vidpid.sh VID:PID input_hsm_file.uf2 output_hsm_file.uf2`
If you own a Raspberry Pico (RP2040 or RP2350), go to [Download page](https://www.picokeys.com/getting-started/). If your board is mounted with the RP2040, then select Pico. If your board is mounted with the RP2350 or RP2354, select Pico2.
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you plan to use it with OpenSC or similar tools, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the [PicoKey App](https://www.picokeys.com/picokeyapp/ "PicoKey App").
You can use whatever VID/PID (i.e., 234b:0000 from FISJ), but remember that you are not authorized to distribute the binary with a VID/PID that you do not own.
## Build
Note that the [PicoKey App](https://www.picokeys.com/picokeyapp/ "PicoKey App") is the most recommended.
## Build for Raspberry Pico
Before building, ensure you have installed the toolchain for the Pico and the Pico SDK is properly located in your drive.
```
git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm
git submodule update --init --recursive
cd pico-hsm
mkdir build
cd build
@ -138,41 +204,79 @@ make
```
Note that `PICO_BOARD`, `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` are optional. If not provided, `pico` board and VID/PID `FEFF:FCFD` will be used.
After `make` ends, the binary file `pico_hsm.uf2` will be generated. Put your pico board into loading mode, by pushing `BOOTSEL` button while pluging on, and copy the UF2 to the new fresh usb mass storage Pico device. Once copied, the pico mass storage will be disconnected automatically and the pico board will reset with the new firmware. A blinking led will indicate the device is ready to work.
Additionally, you can pass the `VIDPID=value` parameter to build the firmware with a known VID/PID. The supported values are:
- `NitroHSM`
- `NitroFIDO2`
- `NitroStart`
- `NitroPro`
- `Nitro3`
- `Yubikey5`
- `YubikeyNeo`
- `YubiHSM`
- `Gnuk`
- `GnuPG`
After running `make`, the binary file `pico_hsm.uf2` will be generated. To load this onto your Pico board:
1. Put the Pico board into loading mode by holding the `BOOTSEL` button while plugging it in.
2. Copy the `pico_hsm.uf2` file to the new USB mass storage device that appears.
3. Once the file is copied, the Pico mass storage device will automatically disconnect, and the Pico board will reset with the new firmware.
4. A blinking LED will indicate that the device is ready to work.
### Docker
Independent from your Linux distribution or when using another OS that supports Docker, you could build a specific pico-hsm version in a Linux container.
```
sudo docker build \
--build-arg VERSION_PICO_SDK=2.0.0 \
--build-arg VERSION_MAJOR=5 \
--build-arg VERSION_MINOR=0 \
--build-arg PICO_BOARD=waveshare_rp2040_zero \
--build-arg USB_VID=0xfeff \
--build-arg USB_PID=0xfcfd \
-t pico-hsm-builder .
sudo docker run \
--name mybuild \
-it pico-hsm-builder \
ls -l /home/builduser/pico-hsm/build_release/pico_hsm.uf2
sudo docker cp mybuild:/home/builduser/pico-hsm/build_release/pico_hsm.uf2 .
sudo docker rm mybuild
```
## Usage
The firmware uploaded to the Pico contains a reader and a virtual smart card. It is like having a physical reader with an inserted SIM card.
We recommend the use of [OpenSC](http://github.com/opensc/opensc/ "OpenSC") to communicate with the reader. If it is not installed, you can download and build it or install the binaries for your system. The first command is to ensure that the Pico is detected as a HSM:
```
The firmware uploaded to the Pico contains a reader and a virtual smart card, similar to having a physical reader with an inserted SIM card. We recommend using [OpenSC](http://github.com/opensc/opensc/ "OpenSC") to communicate with the reader. If OpenSC is not installed, you can download and build it or install the binaries for your system.
To ensure that the Pico is detected as an HSM, use the following command:
```sh
opensc-tool -an
```
It should return a text like the following:
```
It should return a text similar to:
```sh
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
3b:fe:18:00:00:81:31:fe:45:80:31:81:54:48:53:4d:31:73:80:21:40:81:07:fa
SmartCard-HSM
```
The name of the reader may vary if you modified the VID/PID.
For initialization and asymmetric operations, check [doc/usage.md](/doc/usage.md).
For further details and operations, refer to the following documentation:
For signing and verification operations, check [doc/sign-verify.md](/doc/sign-verify.md).
For asymmetric encryption and decryption, check [doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md](/doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md).
For backup, restore and DKEK share management, check [doc/backup-and-restore.md](/doc/backup-and-restore.md).
For AES key generation, encryption and decryption, check [doc/aes.md](/doc/aes.md).
For 4096 bits RSA support, check [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md).
For storing and retrieving arbitrary data, check [doc/store_data.md](/doc/store_data.md).
For extra options, such as set/get real datetime or enable/disable press-to-confirm button, check [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md).
- Initialization and Asymmetric Operations [doc/usage.md](/doc/usage.md)
- Signing and Verification Operations [doc/sign-verify.md](/doc/sign-verify.md)
- Asymmetric Encryption and Decryption [doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md](/doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md)
- Backup, Restore, and DKEK Share Management [doc/backup-and-restore.md](/doc/backup-and-restore.md)
- AES Key Generation, Encryption, and Decryption [doc/aes.md](/doc/aes.md)
- 4096 Bits RSA Support [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md)
- Storing and Retrieving Arbitrary Data [doc/store_data.md](/doc/store_data.md)
- Extra Options (e.g., set/get real datetime, enable/disable press-to-confirm button [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md)
- Public Key Authentication [doc/public_key_authentication.md](/doc/public_key_authentication.md)
## Operation time
### Keypair generation
Generating EC keys is almost instant. RSA keypair generation takes some time, specially for `3072` and `4096` bits.
Generating EC keys is almost instant. RSA keypair generation takes some time, specially for `3072` and `4096` bits.
| RSA key length (bits) | Average time (seconds) |
| :---: | :---: |
@ -190,14 +294,17 @@ Generating EC keys is almost instant. RSA keypair generation takes some time, sp
| 4096 | 15 |
## Press-to-confirm button
Raspberry Pico comes with the BOOTSEL button to load the firmware. When this firmware is running, the button can be used for other purposes. Pico HSM uses this button to confirm private/secret operations. This feature is optional and it shall be enabled. For more information, see [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md).
The Raspberry Pico includes a BOOTSEL button used for loading firmware initially. Once the Pico HSM firmware is running, this button can be repurposed for additional functionalities. Specifically, the Pico HSM utilizes this button to confirm private and secret operations, a feature that is optional but highly recommended for enhanced security.
With this feature enabled, everytime that a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM awaits for the user confirmation by pressing the BOOTSEL button. The Led of the Pico HSM will remain almost illuminated, turning off quickly once a second, indicating that the user must press the button to confirm the operation. Otherwise, the Pico HSM waits indefinitely. See [Led blink](#press-to-confirm) for a picture of the blinking sequence. When in this mode, the Pico HSM sends periodic timeout commands to the host to do not trigger the timeout operation.
When enabled, each time a private or secret key operation is initiated, the Pico HSM enters a waiting state where it awaits user confirmation by pressing the BOOTSEL button. During this waiting period, the Pico HSM's LED remains mostly illuminated but blinks off briefly every second, signaling to the user to press the button for confirmation. If no action is taken, the Pico HSM will continue to wait indefinitely. This operation mode includes periodic timeout commands sent to the host to prevent the session from timing out prematurely.
This feature is an extra layer of security, as it requires the user intervention to sign or decrypt and it ensures that any application will use the Pico HSM without user awareness. However, it is not recommended for servers or other environments where operations are authomatized, since it requires a physical access to the Pico HSM to push the button.
This feature adds an additional layer of security by requiring physical user intervention for sensitive operations such as signing or decrypting data. It mitigates risks associated with unauthorized applications or scripts using the Pico HSM without user awareness. However, it is not recommended for server environments or other automated settings where physical access to press the button may not be practical.
For more details on configuring and using this feature, refer to the [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md) document.
## Led blink
Pico HSM uses the led to indicate the current status. Four states are available:
### Press to confirm
The Led is almost on all the time. It goes off for 100 miliseconds every second.
@ -220,18 +327,60 @@ While processing, the Pico HSM is busy and cannot receive additional commands un
## Driver
Pico HSM uses the `sc-hsm` driver provided by [OpenSC](https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/ "OpenSC") or the `sc-hsm-embedded` driver provided by [CardContact](https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded "CardContact"). This driver utilizes the standardized PKCS#11 interface to communicate with the user and it can be used with many engines that accept PKCS#11 interface, such as OpenSSL, P11 library or pkcs11-tool.
The Pico HSM uses either the `sc-hsm` driver from [OpenSC](https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/) or the `sc-hsm-embedded` driver from [CardContact](https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded/) to interface with external applications. These drivers employ the standardized PKCS#11 interface, making it compatible with various cryptographic engines that support PKCS#11, such as OpenSSL, P11 library, or pkcs11-tool.
Pico HSM relies on PKCS#15 structure to store and manipulate the internal files (PINs, private keys, certificates, etc.) and directories. Therefore, it accepts the commands from `pkcs15-tool`. For instance, `pkcs15-tool -D` will list all elements stored in the Pico HSM.
Internally, the Pico HSM organizes and manages its data using the PKCS#15 structure, which includes elements like PINs, private keys, and certificates. Commands can be issued to interact with these stored elements using tools such as `pkcs15-tool`. For example, `pkcs15-tool -D` lists all elements stored within the Pico HSM.
The way to communicate is exactly the same as with other cards, such as OpenPGP or similar.
Communication with the Pico HSM follows the same protocols and methods used with other smart cards, such as OpenPGP cards or similar devices.
For an advanced usage, see the docs and examples.
For advanced usage scenarios, refer to the documentation and examples provided. Additionally, the Pico HSM supports the SCS3 tool for more sophisticated operations and includes features like multiple key domains. For detailed information on SCS3 usage, refer to [SCS3 documentation](/doc/scs3.md).
Pico HSM also supports SCS3 tool for advanced use and multiple key domain. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md) for more information.
## License and Commercial Use
### Important
OpenSC relies on PCSC driver, which reads a list (`Info.plist`) that contains a pair of VID/PID of supported readers. In order to be detectable, you must patch the UF2 binary (if you just downloaded from the [Release section](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/releases "Release section")) or configure the project with the proper VID/PID with `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` parameters in `CMake` (see [Build section](#build "Build section")). Note that you cannot distribute the patched/compiled binary if you do not own the VID/PID or have an explicit authorization.
This project is available under two editions:
**Community Edition (FOSS)**
- Released under the GNU Affero General Public License v3 (AGPLv3).
- You are free to study, modify, and run the code, including for internal evaluation.
- If you distribute modified binaries/firmware, OR if you run a modified version of this project as a network-accessible service, you must provide the corresponding source code to the users of that binary or service, as required by AGPLv3.
- No warranty. No SLA. No guaranteed support.
**Enterprise / Commercial Edition**
- Proprietary license for organizations that want to:
- run this in production with multiple users/devices,
- integrate it into their own product/appliance,
- enforce corporate policies (PIN policy, admin/user roles, revocation),
- deploy it as an internal virtualized / cloud-style service,
- and *not* be required to publish derivative source code.
- Base package includes:
- commercial license (no AGPLv3 disclosure obligation for your modifications / integration)
- onboarding call
- access to officially signed builds
- Optional / on-demand enterprise components that can be added case-by-case:
- ability to operate in multi-user / multi-device environments
- device inventory, traceability and secure revocation/offboarding
- custom attestation, per-organization device identity / anti-cloning
- virtualization / internal "HSM or auth backend" service for multiple teams or tenants
- post-quantum (PQC) key material handling and secure PQC credential storage
- hierarchical deterministic key derivation (HD walletstyle key trees for per-user / per-tenant keys, firmware signing trees, etc.)
- cryptographically signed audit trail / tamper-evident logging
- dual-control / two-person approval for high-risk operations
- secure key escrow / disaster recovery strategy
- release-signing / supply-chain hardening toolchain
- policy-locked hardened mode ("FIPS-style profile")
- priority security-response SLA
- white-label demo / pre-sales bundle
Typical licensing models:
- Internal use (single legal entity, including internal private cloud / virtualized deployments).
- OEM / Redistribution / Service (ship in your product OR offer it as a service to third parties).
These options are scoped and priced individually depending on which components you actually need.
For commercial licensing and enterprise features, email pol@henarejos.me
Subject: `ENTERPRISE LICENSE <your company name>`
See `ENTERPRISE.md` for details.
## Credits
Pico HSM uses the following libraries or portion of code:

View file

@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
#!/bin/bash
VERSION_MAJOR="2"
VERSION_MAJOR="6"
VERSION_MINOR="2"
SUFFIX="${VERSION_MAJOR}.${VERSION_MINOR}"
#if ! [[ -z "${GITHUB_SHA}" ]]; then
# SUFFIX="${SUFFIX}.${GITHUB_SHA}"
#fi
rm -rf release/*
mkdir -p build_release
mkdir -p release
rm -rf -- release/*
cd build_release
for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 adafruit_itsybitsy_rp2040 adafruit_qtpy_rp2040 adafruit_trinkey_qt2040 arduino_nano_rp2040_connect melopero_shake_rp2040 pimoroni_interstate75 pimoroni_keybow2040 pimoroni_pga2040 pimoroni_picolipo_4mb pimoroni_picolipo_16mb pimoroni_picosystem pimoroni_plasma2040 pimoroni_tiny2040 pybstick26_rp2040 sparkfun_micromod sparkfun_promicro sparkfun_thingplus vgaboard waveshare_rp2040_lcd_0.96 waveshare_rp2040_plus_4mb waveshare_rp2040_plus_16mb waveshare_rp2040_zero
do
rm -rf *
PICO_SDK_PATH=~/Devel/pico/pico-sdk cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$board
make -kj20
mv pico_hsm.uf2 ../release/pico_hsm_$board-$VERSION_MAJOR.$VERSION_MINOR.uf2
done
PICO_SDK_PATH="${PICO_SDK_PATH:-../../pico-sdk}"
SECURE_BOOT_PKEY="${SECURE_BOOT_PKEY:-../../ec_private_key.pem}"
boards=("pico" "pico2")
rm -rf *
PICO_SDK_PATH=~/Devel/pico/pico-sdk cmake ..
make -kj20
mv pico_hsm.uf2 ../release/pico_hsm_pico_generic-$VERSION_MAJOR.$VERSION_MINOR.uf2
for board_name in "${boards[@]}"
do
rm -rf -- ./*
PICO_SDK_PATH="${PICO_SDK_PATH}" cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$board_name -DSECURE_BOOT_PKEY=${SECURE_BOOT_PKEY}
make -j`nproc`
mv pico_hsm.uf2 ../release/pico_hsm_$board_name-$SUFFIX.uf2
done

View file

@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Created on Wed Apr 13 20:15:01 2022
@author: Pol Henarejos
"""
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
import base64
import urllib.request
import json
import sys
def print_var(v, name):
s = '\n'
s += "static const unsigned char "+name+"[] = {\n"
s += "\t0x{:02x},0x{:02x},\n".format((len(v) & 0xff),((len(v)>> 8) & 0xff))
for i in range(len(v)):
if (i%16 == 0):
s += '\t'
s += "0x{:02x}".format((v[i]))
if (i < len(v)-1):
s += ','
if (i%16 == 15):
s += '\n'
s += '\n'
s += '};\n'
return s
def main():
args = sys.argv[1:]
private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP192R1(), default_backend())
public_key = private_key.public_key()
pub_num = public_key.public_numbers()
pbk = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b'\x04'+pub_num.x.to_bytes(24,'big')+pub_num.y.to_bytes(24,'big'))
user_agent = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.7) Gecko/2009021910 Firefox/3.0.7'
data = urllib.parse.urlencode({'pubkey':pbk}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request("https://www.henarejos.me/pico-hsm.php", method='POST', data=data, headers={'User-Agent':user_agent,} ) #The assembled request
response = urllib.request.urlopen(req)
resp = response.read().decode('utf-8')
j = json.loads(resp)
cvcert = base64.b64decode(j['cvcert'])
dica = [
0x7f,0x21,0x81,0xc5,0x7f,0x4e,0x81,0x8e,0x5f,0x29,0x01,0x00,0x42,0x0e,0x45,0x53,
0x43,0x56,0x43,0x41,0x48,0x53,0x4d,0x30,0x30,0x30,0x30,0x31,0x7f,0x49,0x3f,0x06,
0x0a,0x04,0x00,0x7f,0x00,0x07,0x02,0x02,0x02,0x02,0x03,0x86,0x31,0x04,0x93,0x7e,
0xdf,0xf1,0xa6,0xd2,0x40,0x7e,0xb4,0x71,0xb2,0x97,0x50,0xdb,0x7e,0xe1,0x70,0xfb,
0x6c,0xcd,0x06,0x47,0x2a,0x3e,0x9c,0x8d,0x59,0x56,0x57,0xbe,0x11,0x11,0x0a,0x08,
0x81,0x54,0xed,0x22,0xc0,0x83,0xac,0xa1,0x2e,0x39,0x7b,0xd4,0x65,0x1f,0x5f,0x20,
0x0e,0x45,0x53,0x44,0x56,0x43,0x41,0x48,0x53,0x4d,0x30,0x30,0x30,0x30,0x31,0x7f,
0x4c,0x12,0x06,0x09,0x04,0x00,0x7f,0x00,0x07,0x03,0x01,0x02,0x02,0x53,0x05,0x80,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x5f,0x25,0x06,0x02,0x02,0x00,0x03,0x02,0x07,0x5f,0x24,0x06,
0x02,0x05,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x5f,0x37,0x30,0x8b,0xb2,0x01,0xb6,0x24,0xfe,0xe5,
0x4e,0x65,0x3a,0x02,0xa2,0xb2,0x27,0x2d,0x3d,0xb4,0xb0,0xc9,0xdd,0xbf,0x10,0x6d,
0x99,0x49,0x46,0xd6,0xd0,0x72,0xc1,0xf3,0x4c,0xab,0x4f,0x32,0x14,0x7c,0xb0,0x99,
0xb7,0x33,0x70,0xd6,0x00,0xff,0x73,0x0c,0x5d
]
s = '#ifndef _CVCERTS_H_\n#define _CVCERTS_H_\n'
s += print_var(dica,'dica')
s += print_var(cvcert,'termca')
pvk = private_key.private_numbers().private_value.to_bytes(24,'big')
s += print_var(pvk,'termca_pk')
s += '\n#endif\n'
f = open(args[0] + '/src/hsm/cvcerts.h','w')
f.write(s)
f.close()
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()

View file

@ -54,4 +54,4 @@ Using decrypt algorithm AES-CBC
This is a text.
```
AES-CBC it is a block operation and it requires an input size multiple of 16 bytes. Thus, for a trivial data, a padding operation has to be performed beforehand.
AES-CBC it is a block operation and it requires an input size multiple of 16 bytes. Thus, for a trivial data, a padding operation has to be performed beforehand.

View file

@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ This algorithm uses the PKCSv1.5 padding. It is considered deprecated and insecu
First, we encrypt the data with the public key:
```
$ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data -pubin -out data.crypt
$ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data -pubin -out data.crypt
```
Then, we decrypt with the private key inside the Pico HSM:
```
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-PKCS -i data.crypt
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using decrypt algorithm RSA-PKCS
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ $ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data_pad -pubin -out data.crypt -raw
Then, we decrypt with the private key inside the Pico HSM:
```
$ cat data.crypt|pkcs11-tool --id 4 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-X-509
$ cat data.crypt|pkcs11-tool --id 4 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-X-509
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using decrypt algorithm RSA-X-509
This is a test string. Be safe, be secure.
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ This is a test string. Be safe, be secure.
```
## ECDH-DERIVE
ECC keys do not allow ciphering operations. Instead, the ECDH scheme provides a mechanism to exchange a shared symmetric key without transmitting it to the remote part. The shared key is composed by multiplying the local private key and the remote public key.
ECC keys do not allow ciphering operations. Instead, the ECDH scheme provides a mechanism to exchange a shared symmetric key without transmitting it to the remote part. The shared key is composed by multiplying the local private key and the remote public key.
First, we create the remote part, Bob, by generating an ECC keypair and getting the public key:
```
@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ No output is displayed if both are equal.
You can also view the contents of both keys:
```
$ xxd -p bob-mine.der
$ xxd -p bob-mine.der
9874558aefa9d92cc051e5da6d1753987e5314925d6d78bf
$ xxd -p mine-bob.der
$ xxd -p mine-bob.der
9874558aefa9d92cc051e5da6d1753987e5314925d6d78bf
```

View file

@ -29,15 +29,15 @@ symbols.
Please keep the generated DKEK share file in a safe location. We also recommend to keep a
paper printout, in case the electronic version becomes unavailable. A printable version
of the file can be generated using "openssl base64 -in <filename>".
Enter password to encrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to encrypt DKEK share :
Please retype password to confirm :
Please retype password to confirm :
Enciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share created and saved to dkek.pbe
```
The generated file `dkek.pbe` contains the DKEK. Technically, it contains a share. But if a device is initialized with one share, it is equivalent to contain the full DKEK.
The generated file `dkek.pbe` contains the DKEK. Technically, it contains a share. But if a device is initialized with one share, it is equivalent to contain the full DKEK.
Keep these file in a safe place. If this file is lost, you can export the private keys but you will not be able to import into another device or in the same device if it is initialized again.
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ At this moment, the Pico HSM expects the DKEK. It is loaded with the following c
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ And finally, all are imported one after the other, without special order:
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-1.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ DKEK import pending, 2 share(s) still missing
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-2.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ DKEK import pending, 1 share(s) still missing
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-1.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ DKEK key check value : 4B7DA256ACD4EF62
### DKEK n-of-m threshold scheme
This scheme provides an extra level of flexiblity, as not all custodians are necessary to import the DKEK share. For instance, with the previous schemes, if a custodian gets unavailable, the initialization will block until the missing custodian can got to finalize the initialization.
With n-of-m threshold scheme, it flexibilizes the number of required custodians to reduce failure points. If a share is lost, the DKEK can still be recovered without major implications.
With n-of-m threshold scheme, it flexibilizes the number of required custodians to reduce failure points. If a share is lost, the DKEK can still be recovered without major implications.
This scheme is not a replacement of DKEK shares. Instead, it splits the DKEK share encryption password amongst the n-of-m threshold scheme. For instance, if you define 2 shares and a scheme of 3-of-5 threshold for each share, it will imply 10 different custodians, where 6 are necessary to load both shares. You can also mix one share with traditional passphrase and the other with the n-of-m threshold scheme.
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Using reader with a card:Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
The DKEK will be enciphered using a randomly generated 64 bit password.
This password is split using a (3-of-5) threshold scheme.
Please keep the generated and encrypted DKEK file in a safe location. We also recommend
Please keep the generated and encrypted DKEK file in a safe location. We also recommend
to keep a paper printout, in case the electronic version becomes unavailable. A printable version
of the file can be generated using "openssl base64 -in <filename>".
@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Private RSA Key [Certificate]
...
```
Note that `Key ref` and `ID` may be different. Whilst different keys may share the same `ID` (highly discouraged), the `Key ref` is a value internally computed and unique.
Note that `Key ref` and `ID` may be different. Whilst different keys may share the same `ID` (highly discouraged), the `Key ref` is a value internally computed and unique.
To export and wrap the private key:
@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ To export and wrap the private key:
$ sc-hsm-tool --wrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 1 --pin 648219
```
A file named `wrap-key.bin` is created with the private key encrypted securely with the DKEK.
A file named `wrap-key.bin` is created with the private key encrypted securely with the DKEK.
## Restore
To restore the wraped key, a device initialized with the same DKEK is mandatory.
To restore the wraped key, a device initialized with the same DKEK is mandatory.
To unwrap the key:

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Extra command
Pico HSM supports a customized extra command to use with different options. Since the drivers in the market do not support the following features, a raw APDU command shall be sent.
Pico HSM supports a customized extra command to use with different options. Since the drivers in the market do not support the following features, a raw APDU command shall be sent.
To send a raw APDU command, `opensc-tool -s <APDU>` can be used. The `APDU` parameter is a string of hexadecimal numbers and it takes the following form:
```
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ For example, to obtain the current datetime:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 80640A0008
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00):
07 E6 04 06 03 13 29 1E ......).
```
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ To set the reference datetime, a datetime string must be provided. For example:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 80640A000807E6040603132917
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08 07 E6 04 06 03 13 29 17
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08 07 E6 04 06 03 13 29 17
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ Pico HSM support initialize options, such as setting Transport PIN or reset retr
To specify a set of options, the `XX` parameter shall be set to `06`. The data parameter shall be 1 byte, where the options are combined with the or operand `|`. The length `YY` shall be set to `01`.
Available options (counting from LSB):
- Bit `0`: enable/disable press-to-confirm button.
- Bit `1`: enable/disable key usage counter for all keys.
### Press-to-confirm button
Press-to-confirm button offers an extra security layer by requiring the user confirmation everytime that a private/secret key is loaded. This avoids ghost applications thay may perform hidden opperations without noticing the user, such as signing or decrypting. Pico HSM will inform the user that is awaiting for a confirmation by making almost a fixed Led blink.
@ -68,7 +72,7 @@ This feature is disabled by default but can be enabled rapidly by setting the LS
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000101
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
@ -89,3 +93,23 @@ Pico HSM supports a key usage counter to audit the usage of a particular key. Fo
This option is disabled by default. When enabled, each generated key in the device is attached to a counter, starting at `2^32-1` (`FFFFFFFEh`). Therefore, it allows to count how many times a key is used for signing or decryption.
The counter can be viewed by using the SCS3 tool. More info at [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md).
This feature is disabled by default but can be enabled rapidly by setting the 2nd LSB bit to 1:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000102
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
At this moment, when a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM will wait for the pressed BOOTSEL button to confirm the operation.
To disable, the LSB bit must be set to 0:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000100
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 00
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```

View file

@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
# Public Key Authentication
Public Key Authentication (PKA) is a mechanism to authenticate a legit user without introducing any PIN (see Notes below). The authentication is performed by signing a challenge and checking the signature result.
1. A Pico HSM #A contains a private key, whose public key will be used for authentication.
2. The public key of #A is registered into a second Pico HSM #B.
3. When a user wants to login into #B, #B generates a challenge that is passed to #A for signature.
4. #A signs the challenge and returns the signature.
5. #B verifies the signature against the challenge with the public key of #A, previously registered.
6. If the signature is valid, #B grants access to the user.
To enable PKA, the device must be initialized beforehand. In case the device has secret/private keys, all shall be exported and reimported when the set up is finished.
## Requirements
To take advantage of PKA, the following is required:
1. Two Pico HSM: one will be used only for authentication (it can be any device able to generate a private key and sign arbitrary data).
2. [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") tool to authenticate the user. At this time, OpenSC does not support PKA, only initialization.
3. A secret key of ECC 256 bits.
## Usage
Before using SCS3, it must be patched [scs3.patch.txt](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/files/8890050/scs3.patch.txt). See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") for further details.
### Generate the authentication key
On a secondary device, generate a private key, on the ECC 256 bits (`brainpoolP256r1` or `secp192r1`). Label it with an easy name, such as "Authentication".
<img width="1037" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353764-4620ece4-0d82-4a23-a153-99bf912621a7.png">
Once finished, export the public key.
<img width="350" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353732-63f40572-a42f-4e5c-a9ab-6e52a083956b.png">
### Initialization
On the primary device, initialize it. When prompting for an authentication mechanism, select "Public Key Authentication".
<img width="412" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353661-17caf6db-0c76-4903-9b70-5afa79f5ae54.png"><img width="1037" alt="Captura de Pantalla 2022-06-13 a les 12 14 48" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353822-310219dc-7c7d-4ece-9fd9-c7835c2688df.png">
Once finished, register the exported public key. A message of `0 authenticated public key(s) in 1 of 1 scheme` will appear if it is properly registered.
<img width="342" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353917-f3f99405-c7ff-43ce-8914-6f3b713df952.png"><img width="1037" alt="Captura de Pantalla 2022-06-13 a les 12 16 17" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353946-ee7eacf9-cead-4804-ac7a-57848f7c822b.png">
### Authentication
Plug the secondary device that stores the private key (do not load the device in the SCS3 tool) and initiate the public key authentication.
<img width="321" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353998-8f418ec6-d90d-4168-801f-51008c78824d.png">
Select the secondary card and the Authentication private key (or the name you labeled it).
<img width="435" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173354044-50163113-829e-4d80-bbda-7b589849af73.png">
Introduce the PIN of the secondary device.
If the private key matches with the registered public key, the primary device will grant access and it will display `User PIN authenticated (9000)` (despite no PIN is provided).
From now on, you have full access and can operate normally with the primary device.
## Notes on DKEK
Pico HSM uses the PIN to protect the DKEK, which is lately used to protect private/secret keys and wrap/unwrap. However, when PKA is enabled, the authentication is not performed by introducing any PIN.
Authenticated privileges are granted when PKA succeeds, regardless of PIN, which is optional.
Nevertheless, **it is extremely recommended to combine PKA with PIN**. Note that when combined, only PKA grants authenticated privileges. Therefore, if both schemes are setup, it is necessary to unlock the DKEK with PIN verification.
Otherwise, it will not be possible to operate with private/secret keys despite the user will be logged in.
With this scheme, multiple custodians may authenticate the device individually and remotely and, when fully authenticated, the master user can unlock the DKEK with the PIN.
Moreover, with this approach the device is kept safe and neither the DKEK nor the private/secret keys are stored in plain text in the device.
Even though the flash memory is dumped by an attacker, it will not be possible to decipher any sensitive data or key.
Initialization of the device with PKA **and** PIN can be achieved with SCS3 or OpenSC:
**Note:** do not import any DKEK share or DKEK operation before PKA and PIN setup.
### With OpenSC
Use the following command (or similar), which accepts the use of PIN parameter **and** PKA configuration:
```
sc-hsm-tool -X --so-pin 1234567890123456 --pin 648219 -K 1 -n 1 -s 1
```
and PKA and PIN are enabled, jointly with DKEK protection.
### With SCS3
Unfortunately, SCS3 does not allow to initialize the device with PKA and PIN at the same time, though it can be achieved in separated steps:
1. Initialize the device with PKA. When done, the PIN will not be initialized but it will advice that 3 attemps can be performed.
2. There is NO default PIN. So, DO NOT attempt to log in yet. A reset PIN shall be requested.
3. Click on ``Reset User-PIN``, introduce the SO-PIN configured during the initialization and introduce the desired User-PIN.
When done, the device will be configured with PIN **and** PKA.

View file

@ -1,13 +1,20 @@
# SCS3 tool
SCS3 tool is a specific tool developed by CardContact to manage HSM. Thanks to its interface, Pico HSM can be enhanced with more advanced functionalities, not present in the PKCS11 module:
- Import PKCS12 private keys and certificates.
- Import private keys and certificates from other Pico HSM devices in WKY format.
-
Unfortunately, there is no pkcs11 tool or equivalent capable to perform the import. Since it uses the SC-HSM driver, it also supports the communication with the [SCS3 tool](https://www.openscdp.org/scsh3/ "SCS3 tool"). It can be downloaded from [here](https://www.openscdp.org/scsh3/download.html "here").
However, SCS3 only works with those HSM manufactured by CardContact. The check is performed by means of trust store against the manufacturing certificates. For obvious reasons, these certificates can only be signed with the private keys of the Certificate Authorities listed in the trust store.
However, SCS3 only works with those HSM manufactured by CardContact. The check is performed by means of trust store against the manufacturing certificates. For obvious reasons, these certificates can only be signed with the private keys of the Certificate Authorities listed in the trust store.
Pico HSM is shipped with its own CA certificates. To load this certificate onto the trust store of SCS3, the following line has to be appended to `SmartCardHSM.rootCerts` variable, near line `235` in the file `scs3/scsh/sc-hsm/SmartCardHSM.js`.
```
ESCVCAHSM00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESPICOHSMCA00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESPICOHSMCA00002: new CVC(new ByteString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
```
Therefore, the whole variable becomes:
@ -16,18 +23,28 @@ Therefore, the whole variable becomes:
SmartCardHSM.rootCerts = {
DESRCACC100001: new CVC(new ByteString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
UTSRCACC100001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESCVCAHSM00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESPICOHSMCA00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESPICOHSMCA00002: new CVC(new ByteString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
}
```
After this ammendment, the KeyManager can be invoked (CTRL+M) and it will output something similar to:
Similarly, replace the line `1531` in file `scs3/keymanager/keymanager.js` with:
```
assert(devcert.verifyWith(this.crypto, dicacert.getPublicKey(SmartCardHSM.rootCerts.ESPICOHSMCA00001.getPublicKey()), dicacert.getPublicKeyOID()));
```
Alternatively, this patch [scs3.patch.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/20274013/scs3.patch.txt) can be applied.
After this ammendment, the program can be started and the KeyManager can be invoked (CTRL+M) and it will output something similar to:
```
>load("keymanager/keymanager.js");
SmartCard-HSM Version 1.6 on JCOP Free memory 217104 byte
Issuer Certificate : CVC id-AT DV (official domestic) CAR=ESCVCAHSM00001 CHR=ESDVCAHSM00001 CED=27 / de març / 2022 CXD=31 / de desembre / 2025
Device Certificate : CVC id-AT Terminal CAR=ESDVCAHSM00001 CHR=ESTERMHSM00001 CED=27 / de març / 2022 CXD=31 / de desembre / 2023
Default Key Domain : 0F89B400975EDD2D425ABF85F2FBD318779B3D85475E65D4
SmartCard-HSM Version 2.6 on JCOP Free memory 215512 byte
Issuer Certificate : CVC id-AT DV (official domestic) CAR=ESPICOHSMCA00001 CHR=ESPICOHSMDV00001 CED=18 / dagost / 2022 CXD=14 / de juny / 2023
Device Certificate : CVC id-AT Terminal CAR=ESPICOHSMDV00001 CHR=ESPICOHSMTRYZRGW CED=22 / dagost / 2022 CXD=22 / dagost / 2023
Default Key Domain : 223CD8D8F794889AC163305881BF8C04960BBB8658120491F1C0601F6BF97183
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Please right-click on nodes in the outline to see possible actions.
For most operations you will need to authenticate first using a
@ -37,9 +54,16 @@ mechanism from the User PIN context menu.
The SCS3 tool is ready to import private keys and certificates, wraped in WKY files or in PKCS#12 format. Also, all stored keys can be exported, combined with their respective certificates. Note that the user has to be previously logged in.
## macOS users
In macOS, the PCSC must be explicitly specified. Otherwise, the reader will not be found.
It can be executed in a Terminal via
```
java -Dsun.security.smartcardio.library=/System/Library/Frameworks/PCSC.framework/Versions/Current/PCSC -Dorg.bouncycastle.asn1.allow_unsafe_integer=true -Djava.library.path=./lib -classpath 'lib/*' de.cardcontact.scdp.scsh3.GUIShell
```
## DKEK requirement
In order to perform the import, private keys must be wrapped with the same DKEK present in the Pico HSM. Thus, the Pico HSM must be previously initialized with at minimum of 1 DKEK share. This share will be used to wrap the private key before import.
In order to perform the import, private keys must be wrapped with the same DKEK present in the Pico HSM. Thus, the Pico HSM must be previously initialized with at minimum of 1 DKEK share. This share will be used to wrap the private key before import.
Note that the DKEK share shall be available before the import. In this way, all custodians must be present during the import process, since they will have to introduce their respective DKEK.

View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Sign and verify
Pico HSM supports in place signature of arbitrary data. It supports the following algorithms:
* RSA-PKCS
* RSA-PKCS
* RSA-X-509
* SHA1-RSA-PKCS
* SHA256-RSA-PKCS
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ $ openssl rsa -inform DER -outform PEM -in 1.der -pubin > 1.pub
At this moment, you are able to verify with the public key in `1.pub`. The signature is computed inside the Pico HSM with the private key. It never leaves the device.
## RSA-PKCS
This algorithm is used to sign raw data.
This algorithm is used to sign raw data.
To sign the data:
```
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ This algorithm uses the RSA-PKCS with PSS salt to randomize the signature. Pico
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism RSA-PKCS-PSS -i data.sha1 -o data.sig
```
```
To verify the signature:
```
@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ This algorithm takes the file as the input and sends its hash for signing with t
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism SHA1-RSA-PKCS-PSS -i data -o data.sig
```
```
To verify the signature:
```
@ -118,14 +118,14 @@ This is a raw ECDSA signature, which is usually used to sign a hashed message. `
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 11 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism ECDSA -i data.sha1 -o data.sig --signature-format openssl
$ pkcs11-tool --id 11 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism ECDSA -i data.sha1 -o data.sig --signature-format openssl
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using signature algorithm ECDSA
```
To verify the signature:
```
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
Signature Verified Successfully
```
@ -143,6 +143,6 @@ Using signature algorithm ECDSA-SHA256
The signature is verified with the hash:
```
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
Signature Verified Successfully
```

View file

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Before writting a file into the Pico HSM, we generate the data file with the fol
```
$ echo 'Pico HSM is awesome!' > test
```
```
Then, we can store the data file with the following command:
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Always provide a unique `--label`, as it will be used to index and reference the
To view the stored file, we can use the following command with the same label we employed:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1'
$ pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1'
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Pico HSM is awesome!
```
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Data object 'test1'
applicationName: test1
Path: e82b0601040181c31f0201::cf00
Data (21 bytes): 5069636F2048534D20697320617765736F6D65210A
Data object 'test2'
applicationName: test2
Path: e82b0601040181c31f0201::cd01

View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Usage
## Tools
We use multiple tools and PKCS#11 drivers and modules, depending on the purpose.
We use multiple tools and PKCS#11 drivers and modules, depending on the purpose.
* **pkcs11-tool**: from OpenSC. It interfaces with the HSM via PKCS#11 interface. It supports different drivers and modules.
* **sc-tool**: an alias of pkcs11-tool with the sc-hsm-embedded module. It is mainly used for AES management and it is defined as:
```
@ -22,20 +22,20 @@ init=0
PIN=648219
```
`opensc-pkcs11.so` can be replaced by `libsc-hsm-pkcs11.so` if desired.
* **sc-hsm-tool**: from OpenSC. Used to initialize the device.
* **pico-hsm-tool**: Used to initialize the device.
* **opensc-tool**: from OpenSC. Used to list and detect the reader with the HSM.
[^1]: `openssl version -a` will return the `OPENSSLDIR`, which contains `openssl.cnf` file and `ENGINESDIR`, which contains the p11 engine.
## Initialization
The first step is to initialize the HSM:
The first step is to initialize the HSM. To do so, use:
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219
```
The PIN number is used to manage all private keys in the device. It supports three attemps. After the third PIN failure, it gets blocked.
The PIN number is used to manage all private keys in the device. It supports three attemps. After the third PIN failure, it gets blocked.
The PIN accepts from 6 to 16 characters.
The SO-PIN is used to unblock the PIN. It accepts 15 attemps. After 15 failed attempts, the device will be completely blocked and will be necessary to initialize again, erasing all private keys and losing the access. Therefore, keep the SO-PIN in a safe place.
The SO-PIN is used to unblock the PIN. It accepts 15 attemps. After 15 failed attempts, the device will be completely blocked and will be necessary to initialize again, erasing all private keys and losing the access. Therefore, keep the SO-PIN in a safe place.
The SO-PIN is always 16 hexadecimal characters.
## PIN and SO-PIN management
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ $ pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --change-pin --new-pin 123456
To unblock the PIN:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin=3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin=648219
$ pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin 648219
```
## Keypair generation
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ To generate a RSA 2048 bits, use the following command:
$ pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --keypairgen --key-type rsa:2048 --id 1 --label "RSA2K"
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Key pair generated:
Private Key Object; RSA
Private Key Object; RSA
label: RSA2K
ID: 1
Usage: decrypt, sign
@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ The ID parameter is an internal hexadecimal number for easy identification. The
Pico HSM accepts RSA of 1024 (`rsa:1024`), 2048 (`rsa:2048`) and 4096 bits (`rsa:4096`).
**Caution**: RSA 2048 bits may take more than 20 seconds. RSA 4096 bits may take more than 20 minutes. The Pico HSM will work as normally and neither the HSM nor the host will block. But, in the meantime, the Pico HSM will not accept any command.
**Caution**: RSA 2048 bits may take more than 20 seconds. RSA 4096 bits may take more than 20 minutes. The Pico HSM will work as normally and neither the HSM nor the host will block. But, in the meantime, the Pico HSM will not accept any command.
An alternative is to generate the private key locally and import it to the HSM. This approach, however, is less secure as it does not use a True RNG or HRNG like Pico HSM. Use this approach if you have plugged a TRNG or you are not worried about obtaining the highest entropy.
Pico HSM also accepts ECDSA keypairs:
@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ Certificate:
a0:30:b2:ec:d3:d6:0d:58:f3
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
98:07:DA:13:B0:8E:A0:5C:97:83:68:FE:4A:25:8D:50:C4:DC:16:FA
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:98:07:DA:13:B0:8E:A0:5C:97:83:68:FE:4A:25:8D:50:C4:DC:16:FA
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Certificate:
99:2b:b2:82:66:c1:06:a7:2c:62:af:e2:e4:93:42:36:66:8d:
c5:3f:e1:ec:5f:9a:f8:5f:b3:6a:8f:0e:12:5d:c9:46:38:ea:
0b:08
```
```
The resulting file `cert.pem` contains the signed certificate in PEM format. Convert it into DER format and load it into the Pico HSM:

View file

@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
# This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
# Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
VERSION_MAJOR="2" #Version of Pico CCID Core
VERSION_MINOR="0"
echo "----------------------------"
echo "VID/PID patcher for Pico HSM"
echo "----------------------------"
echo ""
if [ "$#" -le 0 ]; then
echo "Usage: $0 VID:PID [input_uf2_file] [output_uf2_file]"
exit 1
fi
IFS=':' read -r -a ARR <<< "$1"
if [ ${#ARR[@]} -ne 2 ]; then
echo "ERROR: Specify vendor and product ids as VID:PID (e.g., $0 CAFE:1234)"
exit 1
fi
VID=${ARR[0]}
PID=${ARR[1]}
if [ ${#VID} -ne 4 ]; then
echo "ERROR: VID length must be 4 hexadecimal characters"
exit 1
fi
if [ ${#PID} -ne 4 ]; then
echo "ERROR: PID length must be 4 hexadecimal characters"
exit 1
fi
if ! [[ $VID =~ ^[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,}$ ]] ; then
echo "ERROR: VID must contain hexadecimal characters"
exit 1
fi
if ! [[ $PID =~ ^[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,}$ ]] ; then
echo "ERROR: PID must contain hexadecimal characters"
exit 1
fi
UF2_FILE_IF="hsm2040.uf2"
UF2_FILE_OF="$UF2_FILE_IF"
if [ "$#" -ge 2 ]; then
UF2_FILE_IF="$2"
UF2_FILE_OF="$UF2_FILE_IF"
fi
if [ "$#" -ge 3 ]; then
UF2_FILE_OF="$3"
fi
echo -n "Patching ${UF2_FILE_IF}... "
if [[ ! -f "$UF2_FILE_IF" ]]; then
echo "ERROR: UF2 file ${UF2_FILE_IF} does not exist"
exit 1
fi
if [ "$UF2_FILE_IF" != "$UF2_FILE_OF" ]; then
cp -R $UF2_FILE_IF $UF2_FILE_OF
fi
LITTLE_VID="\x${VID:2:2}\x${VID:0:2}"
LITTLE_PID="\x${PID:2:2}\x${PID:0:2}"
perl -pi -e "s/\xff\xfe\xfd\xfc\x$VERSION_MINOR\x$VERSION_MAJOR\x01\x02\x03\x01/$LITTLE_VID$LITTLE_PID\x$VERSION_MINOR\x$VERSION_MAJOR\x01\x02\x03\x01/" $UF2_FILE_OF
echo "Done!"
echo ""
echo "Patched file was saved in ${UF2_FILE_OF}"

@ -1 +0,0 @@
Subproject commit fe53f9a72946577730d283f3cda6a1d9b66b4ebd

1
pico-keys-sdk Submodule

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Subproject commit 263e554cc6c59a5f168f8589c4bdabe6e1e64c25

View file

@ -18,9 +18,20 @@ if (DEFINED ENV{PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH} AND (NOT PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_P
message("Using PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH from environment ('${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH}')")
endif ()
if (DEFINED ENV{PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG} AND (NOT PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG))
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG $ENV{PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG})
message("Using PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG from environment ('${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG}')")
endif ()
if (PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT AND NOT PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG)
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG "master")
message("Using master as default value for PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG")
endif()
set(PICO_SDK_PATH "${PICO_SDK_PATH}" CACHE PATH "Path to the Raspberry Pi Pico SDK")
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT "${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT}" CACHE BOOL "Set to ON to fetch copy of SDK from git if not otherwise locatable")
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH "${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH}" CACHE FILEPATH "location to download SDK")
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG "${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG}" CACHE FILEPATH "release tag for SDK")
if (NOT PICO_SDK_PATH)
if (PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT)
@ -29,11 +40,22 @@ if (NOT PICO_SDK_PATH)
if (PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH)
get_filename_component(FETCHCONTENT_BASE_DIR "${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH}" REALPATH BASE_DIR "${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}")
endif ()
FetchContent_Declare(
pico_sdk
GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk
GIT_TAG master
)
# GIT_SUBMODULES_RECURSE was added in 3.17
if (${CMAKE_VERSION} VERSION_GREATER_EQUAL "3.17.0")
FetchContent_Declare(
pico_sdk
GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk
GIT_TAG ${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG}
GIT_SUBMODULES_RECURSE FALSE
)
else ()
FetchContent_Declare(
pico_sdk
GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk
GIT_TAG ${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG}
)
endif ()
if (NOT pico_sdk)
message("Downloading Raspberry Pi Pico SDK")
FetchContent_Populate(pico_sdk)

57
sdkconfig.defaults Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
# This file was generated using idf.py save-defconfig. It can be edited manually.
# Espressif IoT Development Framework (ESP-IDF) Project Minimal Configuration
#
IGNORE_UNKNOWN_FILES_FOR_MANAGED_COMPONENTS=y
CONFIG_TINYUSB=y
CONFIG_TINYUSB_TASK_STACK_SIZE=16384
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_CUSTOM=y
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_CUSTOM_FILENAME="pico-keys-sdk/config/esp32/partitions.csv"
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_FILENAME="pico-keys-sdk/config/esp32/partitions.csv"
CONFIG_ESPTOOLPY_FLASHSIZE_4MB=y
CONFIG_ESPTOOLPY_FLASHMODE_QIO=y
CONFIG_ESP_DEFAULT_CPU_FREQ_MHZ_240=y
CONFIG_WL_SECTOR_SIZE_512=y
CONFIG_WL_SECTOR_MODE_PERF=y
COMPILER_OPTIMIZATION="Performance"
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CMAC_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HKDF_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_ECC=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_GCM=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_MPI is not set
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_SHA=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_AES=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ROM_MD5 is not set
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA512_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_TLS_DISABLED=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_TLS_ENABLED is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_TLS_USE_DS_PERIPHERAL is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLED is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_MBEDTLS_CRYPTO is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_MBEDTLS_TLS_CLIENT is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_MBEDTLS_CRYPTO is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSK_MODES is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ELLIPTIC_CURVE is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_GMTSSL1_1 is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CLIENT_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SERVER_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_SAE is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_OWE_STA is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_SAE is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_OWE_STA is not set
CONFIG_ESP_COREDUMP_ENABLE_TO_UART=y

6
src/hsm/CMakeLists.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
idf_component_register(
SRCS ${SOURCES}
INCLUDE_DIRS . ../../pico-keys-sdk/src ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/fs ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/rng ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/usb
REQUIRES mbedtls efuse
)
idf_component_set_property(${COMPONENT_NAME} WHOLE_ARCHIVE ON)

326
src/hsm/cmd_bip_slip.c Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "asn1.h"
const uint8_t *k1_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Bitcoin seed";
const uint8_t *p1_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Nist256p1 seed";
const uint8_t *sym_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Symmetric key seed";
mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context = { 0 };
uint8_t hd_keytype = 0;
int node_derive_bip_child(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *parent,
const uint8_t cpar[32],
const uint8_t *i,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *child,
uint8_t cchild[32]) {
uint8_t data[1 + 32 + 4], I[64], *iL = I, *iR = I + 32;
mbedtls_mpi il, kchild;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&il);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&kchild);
if (i[0] >= 0x80) {
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&parent->d, 0) == 0) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
}
data[0] = 0x00;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&parent->d, data + 1, 32);
}
else {
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&parent->grp,
&parent->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
data,
33);
}
do {
memcpy(data + 33, i, 4);
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
cpar,
32,
data,
sizeof(data),
I);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&il, iL, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&kchild, &il, &parent->d);
mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&kchild, &kchild, &parent->grp.N);
data[0] = 0x01;
memcpy(data + 1, iR, 32);
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&il,
&parent->grp.N) != -1 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&kchild, 0) == 0);
mbedtls_mpi_copy(&child->d, &kchild);
mbedtls_ecp_mul(&child->grp, &child->Q, &child->d, &child->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
memcpy(cchild, iR, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&il);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&kchild);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int sha256_ripemd160(const uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), buffer, buffer_len, output);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160), output, 32, output);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int sha256_sha256(const uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), buffer, buffer_len, output);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), output, 32, output);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int node_fingerprint_bip(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t fingerprint[4]) {
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buffer[33];
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp,
&ctx->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
buffer,
sizeof(buffer));
sha256_ripemd160(buffer, sizeof(buffer), buffer);
memcpy(fingerprint, buffer, 4);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int node_fingerprint_slip(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t fingerprint[4]) {
uint8_t buffer[32];
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
sha256_ripemd160(buffer, sizeof(buffer), buffer);
memcpy(fingerprint, buffer, 4);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int load_master_bip(uint16_t mid, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t chain[32],
uint8_t key_type[1]) {
uint8_t mkey[65];
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx);
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_MASTER_SEED | mid);
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(mkey, file_get_data(ef), sizeof(mkey));
int r = mkek_decrypt(mkey + 1,
sizeof(mkey) - 1);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (mkey[0] == 0x1 || mkey[0] == 0x2) {
if (mkey[0] == 0x1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1);
}
else if (mkey[0] == 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
}
else {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, mkey + 1, 32);
memcpy(chain, mkey + 33, 32);
mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, &ctx->d, &ctx->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
else if (mkey[0] == 0x3) {
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, mkey + 33, 32);
memcpy(chain, mkey + 1, 32);
}
key_type[0] = mkey[0];
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int node_derive_path(const uint8_t *path,
uint16_t path_len,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx,
uint8_t chain[32],
uint8_t fingerprint[4],
uint8_t *nodes,
uint8_t last_node[4],
uint8_t key_type[1]) {
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0, tag = 0x0;
uint8_t node = 0, N[64] = { 0 };
int r = 0;
memset(last_node, 0, 4);
memset(fingerprint, 0, 4);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init((uint8_t *)path, path_len, &ctxi);
for (; walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data); node++) {
if (tag == 0x02) {
if ((node == 0 && tag_len != 1) || (node != 0 && tag_len != 4)) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (node == 0) {
if ((r = load_master_bip(tag_data[0], ctx, chain, key_type)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
}
else if (node > 0) {
node_fingerprint_bip(ctx, fingerprint);
if ((r = node_derive_bip_child(ctx, chain, tag_data, ctx, chain)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(last_node, tag_data, 4);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x04) {
if (node == 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
else if (node > 0) {
node_fingerprint_slip(ctx, fingerprint);
*(tag_data - 1) = 0;
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
chain,
32,
tag_data - 1,
tag_len + 1,
N);
memcpy(chain, N, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, N + 32, 32);
}
}
}
if (nodes) {
*nodes = node;
}
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int cmd_bip_slip() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x2 || p1 == 0x3) { // Master generation (K1 and P1)
if (p2 >= 10) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t mkey[65], *seed = mkey + 1, seed_len = 64;
const uint8_t *key_seed = NULL;
mbedtls_mpi il;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&il);
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1);
key_seed = k1_seed;
}
else if (p1 == 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
key_seed = p1_seed;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
key_seed = sym_seed;
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
seed_len = 64;
random_gen(NULL, seed, seed_len);
}
else {
seed_len = MIN((uint8_t)apdu.nc, 64);
memcpy(seed, apdu.data, seed_len);
}
if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x2) {
do {
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), key_seed,
strlen((char *) key_seed), seed, seed_len, seed);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&il, seed, 32);
seed_len = 64;
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&il, 0) == 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&il, &grp.N) != -1);
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&il);
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), key_seed,
strlen((char *) key_seed), seed, seed_len, seed);
}
mkey[0] = p1;
file_t *ef = file_new(EF_MASTER_SEED | p2);
int r = mkek_encrypt(mkey + 1, sizeof(mkey) - 1);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = file_put_data(ef, mkey, sizeof(mkey));
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else if (p1 == 0xA) {
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
uint8_t chain[32] = { 0 }, fgpt[4] = { 0 }, last_node[4] = { 0 }, key_type = 0, nodes = 0;
size_t olen = 0;
int r =
node_derive_path(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctx, chain, fgpt, &nodes, last_node, &key_type);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t pubkey[33];
res_APDU_size = 0;
memcpy(res_APDU, "\x04\x88\xB2\x1E", 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = nodes - 1;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, fgpt, 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, last_node, 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
if (key_type == 0x1 || key_type == 0x2) {
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, chain, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx.grp,
&ctx.Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
pubkey,
sizeof(pubkey));
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, pubkey, olen);
res_APDU_size += (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (key_type == 0x3) {
sha256_sha256(chain, 32, chain);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, chain, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx.d, pubkey, 32);
sha256_sha256(pubkey, 32, pubkey);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, pubkey, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p1 == 0x10) {
uint8_t chain[32] = { 0 }, fgpt[4] = { 0 }, last_node[4] = { 0 }, nodes = 0;
int r = node_derive_path(apdu.data,
(uint16_t)apdu.nc,
&hd_context,
chain,
fgpt,
&nodes,
last_node,
&hd_keytype);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "random.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
uint8_t challenge[256];
uint8_t challenge_len = 0;
int cmd_challenge() {
uint8_t *rb = (uint8_t *) random_bytes_get(apdu.ne);
if (!rb) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, rb, apdu.ne);
challenge_len = (uint8_t)MIN(apdu.ne, sizeof(challenge));
memcpy(challenge, rb, challenge_len);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.ne;
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_change_pin() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81 || P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
file_t *file_pin = NULL;
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
file_pin = file_pin1;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
file_pin = file_sopin;
}
if (!file_pin) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_has_data(file_pin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_pin);
int r = check_pin(file_pin, apdu.data, pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
r = load_mkek(mkek); //loads the MKEK with old pin
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
//encrypt MKEK with new pin
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
hash_multi(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
hash_multi(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
r = store_mkek(mkek);
release_mkek(mkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)apdu.nc - pin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}
}
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
//#include "mbedtls/md_wrap.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
extern mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context;
extern uint8_t hd_keytype;
/* This is copied from pkcs5.c Mbedtls */
/** Unfortunately it is declared as static, so I cannot call it. **/
static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations,
uint16_t *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid;
unsigned char *p = params->p;
const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len;
if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
}
/*
* PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
* salt OCTET STRING,
* iterationCount INTEGER,
* keyLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
* prf AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT algid-hmacWithSHA1
* }
*
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &salt->len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
salt->p = p;
p += salt->len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, iterations)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, (int *)keylen)) != 0) {
if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
}
if (p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(&p, end, &prf_alg_oid)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(&prf_alg_oid, md_type) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
if (p != end) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
return 0;
}
/* Taken from https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2335 */
int mbedtls_ansi_x963_kdf(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
uint16_t input_len,
uint8_t *input,
uint16_t shared_info_len,
uint8_t *shared_info,
uint16_t output_len,
uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
int hashlen = 0, exit_code = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
uint8_t counter_buf[4], tmp_output[64]; //worst case
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type);
if (md_info == NULL) {
return exit_code;
}
if (mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) {
return exit_code;
}
if (input_len + shared_info_len + 4 >= (1ULL << 61) - 1) {
return exit_code;
}
// keydatalen equals output_len
hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
if (output_len >= hashlen * ((1ULL << 32) - 1)) {
return exit_code;
}
for (int i = 0, counter = 1; i < output_len; counter++) {
mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx);
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, input, input_len);
//TODO: be careful with architecture little vs. big
put_uint32_t_be(counter, counter_buf);
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter_buf, 4);
if (shared_info_len > 0 && shared_info != NULL) {
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, shared_info, shared_info_len);
}
mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, tmp_output);
memcpy(&output[i], tmp_output, (output_len - i < hashlen) ? output_len - i : hashlen);
i += hashlen;
}
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
return 0;
}
int cmd_cipher_sym() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu), algo = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (hd_keytype == 0) {
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, algo) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t kdata[64]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (hd_keytype == 0 && mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
if ((apdu.nc % 16) != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
mbedtls_aes_context aes;
mbedtls_aes_init(&aes);
uint8_t tmp_iv[IV_SIZE];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes,
MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
apdu.nc,
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes,
MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
apdu.nc,
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CMAC) {
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
if (key_size == 16) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB);
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB);
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB);
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, kdata, key_size * 8, apdu.data, apdu.nc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_DERIVE) {
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256),
NULL,
0,
kdata,
key_size,
apdu.data,
apdu.nc,
res_APDU,
apdu.nc);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, oid = {0}, enc = {0}, iv = {0}, aad = {0};
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (!asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x6, &oid) || asn1_len(&oid) == 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x81, &enc);
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x82, &iv);
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x83, &aad);
uint8_t tmp_iv[16];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, oid.len) == 0) {
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT && enc.len < 16) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = 0;
mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&ctx, kdata);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx,
enc.len,
asn1_len(&iv) > 0 ? iv.data : tmp_iv,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
res_APDU + enc.len);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&ctx,
enc.len - 16,
asn1_len(&iv) > 0 ? iv.data : tmp_iv,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
enc.data,
res_APDU);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
if (r == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_DIGEST, 7) == 0) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA1, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA224, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512);
}
if (md_info == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = mbedtls_md_hmac(md_info, kdata, key_size, enc.data, enc.len, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA256,
oid.len) == 0 ||
memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA384,
oid.len) == 0 || memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512);
}
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(md_info,
iv.data,
iv.len,
kdata,
key_size,
enc.data,
enc.len,
res_APDU,
apdu.ne > 0 &&
apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : (uint16_t)mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, oid.len) == 0) {
int iterations = 0;
uint16_t keylen = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_buf salt,
params =
{ .p = enc.data, .len = enc.len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) };
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
int r = pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(&params, &salt, &iterations, &keylen, &md_type);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(md_type,
kdata,
key_size,
salt.p,
salt.len,
iterations,
keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 &&
apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32),
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_PKCS5_PBES2, oid.len) == 0) {
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_buf params =
{.p = aad.data, .len = aad.len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)};
int r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&params, algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, kdata, key_size, enc.data, enc.len, res_APDU, MAX_APDU_DATA, &olen);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_KDF_X963, oid.len) == 0) {
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA1, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA224, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA256, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA384, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA512, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
int r = mbedtls_ansi_x963_kdf(md_type,
key_size,
kdata,
aad.len,
aad.data,
apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_NIST_AES, 8) == 0) {
if (oid.len != 9) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t aes_algo = oid.data[8],
mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
if ((aes_algo >= 0x01 && aes_algo <= 0x09 && key_size != 16) ||
(aes_algo >= 0x15 && aes_algo <= 0x1D && key_size != 24) ||
(aes_algo >= 0x29 && aes_algo <= 0x31 && key_size != 32)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
int r = 0;
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
if (asn1_len(&iv) == 0) {
iv.data = tmp_iv;
iv.len = sizeof(tmp_iv);
}
if (aes_algo == 0x01 || aes_algo == 0x15 || aes_algo == 0x29) { /* ECB */
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = MIN(enc.len, 16); // ECB operates with 16-byte blocks
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x02 || aes_algo == 0x16 || aes_algo == 0x2A) { /* CBC */
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x03 || aes_algo == 0x17 || aes_algo == 0x2B) { /* OFB */
size_t iv_off = 0;
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x04 || aes_algo == 0x18 || aes_algo == 0x2C) { /* CFB */
size_t iv_off = 0;
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x06 || aes_algo == 0x1A || aes_algo == 0x2E) { /* GCM */
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); // No AES ctx used
mbedtls_gcm_context gctx;
mbedtls_gcm_init(&gctx);
r = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&gctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gctx,
MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
enc.len,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
16,
res_APDU + enc.len);
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(&gctx,
enc.len - 16,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
16,
enc.data,
res_APDU);
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
mbedtls_gcm_free(&gctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x09 || aes_algo == 0x1D || aes_algo == 0x31) { /* CTR */
size_t iv_off = 0;
uint8_t stream_block[16];
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, stream_block, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x07 || aes_algo == 0x1B || aes_algo == 0x2F) { /* CCM */
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); // No AES ctx used
mbedtls_ccm_context gctx;
mbedtls_ccm_init(&gctx);
r = mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&gctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (iv.len == 16) {
iv.len = 12;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&gctx,
enc.len,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
res_APDU + enc.len,
16);
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&gctx,
enc.len - 16,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
16);
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
mbedtls_ccm_free(&gctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_IEEE_ALG, 8) == 0) {
if (oid.len != 9) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t aes_algo = oid.data[8],
mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
int r = 0;
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (asn1_len(&iv) == 0) {
iv.data = tmp_iv;
iv.len = sizeof(tmp_iv);
}
if ((aes_algo == 0x01 && key_size != 32) || (aes_algo == 0x02 && key_size != 64)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx;
mbedtls_aes_xts_init(&ctx);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_xts_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HD, 11) == 0) {
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
int r = 0;
uint8_t mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT),
secret[64] = { 0 };
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
if (hd_keytype != 0x3) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
return SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS();
}
key_size = 32;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&hd_context.d, kdata, key_size);
r = mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
kdata,
key_size,
aad.data,
aad.len,
secret);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (iv.data == tmp_iv || iv.len == 0) {
iv.data = secret + 32;
iv.len = 16;
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, secret, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, secret, key_size * 8);
}
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
hd_keytype = 0;
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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src/hsm/cmd_decrypt_asym.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "oid.h"
int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (get_key_counter(ef) == 0) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, p2) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
int r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
if (apdu.nc < key_size) { //needs padding
memset(apdu.data + apdu.nc, 0, key_size - apdu.nc);
}
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
size_t olen = apdu.nc;
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, &olen, apdu.data, res_APDU, 512);
if (r == 0) {
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
}
else {
r = mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, apdu.data, res_APDU);
if (r == 0) {
res_APDU_size = key_size;
}
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH || p2 == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t *kdata = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, key_size);
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
free(kdata);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = kdata[0];
int r = 0;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ctx, gid);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
free(kdata);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(gid, (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh, kdata + 1, key_size - 1);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
free(kdata);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = -1;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
*(apdu.data - 1) = (uint8_t)apdu.nc;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, apdu.data - 1, apdu.nc + 1);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
uint16_t pub_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &pub_len);
if (pub) {
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
uint8_t *t86w = (uint8_t *)t86;
if (t86) {
*(t86w - 1) = (uint8_t)t86_len;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, t86 - 1, t86_len + 1);
}
}
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
size_t olen = 0;
// The SmartCard-HSM returns the point result of the DH operation
// with a leading '04'
res_APDU[0] = 0x04;
r =
mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx, &olen, res_APDU + 1, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)(olen + 1);
}
else {
res_APDU_size = 0;
uint16_t ext_len = 0;
const uint8_t *ext = NULL;
if ((ext = cvc_get_ext(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ext_len)) == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 }, kdom_uid = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init((uint8_t *)ext, ext_len, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &ctxo.len, &ctxo.data)) {
if (tag == 0x73) {
asn1_ctx_t oid = {0};
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x6, &oid) == true &&
oid.len == strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) &&
memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID,
strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID)) == 0) {
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x80, &kdom_uid) == false) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
break;
}
}
}
if (asn1_len(&kdom_uid) == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
for (uint8_t n = 0; n < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS; n++) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + n);
if (tf) {
if (file_get_size(tf) == kdom_uid.len &&
memcmp(file_get_data(tf), kdom_uid.data, kdom_uid.len) == 0) {
file_new(EF_DKEK + n);
if (store_dkek_key(n, res_APDU + 1) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(res_APDU, 32);
return SW_OK();
}
}
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
decrement_key_counter(ef);
return SW_OK();
}

45
src/hsm/cmd_delete_file.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_delete_file() {
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
ef = currentEF;
if (!(ef = search_file(ef->fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
uint16_t fid = get_uint16_t_be(apdu.data);
if (!(ef = search_file(fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
if (!authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_DELETE_SELF)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (delete_file(ef) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_OK();
}

101
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E
#define MOD_ADD(N) \
while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&(N), &grp->P) >= 0) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&(N), &(N), &grp->P))
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
const mbedtls_mpi *A,
const mbedtls_mpi *B) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, B));
MOD_ADD(*X);
cleanup:
return ret;
}
int cmd_derive_asym() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t dest_id = P2(apdu);
file_t *fkey;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (!(fkey = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, ALGO_EC_DERIVE) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (apdu.data[0] == ALGO_EC_DERIVE) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
int r;
r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_mpi a, nd;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&nd);
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&a, apdu.data + 1, apdu.nc - 1);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(&ctx.grp, &nd, &ctx.d, &a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.d, &nd);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, dest_id);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "files.h"
extern file_t *ef_puk_aut;
extern uint8_t challenge[256];
extern uint8_t challenge_len;
int cmd_external_authenticate() {
if (P1(apdu) != 0x0 || P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (ef_puk_aut == NULL) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK - 1)] = 0;
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
uint8_t *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(dev_name_len + challenge_len, sizeof(uint8_t)), hash[32];
memcpy(input, dev_name, dev_name_len);
memcpy(input + dev_name_len, challenge, challenge_len);
hash256(input, dev_name_len + challenge_len, hash);
int r =
puk_verify(apdu.data,
(uint16_t)apdu.nc,
hash,
32,
file_get_data(ef_puk_aut),
file_get_size(ef_puk_aut));
free(input);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK - 1)] = 1;
uint8_t auts = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
auts += puk_status[i];
}
if (auts >= puk_data[2]) {
isUserAuthenticated = true;
}
return SW_OK();
}

308
src/hsm/cmd_extras.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#ifdef PICO_PLATFORM
#include "pico/aon_timer.h"
#include "hardware/watchdog.h"
#else
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#endif
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#ifdef PICO_RP2350
#include "otp.h"
#endif
#define CMD_DATETIME 0xA
#define CMD_DYNOPS 0x6
#define CMD_SECURE_LOCK 0x3A
#define CMD_REBOOT 0xFB
#define SECURE_LOCK_KEY_AGREEMENT 0x1
#define SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE 0x2
#define SECURE_LOCK_MASK 0x3
#define SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE 0x4
#define CMD_PHY 0x1B
#define CMD_OTP 0x4C
#define CMD_MEMORY 0x5
int cmd_extras() {
int cmd = P1(apdu);
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
// Only allow change PHY without PIN
if (!isUserAuthenticated && cmd != CMD_PHY && cmd != CMD_MEMORY) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
#endif
//check button (if enabled)
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (cmd == CMD_DATETIME) { //datetime operations
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
#ifdef PICO_PLATFORM
struct timespec tv;
aon_timer_get_time(&tv);
#else
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
struct tm *tm = localtime(&tv.tv_sec);
res_APDU_size += put_uint16_t_be(tm->tm_year + 1900, res_APDU);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_mon;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_mday;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_wday;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_hour;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_min;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_sec;
}
else {
if (apdu.nc != 8) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
struct tm tm;
tm.tm_year = get_uint16_t_be(apdu.data) - 1900;
tm.tm_mon = apdu.data[2];
tm.tm_mday = apdu.data[3];
tm.tm_wday = apdu.data[4];
tm.tm_hour = apdu.data[5];
tm.tm_min = apdu.data[6];
tm.tm_sec = apdu.data[7];
time_t tv_sec = mktime(&tm);
#ifdef PICO_PLATFORM
struct timespec tv = {.tv_sec = tv_sec, .tv_nsec = 0};
aon_timer_set_time(&tv);
#else
struct timeval tv = {.tv_sec = tv_sec, .tv_usec = 0};
settimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
}
}
else if (cmd == CMD_DYNOPS) { //dynamic options
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (apdu.nc > sizeof(uint8_t)) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
res_APDU_size += put_uint16_t_be(opts, res_APDU);
}
else {
uint8_t newopts[] = { apdu.data[0], (opts & 0xff) };
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
}
else if (cmd == CMD_SECURE_LOCK) { // secure lock
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_KEY_AGREEMENT) { // Key Agreement
mbedtls_ecdh_context hkey;
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&hkey);
mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&hkey, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
int ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q, random_gen, NULL);
mbedtls_mpi_lset(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp.Z, 1);
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
memcpy(mse.Qpt, apdu.data, sizeof(mse.Qpt));
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&hkey, &olen, buf, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen, NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
ret = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), NULL, 0, buf, olen, mse.Qpt, sizeof(mse.Qpt), mse.key_enc, sizeof(mse.key_enc));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, res_APDU, MAX_APDU_DATA);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mse.init = true;
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE || P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_MASK || P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE) {
if (mse.init == false) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
int ret = mse_decrypt_ct(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE || P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE) { // Enable
uint8_t newopts[] = { opts >> 8, (opts & 0xff) };
if ((P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE && !(opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK)) ||
(P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE && (opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK))) {
uint16_t tfids[] = { EF_MKEK, EF_MKEK_SO };
for (int t = 0; t < sizeof(tfids) / sizeof(uint16_t); t++) {
file_t *tf = search_file(tfids[t]);
if (tf) {
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, file_get_size(tf));
memcpy(tmp, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(tmp)[i] ^= apdu.data[i];
}
file_put_data(tf, tmp, file_get_size(tf));
free(tmp);
}
}
}
if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE) {
newopts[0] |= HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE) {
newopts[0] &= ~HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
}
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
else if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_MASK && (opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK)) {
memcpy(mkek_mask, apdu.data, MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
has_mkek_mask = true;
}
}
}
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
else if (cmd == CMD_PHY) { // Set PHY
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
if (file_has_data(ef_phy)) {
res_APDU_size = file_get_size(ef_phy);
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef_phy), res_APDU_size);
}
}
else {
if (P2(apdu) == PHY_VIDPID) { // VIDPID
if (apdu.nc != 4) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
phy_data.vid = get_uint16_t_be(apdu.data);
phy_data.pid = get_uint16_t_be(apdu.data + 2);
phy_data.vidpid_present = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_LED_GPIO) {
phy_data.led_gpio = apdu.data[0];
phy_data.led_gpio_present = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_LED_BTNESS) {
phy_data.led_brightness = apdu.data[0];
phy_data.led_brightness_present = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_OPTS) {
if (apdu.nc != 2) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
phy_data.opts = get_uint16_t_be(apdu.data);
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (phy_save() != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
#endif
#if PICO_RP2350
else if (cmd == CMD_OTP) {
if (apdu.nc < 2) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t row = get_uint16_t_be(apdu.data);
bool israw = P2(apdu) == 0x1;
if (apdu.nc == 2) {
if (row > 0xbf && row < 0xf48) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (israw) {
memcpy(res_APDU, otp_buffer_raw(row), apdu.ne);
}
else {
memcpy(res_APDU, otp_buffer(row), apdu.ne);
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne;
}
else {
apdu.nc -= 2;
apdu.data += 2;
if (apdu.nc > 1024) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (apdu.nc % (israw ? 4 : 2)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t adata[1024] __attribute__((aligned(4)));
memcpy(adata, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
int ret = 0;
if (israw) {
ret = otp_write_data_raw(row, adata, apdu.nc);
}
else {
ret = otp_write_data(row, adata, apdu.nc);
}
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
#endif
#ifdef PICO_PLATFORM
else if (cmd == CMD_REBOOT) {
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
watchdog_reboot(0, 0, 100);
}
#endif
else if (cmd == CMD_MEMORY) {
res_APDU_size = 0;
uint32_t free = flash_free_space(), total = flash_total_space(), used = flash_used_space(), nfiles = flash_num_files(), size = flash_size();
res_APDU_size += put_uint32_t_be(free, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
res_APDU_size += put_uint32_t_be(used, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
res_APDU_size += put_uint32_t_be(total, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
res_APDU_size += put_uint32_t_be(nfiles, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
res_APDU_size += put_uint32_t_be(size, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "eac.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "otp.h"
int cmd_general_authenticate() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 && P2(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (apdu.data[0] == 0x7C) {
int r = 0;
uint16_t pubkey_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pubkey = NULL;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data + 2, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - 2), &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) {
pubkey = tag_data - 1; //mbedtls ecdh starts reading one pos before
pubkey_len = tag_len + 1;
}
}
file_t *fkey = search_file(EF_KEY_DEV);
if (!fkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ectx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ectx);
r = load_private_key_ecdh(&ectx, fkey);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
if (otp_key_2) {
gid = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1;
}
r = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ctx, gid);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, &ectx.d);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, pubkey, pubkey_len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t derived[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
r = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx,
&olen,
derived,
MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES,
random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
sm_derive_all_keys(derived, olen);
uint8_t *t = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, pubkey_len + 16);
memcpy(t, "\x7F\x49\x4F\x06\x0A", 5);
if (sm_get_protocol() == MSE_AES) {
memcpy(t + 5, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, 10);
}
t[15] = 0x86;
memcpy(t + 16, pubkey, pubkey_len);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x7C;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 20;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x81;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 8;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, sm_get_nonce(), 8);
res_APDU_size += 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x82;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 8;
r = sm_sign(t, pubkey_len + 16, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
free(t);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size += 8;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "otp.h"
extern void scan_all();
extern char __StackLimit;
int heapLeft() {
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
char *p = malloc(256); // try to avoid undue fragmentation
int left = &__StackLimit - p;
free(p);
#else
int left = 1024 * 1024;
#endif
return left;
}
extern void reset_puk_store();
int cmd_initialize() {
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK && !has_mkek_mask) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
int ret_mkek = load_mkek(mkek); //Try loading MKEK with previous session
initialize_flash(true);
scan_all();
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = has_mkek_mask = false;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL, *kds = NULL, *dkeks = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) { //options
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
}
else if (tag == 0x81) { //user pin
if (file_pin1 && file_pin1->data) {
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
hash_multi(tag_data, tag_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
}
}
else if (tag == 0x82) { //sopin pin
if (file_sopin && file_sopin->data) {
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_sopin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
hash_multi(tag_data, tag_len, session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
}
else if (tag == 0x91) { //retries user pin
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES);
if (tf && tf->data) {
file_put_data(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
}
if (file_retries_pin1 && file_retries_pin1->data) {
file_put_data(file_retries_pin1, tag_data, tag_len);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x92) {
dkeks = tag_data;
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
else if (tag == 0x93) {
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!ef_puk) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
uint8_t pk_status[4], puks = MIN(tag_data[0], MAX_PUK);
memset(pk_status, 0, sizeof(pk_status));
pk_status[0] = puks;
pk_status[1] = puks;
pk_status[2] = tag_data[1];
file_put_data(ef_puk, pk_status, sizeof(pk_status));
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < puks; i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_PUK + i);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x97) {
kds = tag_data;
/*
for (int i = 0; i < MIN(*kds,MAX_KEY_DOMAINS); i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK+i);
if (!tf)
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
*/
}
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
if (!tf_kd) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (ret_mkek != PICOKEY_OK) {
ret_mkek = load_mkek(mkek); //Try again with new PIN/SO-PIN just in case some is the same
}
if (store_mkek(ret_mkek == PICOKEY_OK ? mkek : NULL) != PICOKEY_OK) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
release_mkek(mkek);
if (dkeks) {
if (*dkeks > 0) {
uint16_t d = *dkeks;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else {
int r = save_dkek_key(0, random_bytes_get(32));
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t d = 0x0101;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
else {
uint16_t d = 0x0000;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (kds) {
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2], k = MIN(*kds, MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
memset(t, 0xff, 2 * k);
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, 2 * k) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
/* When initialized, it has all credentials */
isUserAuthenticated = true;
/* Create terminal private key */
file_t *fdkey = search_file(EF_KEY_DEV);
if (!fdkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int ret = 0;
if (ret_mkek != PICOKEY_OK || !file_has_data(fdkey)) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
uint8_t key_id = 0;
if (otp_key_2) {
ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, &ecdsa, otp_key_2, 32);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecdsa.grp, &ecdsa.Q, &ecdsa.d, &ecdsa.grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(&ecdsa, ec_id, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
if (ret != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t ee_len = 0, term_len = 0;
if ((ee_len = asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, MAX_APDU_DATA, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *fpk = search_file(EF_EE_DEV);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, ee_len);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((term_len = asn1_cvc_cert(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU + ee_len, MAX_APDU_DATA - ee_len, NULL, 0, true)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
fpk = search_file(EF_TERMCA);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, ee_len + term_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *keyid = (const uint8_t *) "\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0",
*label = (const uint8_t *) "ESPICOHSMTR";
uint16_t prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_ecc(label, (uint16_t)strlen((const char *) label), keyid, 20, 256, res_APDU, MAX_APDU_DATA);
fpk = search_file(EF_PRKD_DEV);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, prkd_len);
}
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
reset_puk_store();
}
else { //free memory bytes request
int heap_left = heapLeft();
res_APDU_size += put_uint32_t_be(heap_left, res_APDU);
res_APDU[4] = 0;
res_APDU[5] = HSM_VERSION_MAJOR;
res_APDU[6] = HSM_VERSION_MINOR;
res_APDU_size = 7;
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey) {
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
if (!file_has_data(fkey)) {
return 0xff;
}
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(fkey, 0x92, &tag_len);
if (meta_tag) {
return *meta_tag;
}
return 0x0;
}
int cmd_key_domain() {
//if (dkeks == 0)
// return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if ((has_session_pin == false || isUserAuthenticated == false) && apdu.nc > 0 &&
!(p1 == 0x0 && p2 == 0x0)) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 >= MAX_KEY_DOMAINS) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
if (!tf_kd) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t tf_kd_size = file_get_size(tf_kd);
if (tf_kd_size == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (2 * p2 >= tf_kd_size) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * p2] : 0,
current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * p2 + 1] : 0;
if (p1 == 0x0) { //dkek import
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK + p2);
if (!tf) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (apdu.nc < 32) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (current_dkeks == dkeks) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
if (++current_dkeks >= dkeks) {
int r = save_dkek_key(p2, NULL);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
if (r == PICOKEY_NO_LOGIN) {
pending_save_dkek = p2;
}
else {
/* On fail, it will return to previous dkek state. */
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (current_dkeks == 0xff && !file_has_data(tf)) { //XKEK have always 0xff
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x3 || p1 == 0x4) { //key domain setup
if (p1 == 0x1 && apdu.nc != 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (p1 == 0x3) { //if key domain is not empty, command is denied
for (uint16_t i = 1; i < 256; i++) {
file_t *fkey = search_file(KEY_PREFIX << 8 | (uint8_t)i);
if (get_key_domain(fkey) == p2) {
return SW_FILE_EXISTS();
}
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
if (t[2 * p2] != 0xff || t[2 * p2 + 1] != 0xff) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = apdu.data[0];
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
if (t[2 * p2] == 0xff && t[2 * p2 + 1] == 0xff) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = 0xff;
t[2 * p2 + 1] = 0xff;
}
else if (p1 == 0x4) {
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *tf = NULL;
if ((tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (p1 == 0x3 && (tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
low_flash_available();
if (p1 == 0x3) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x2) { //XKEK Key Domain creation
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
uint16_t pub_len = 0;
file_t *fterm = search_file(EF_TERMCA);
if (!fterm) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(file_get_data(fterm), file_get_size(fterm), &pub_len);
if (!pub) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (!t86 || t86[0] != 0x4) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t t54_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t54 = cvc_get_field(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &t54_len, 0x54);
if (!t54) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t hash[32], *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, (t86_len - 1) / 2 + 1);
input[0] = 0x54;
memcpy(input + 1, t86 + 1, (t86_len - 1) / 2);
hash256(input, (t86_len - 1) / 2 + 1, hash);
free(input);
int r = puk_verify(t54, t54_len, hash, 32, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (!tf) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
//All checks done. Get Key Domain UID
pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &pub_len);
if (pub) {
t86_len = 0;
t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (t86) {
file_put_data(tf, t86 + 1, (uint16_t)t86_len - 1);
low_flash_available();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
memset(res_APDU, 0, 10);
res_APDU[0] = dkeks;
res_APDU[1] = dkeks > current_dkeks ? dkeks - current_dkeks : 0;
dkek_kcv(p2, res_APDU + 2);
res_APDU_size = 2 + 8;
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(res_APDU + 10, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
res_APDU_size += file_get_size(tf);
}
return SW_OK();
}

67
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "random.h"
int cmd_key_gen() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
uint8_t key_size = 32;
int r;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 == 0xB3) {
key_size = 64;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB2) {
key_size = 32;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB1) {
key_size = 24;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB0) {
key_size = 16;
}
//at this moment, we do not use the template, as only CBC is supported by the driver (encrypt, decrypt and CMAC)
uint8_t aes_key[64]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(aes_key, random_bytes_get(key_size), key_size);
int aes_type = 0x0;
if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

153
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "cvc.h"
int cmd_key_unwrap() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
int r = 0;
if (P2(apdu) != 0x93) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
uint8_t *data = apdu.data;
uint16_t data_len = apdu.nc;
if (data_len == 0) { // New style
file_t *tef = search_file(0x2F10);
if (!file_has_data(tef)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
data = file_get_data(tef);
data_len = file_get_size(tef);
}
int key_type = dkek_type_key(data);
uint8_t *allowed = NULL;
int16_t kdom = -1;
uint16_t allowed_len = 0;
if (key_type == 0x0) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom, &ctx, data, data_len, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, MAX_APDU_DATA, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom, &ctx, data, data_len, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, MAX_APDU_DATA, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
uint8_t aes_key[64];
int key_size = 0, aes_type = 0;
do {
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom,
aes_key,
data,
data_len,
&key_size,
&allowed,
&allowed_len);
} while ((r == PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
else {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if ((allowed != NULL && allowed_len > 0) || kdom >= 0) {
uint16_t meta_len = (allowed_len > 0 ? 2 + allowed_len : 0) + (kdom >= 0 ? 3 : 0);
uint8_t *meta = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, meta_len), *m = meta;
if (allowed_len > 0) {
*m++ = 0x91;
*m++ = (uint8_t)allowed_len;
memcpy(m, allowed, allowed_len); m += allowed_len;
}
if (kdom >= 0) {
*m++ = 0x92;
*m++ = 1;
*m++ = (uint8_t)kdom;
}
r = meta_add((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id, meta, meta_len);
free(meta);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
}
if (res_APDU_size > 0) {
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
r = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = 0;
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
extern uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey);
int cmd_key_wrap() {
int r = 0;
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
if (P2(apdu) != 0x92) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t kdom = get_key_domain(ef);
if (kdom == 0xff) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * kdom] : 0,
current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * kdom + 1] : 0;
if (dkeks != current_dkeks || dkeks == 0 || dkeks == 0xff) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, ALGO_WRAP) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *prkd = search_file((PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!prkd) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
const uint8_t *dprkd = file_get_data(prkd);
uint16_t wrap_len = MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER, tag_len = 0;
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(ef, 0x91, &tag_len);
if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_ECC) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, ef);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_AES) {
uint8_t kdata_aes[64]; //maximum AES key size
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef), aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES;
memcpy(kdata_aes, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata_aes, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, kdata_aes, aes_type, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata_aes, sizeof(kdata_aes));
}
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = wrap_len;
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_keypair_gen() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
int ret = 0;
//sc_asn1_print_tags(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
//DEBUG_DATA(apdu.data,apdu.nc);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x7f49, &ctxo) && asn1_len(&ctxo) > 0) {
asn1_ctx_t oid = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x6, &oid) && asn1_len(&oid) > 0) {
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256, oid.len) == 0) { //RSA
asn1_ctx_t ex = { 0 }, ks = { 0 };
uint32_t exponent = 65537, key_size = 2048;
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x82, &ex) && asn1_len(&ex) > 0) {
exponent = asn1_get_uint(&ex);
}
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x2, &ks) && asn1_len(&ks) > 0) {
key_size = asn1_get_uint(&ks);
}
mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(&rsa, random_gen, &index, key_size, exponent);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&rsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, MAX_APDU_DATA, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&rsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if (ret != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, MIN(oid.len, 10)) == 0) { //ECC
asn1_ctx_t prime = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x81, &prime) != true) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(prime.data, prime.len);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED();
}
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 || ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) {
asn1_ctx_t g = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x83, &g) != true) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
#ifdef MBEDTLS_EDDSA_C
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 && (g.data[0] != 9)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519;
}
else if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 && (g.len != 56 || g.data[0] != 5)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448;
}
#endif
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(&ecdsa, ec_id, random_gen, &index);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
asn1_ctx_t a91 = { 0 }, ext = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x91, &a91) && asn1_len(&a91) > 0) {
for (size_t n = 0; n < a91.len; n++) {
if (a91.data[n] == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
asn1_ctx_t a92 = {0};
if (!asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x92, &a92) || asn1_len(&a92) == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (a92.data[0] > MAX_KEY_DOMAINS) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
file_t *tf_xkek = search_file(EF_XKEK + a92.data[0]);
if (!tf_xkek) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
ext.len = 2 + 2 + (uint16_t)strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) + 2 + file_get_size(
tf_xkek);
ext.data = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, ext.len);
uint8_t *pe = ext.data;
*pe++ = 0x73;
*pe++ = (uint8_t)ext.len - 2;
*pe++ = 0x6;
*pe++ = (uint8_t)strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
memcpy(pe, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID, strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID));
pe += strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
*pe++ = 0x80;
*pe++ = (uint8_t)file_get_size(tf_xkek);
memcpy(pe, file_get_data(tf_xkek), file_get_size(tf_xkek));
}
}
}
if ((res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, MAX_APDU_DATA, ext.data, ext.len)) == 0) {
if (ext.data) {
free(ext.data);
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (ext.data) {
free(ext.data);
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
if (ret != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (apdu.ne == 0) {
apdu.ne = res_APDU_size;
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
int cmd_list_keys() {
/* First we send DEV private key */
/* Both below conditions should be always TRUE */
if (search_file(EF_PRKD_DEV)) {
res_APDU_size += put_uint16_t_be(EF_PRKD_DEV, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
}
if (search_file(EF_KEY_DEV)) {
res_APDU_size += put_uint16_t_be(EF_KEY_DEV, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
}
//first CC
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = KEY_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (PRKD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = PRKD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
//second CD
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (CD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = CD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (DCOD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = DCOD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
if ((apdu.rlen + 2 + 10) % 64 == 0) { // FIX for strange behaviour with PSCS and multiple of 64
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0;
}
#endif
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "eac.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "cvc.h"
file_t *ef_puk_aut = NULL;
int cmd_mse() {
int p1 = P1(apdu);
int p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p2 != 0xA4 && p2 != 0xA6 && p2 != 0xAA && p2 != 0xB4 && p2 != 0xB6 && p2 != 0xB8) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (p1 & 0x1) { //SET
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) {
if (p2 == 0xA4) {
if (tag_len == 10 &&
memcmp(tag_data, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, tag_len) == 0) {
sm_set_protocol(MSE_AES);
}
}
}
else if (tag == 0x83) {
if (tag_len == 1) {
}
else {
if (p2 == 0xB6) {
if (puk_store_select_chr(tag_data) == PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_OK();
}
}
else if (p2 == 0xA4) { /* Aut */
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < MAX_PUK; i++) {
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_PUK + i);
if (!ef) {
break;
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
break;
}
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef),
file_get_size(ef),
&chr_len);
if (memcmp(chr, tag_data, chr_len) == 0) {
ef_puk_aut = ef;
if (puk_status[i] == 1) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED(); // It is correct
}
return SW_OK();
}
}
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
extern int add_cert_puk_store(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t data_len, bool copy);
extern PUK *current_puk;
int cmd_pso() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 == 0x0 && (p2 == 0x92 || p2 == 0xAE || p2 == 0xBE)) { /* Verify certificate */
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (current_puk == NULL) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x7F || apdu.data[1] != 0x21) {
uint8_t tlv_len = 2 + format_tlv_len((uint16_t)apdu.nc, NULL);
memmove(apdu.data + tlv_len, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
memcpy(apdu.data, "\x7F\x21", 2);
format_tlv_len((uint16_t)apdu.nc, apdu.data + 2);
apdu.nc += tlv_len;
}
int r = cvc_verify(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, current_puk->cvcert, current_puk->cvcert_len);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
if (r == PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
else if (r == PICOKEY_WRONG_SIGNATURE) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < 0xfe; i++) {
uint16_t fid = (CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | i;
file_t *ca_ef = search_file(fid);
if (!ca_ef) {
ca_ef = file_new(fid);
file_put_data(ca_ef, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
if (add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(ca_ef), file_get_size(ca_ef),
false) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &chr_len);
if (chr == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint16_t puk_len = 0, puk_bin_len = 0;
const uint8_t *puk = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &puk_len), *puk_bin = NULL;
if (puk == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint16_t oid_len = 0;
const uint8_t *oid = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &oid_len, 0x6);
if (oid == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA, 9) == 0) { //RSA
puk_bin = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &puk_bin_len, 0x81);
if (!puk_bin) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA, 9) == 0) { //ECC
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = cvc_inherite_ec_group(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
if (mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, ec_id) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint16_t plen = (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp.P);
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
if (plen != t86_len) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
puk_bin = t86;
puk_bin_len = t86_len;
}
else if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
if (t86[0] == 0x2 || t86[0] == 0x3) {
if (t86_len != plen + 1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else if (t86[0] == 0x4) {
if (t86_len != 2 * plen + 1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
puk_bin = t86 + 1;
puk_bin_len = plen;
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
if (!puk_bin) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
file_t *cd_ef = file_new((CD_PREFIX << 8) | i);
uint16_t cd_len = (uint16_t)asn1_build_cert_description(chr,
chr_len,
puk_bin,
puk_bin_len,
fid,
NULL,
0);
if (cd_len == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *) calloc(cd_len, sizeof(uint8_t));
r = (int)asn1_build_cert_description(chr,
chr_len,
puk_bin,
puk_bin_len,
fid,
buf,
cd_len);
file_put_data(cd_ef, buf, cd_len);
free(buf);
if (r == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
break;
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

99
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "cvc.h"
int cmd_puk_auth() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
if (p1 == 0x0 || p1 == 0x1) {
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (p1 == 0x0) { /* Add */
if (p2 != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
ef = search_file(EF_PUK + i);
if (!ef) { /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) { /* found first empty slot */
break;
}
}
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(file_get_size(ef_puk), sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(tmp, puk_data, file_get_size(ef_puk));
tmp[1] = puk_data[1] - 1;
file_put_data(ef_puk, tmp, file_get_size(ef_puk));
puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
free(tmp);
}
else if (p1 == 0x1) { /* Replace */
if (p2 >= puk_data[0]) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
ef = search_file(EF_PUK + p2);
if (!ef) { /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
file_put_data(ef, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
low_flash_available();
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
}
if (p1 == 0x2) {
if (p2 >= puk_data[0]) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_PUK + p2);
if (!ef) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef), file_get_size(ef), &chr_len);
if (chr) {
memcpy(res_APDU, chr, chr_len);
res_APDU_size = chr_len;
}
return set_res_sw(0x90, puk_status[p2]);
}
else {
memcpy(res_APDU, puk_data, 3);
res_APDU[3] = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
res_APDU[3] += puk_status[i];
}
res_APDU_size = 4;
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_read_binary() {
uint16_t offset = 0;
uint8_t ins = INS(apdu), p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
const file_t *ef = NULL;
if ((ins & 0x1) == 0) {
if ((p1 & 0x80) != 0) {
if (!(ef = search_file(p1 & 0x1f))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
offset = p2;
}
else {
offset = make_uint16_t_be(p1, p2) & 0x7fff;
ef = currentEF;
}
}
else {
if (p1 == 0 && (p2 & 0xE0) == 0 && (p2 & 0x1f) != 0 && (p2 & 0x1f) != 0x1f) {
if (!(ef = search_file(p2 & 0x1f))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
uint16_t file_id = make_uint16_t_be(p1, p2); // & 0x7fff;
if (file_id == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
}
else if (!(ef = search_file(file_id))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x54) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
offset = 0;
for (int d = 0; d < apdu.data[1]; d++) {
offset |= apdu.data[2 + d] << (apdu.data[1] - 1 - d) * 8;
}
}
}
if ((ef->fid >> 8) == KEY_PREFIX || !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_READ_SEARCH)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (ef->data) {
if ((ef->type & FILE_DATA_FUNC) == FILE_DATA_FUNC) {
uint16_t data_len = (uint16_t)((int (*)(const file_t *, int))(ef->data))((const file_t *) ef, 1); //already copies content to res_APDU
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
apdu.ne = maxle;
}
if (offset) {
memmove(res_APDU, res_APDU + offset, res_APDU_size - offset);
//res_APDU += offset;
res_APDU_size -= offset;
}
}
else {
uint16_t data_len = file_get_size(ef);
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WARNING_EOF();
}
//uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
//if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
// apdu.ne = maxle;
//}
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef) + offset, data_len - offset);
res_APDU_size = data_len - offset;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_reset_retry() {
if (P2(apdu) != 0x81) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_sopin || !file_pin1) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_has_data(file_sopin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC)) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 || P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
uint8_t newpin_len = 0;
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
uint8_t so_pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_sopin);
if ((uint16_t)apdu.nc <= so_pin_len + 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, so_pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
newpin_len = (uint8_t)apdu.nc - so_pin_len;
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
if (!has_session_sopin) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc > 16) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
newpin_len = (uint8_t)apdu.nc;
}
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = newpin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data + (apdu.nc - newpin_len), newpin_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
int r = load_mkek(mkek); //loads the MKEK with SO pin
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
hash_multi(apdu.data + (apdu.nc - newpin_len), newpin_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
r = store_mkek(mkek);
release_mkek(mkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x1 || P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY)) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x1) {
uint8_t so_pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_sopin);
if (apdu.nc != so_pin_len) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, so_pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!has_session_sopin) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
}
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
return SW_OK();
}
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "version.h"
void select_file(file_t *pe) {
if (!pe) {
currentDF = (file_t *) MF;
currentEF = NULL;
}
else if (pe->type & (FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF|FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF)) {
currentEF = pe;
currentDF = &file_entries[pe->parent];
}
else {
currentDF = pe;
}
if (currentEF == file_openpgp || currentEF == file_sc_hsm) {
selected_applet = currentEF;
//sc_hsm_unload(); //reset auth status
}
}
int cmd_select() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
file_t *pe = NULL;
uint16_t fid = 0x0;
// Only "first or only occurence" supported
//if ((p2 & 0xF3) != 0x00) {
// return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
//}
if (apdu.nc == 2) {
fid = get_uint16_t_be(apdu.data);
}
//if ((fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8))
// fid = (PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | (fid & 0xff);
/*uint8_t pfx = fid >> 8;*/
/*if (pfx == PRKD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == KEY_PREFIX ||
pfx == EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == DCOD_PREFIX ||
pfx == DATA_PREFIX ||
pfx == PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {*/
if (fid != 0x0 && !(pe = search_file(fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
/*}*/
if (!pe) {
if (p1 == 0x0) { //Select MF, DF or EF - File identifier or absent
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
pe = (file_t *) MF;
//ac_fini();
}
else if (apdu.nc == 2) {
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_ANY))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x01) { //Select child DF - DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, currentDF, SPECIFY_DF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x02) { //Select EF under the current DF - EF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, currentDF, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x03) { //Select parent DF of the current DF - Absent
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x04) { //Select by DF name - e.g., [truncated] application identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_name(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (card_terminated) {
return set_res_sw(0x62, 0x85);
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x08) { //Select from the MF - Path without the MF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, (uint8_t)apdu.nc, MF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x09) { //Select from the current DF - Path without the current DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, (uint8_t)apdu.nc, currentDF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
if ((p2 & 0xfc) == 0x00 || (p2 & 0xfc) == 0x04) {
process_fci(pe, 0);
if (pe == file_sc_hsm) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x85;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 5;
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
res_APDU_size += put_uint16_t_be(opts, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0xFF;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = HSM_VERSION_MAJOR;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = HSM_VERSION_MINOR;
res_APDU[1] = (uint8_t)res_APDU_size - 2;
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
select_file(pe);
return SW_OK();
}

35
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "eac.h"
int cmd_session_pin() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x01 && P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
memcpy(sm_session_pin, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
sm_session_pin_len = 8;
memcpy(res_APDU, sm_session_pin, sm_session_pin_len);
res_APDU_size = sm_session_pin_len;
apdu.ne = sm_session_pin_len;
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "random.h"
#ifdef MBEDTLS_EDDSA_C
#include "mbedtls/eddsa.h"
#endif
extern mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context;
extern uint8_t hd_keytype;
//-----
/* From OpenSC */
static const uint8_t hdr_md5[] = {
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha1[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha224[] = {
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
};
static const uint8_t hdr_ripemd160[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const struct digest_info_prefix {
mbedtls_md_type_t algorithm;
const uint8_t *hdr;
uint16_t hdr_len;
uint16_t hash_len;
} digest_info_prefix[] = {
{ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, hdr_md5, sizeof(hdr_md5), 16 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, hdr_sha1, sizeof(hdr_sha1), 20 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hdr_sha256, sizeof(hdr_sha256), 32 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, hdr_sha384, sizeof(hdr_sha384), 48 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, hdr_sha512, sizeof(hdr_sha512), 64 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, hdr_sha224, sizeof(hdr_sha224), 28 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, hdr_ripemd160, sizeof(hdr_ripemd160), 20 },
{ 0, NULL, 0, 0 }
};
int pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(mbedtls_md_type_t *algorithm,
const uint8_t *in_dat,
uint16_t in_len,
uint8_t *out_dat,
uint16_t *out_len) {
for (int i = 0; digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm != 0; i++) {
uint16_t hdr_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr_len, hash_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hash_len;
const uint8_t *hdr = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr;
if (in_len == (hdr_len + hash_len) && !memcmp(in_dat, hdr, hdr_len)) {
if (algorithm) {
*algorithm = digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm;
}
if (out_dat == NULL) {
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
if (*out_len < hash_len) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
memmove(out_dat, in_dat + hdr_len, hash_len);
*out_len = hash_len;
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
}
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
//-----
int cmd_signature() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
mbedtls_md_type_t md = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
file_t *fkey;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (!(fkey = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (get_key_counter(fkey) == 0) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, p2) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256 ||
p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
generic_hash(md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, apdu.data);
apdu.nc = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md));
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_RAW && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
int r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
asn1_ctx_t hash = {.len = (uint16_t)apdu.nc, .data = apdu.data};
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1) { //DigestInfo attached
uint16_t nc = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
if (pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(&md, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, apdu.data,
&nc) != PICOKEY_OK) { //gets the MD algo id and strips it off
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
apdu.nc = nc;
}
else {
//sc_asn1_print_tags(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 }, oid = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x30, &ctxo) && asn1_len(&ctxo) > 0) {
asn1_ctx_t a30 = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x30, &a30) && asn1_len(&a30) > 0) {
asn1_find_tag(&a30, 0x6, &oid);
}
asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x4, &hash);
}
if (asn1_len(&oid)) {
if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_PSS && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS && asn1_len(&oid) == 0) {
if (apdu.nc == 20) { //default is sha1
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 28) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 32) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 48) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 64) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md);
}
}
if (md == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
if (apdu.nc < key_size) { //needs padding
memset(apdu.data + apdu.nc, 0, key_size - apdu.nc);
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, apdu.data, res_APDU);
}
else {
uint8_t *signature = (uint8_t *) calloc(key_size, sizeof(uint8_t));
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, md, hash.len, hash.data, signature);
memcpy(res_APDU, signature, key_size);
free(signature);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = key_size;
apdu.ne = key_size;
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 >= ALGO_EC_RAW && p2 <= ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_RAW) {
if (apdu.nc == 32) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 20) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 28) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 48) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 64) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
int r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
#ifdef MBEDTLS_EDDSA_C
if (ctx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519 || ctx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448) {
r = mbedtls_eddsa_write_signature(&ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, sizeof(buf), &olen, MBEDTLS_EDDSA_PURE, NULL, 0, random_gen, NULL);
}
else
#endif
{
r = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&ctx, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_HD) {
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = {0};
if (hd_context.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (hd_keytype != 0x1 && hd_keytype != 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
return SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS();
}
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&hd_context, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf,
MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
hd_keytype = 0;
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
decrement_key_counter(fkey);
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
extern void select_file(file_t *pe);
int cmd_update_ef() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
uint16_t fid = (p1 << 8) | p2;
uint8_t *data = NULL;
uint16_t offset = 0;
uint16_t data_len = 0;
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (fid == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
}
/*
// This should not happen
else if (p1 != EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX && p1 != PRKD_PREFIX && p1 != CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX &&
p1 != CD_PREFIX && p1 != DATA_PREFIX && p1 != DCOD_PREFIX &&
p1 != PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
*/
if (ef && !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_UPDATE_ERASE)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x54) { //ofset tag
for (size_t i = 1; i <= tag_len; i++) {
offset |= (*tag_data++ << (8 * (tag_len - i)));
}
}
else if (tag == 0x53) { //data
data_len = (uint16_t)tag_len;
data = tag_data;
}
}
if (data_len == 0 && offset == 0) { //new file
ef = file_new(fid);
//if ((fid & 0xff00) == (EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8))
// add_file_to_chain(ef, &ef_pukdf);
select_file(ef);
}
else {
if (fid == 0x0 && !ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
else if (fid != 0x0 && !(ef = search_file(fid))) { //if does not exist, create it
//return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
ef = file_new(fid);
}
if (offset == 0) {
int r = file_put_data(ef, data, data_len);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
else {
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
uint8_t *data_merge = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, offset + data_len);
memcpy(data_merge, file_get_data(ef), offset);
memcpy(data_merge + offset, data, data_len);
int r = file_put_data(ef, data_merge, offset + data_len);
free(data_merge);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
low_flash_available();
}
return SW_OK();
}

63
src/hsm/cmd_verify.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_verify() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 != 0x0 || (p2 & 0x60) != 0x0) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (p2 == 0x81) { //UserPin
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (opts & HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
if (has_session_pin && apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_OK();
}
if (*file_get_data(file_pin1) == 0 && pka_enabled() == false) { //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_pin1, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_retries_pin1) == 0) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_retries_pin1));
}
else if (p2 == 0x88) { //SOPin
if (file_read_uint8(file_sopin) == 0) { //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_retries_sopin) == 0) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
}
if (has_session_sopin) {
return SW_OK();
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_retries_sopin));
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}

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@ -1,27 +1,105 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _CVC_H_
#define _CVC_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
extern size_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa, uint8_t key_type, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
extern size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa, uint8_t key_type, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
#else
#include <stdbool.h>
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
typedef struct PUK {
const uint8_t *puk;
uint16_t puk_len;
const uint8_t *car;
uint16_t car_len;
const uint8_t *chr;
uint16_t chr_len;
const uint8_t *cvcert;
uint16_t cvcert_len;
bool copied;
} PUK;
#define MAX_PUK_STORE_ENTRIES 4
extern uint16_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
uint16_t ext_len,
bool full);
extern uint16_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
uint16_t ext_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_cert_description(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *puk,
uint16_t puk_len,
uint16_t fid,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_field(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen, uint16_t tag);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_car(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_chr(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_pub(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_ext(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern int cvc_verify(const uint8_t *cert, uint16_t cert_len, const uint8_t *ca, uint16_t ca_len);
extern mbedtls_ecp_group_id cvc_inherite_ec_group(const uint8_t *ca, uint16_t ca_len);
extern int puk_verify(const uint8_t *sig,
uint16_t sig_len,
const uint8_t *hash,
uint16_t hash_len,
const uint8_t *ca,
uint16_t ca_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_ecc(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_rsa(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_aes(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_generic(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
int key_tpe,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
#endif

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@ -1,511 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "dkek.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "files.h"
extern bool has_session_pin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32];
#define POLY 0xedb88320
uint32_t crc32c(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
{
uint32_t crc = ~0;
while (len--) {
crc ^= *buf++;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++)
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (POLY & (0 - (crc & 1)));
}
return ~crc;
}
int load_dkek(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false)
return CCID_NO_LOGIN;
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_SIZE);
int ret = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(session_pin, DKEK_IV(dkek), DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
if (ret != 0)
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
if (crc32c(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE) != *(uint32_t*)DKEK_CHECKSUM(dkek))
return CCID_WRONG_DKEK;
return CCID_OK;
}
void release_dkek(uint8_t *dkek) {
memset(dkek, 0, DKEK_SIZE);
}
int store_dkek_key(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
*(uint32_t*)DKEK_CHECKSUM(dkek) = crc32c(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_pin, DKEK_IV(dkek), DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, dkek, DKEK_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
release_dkek(dkek);
return CCID_OK;
}
int save_dkek_key(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *key) {
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE];
const uint8_t *iv = random_bytes_get(32);
memcpy(dkek, iv, DKEK_IV_SIZE);
if (!key) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
memcpy(DKEK_KEY(dkek), file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else
memcpy(DKEK_KEY(dkek), key, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
return store_dkek_key(id, dkek);
}
int import_dkek_share(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *share) {
uint8_t tmp_dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
memset(tmp_dkek, 0, sizeof(tmp_dkek));
if (file_get_size(tf) == DKEK_KEY_SIZE)
memcpy(tmp_dkek, file_get_data(tf),DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
for (int i = 0; i < DKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++)
tmp_dkek[i] ^= share[i];
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp_dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kcv(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kcv) { //kcv 8 bytes
uint8_t hsh[32], dkek[DKEK_SIZE];
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
hash256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE, hsh);
release_dkek(dkek);
memcpy(kcv, hsh, 8);
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kenc(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kenc) { //kenc 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE+4];
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
memcpy(DKEK_KEY(dkek)+DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x1", 4);
hash256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE+4, kenc);
release_dkek(dkek);
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kmac(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kmac) { //kmac 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE+4];
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
memcpy(DKEK_KEY(dkek)+DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x2", 4);
hash256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE+4, kmac);
release_dkek(dkek);
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_encrypt(uint8_t id, uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE+4];
if ((r = load_dkek(id, dkek)) != CCID_OK)
return r;
r = aes_encrypt_cfb_256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_IV(dkek), data, len);
release_dkek(dkek);
return r;
}
int dkek_decrypt(uint8_t id, uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE+4];
if ((r = load_dkek(id, dkek)) != CCID_OK)
return r;
r = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_IV(dkek), data, len);
release_dkek(dkek);
return r;
}
int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, int key_type, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
if (!(key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_AES))
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
uint8_t kb[8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
int kb_len = 0, r = 0;
uint8_t *algo = NULL;
uint8_t algo_len = 0;
uint8_t *allowed = NULL;
uint8_t allowed_len = 0;
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
uint8_t kcv[8];
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_128)
kb_len = 16;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_192)
kb_len = 24;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_256)
kb_len = 32;
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if (*out_len < 8+1+10+6+4+(2+32+14)+16)
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
put_uint16_t(kb_len, kb+8);
memcpy(kb+10, key_ctx, kb_len);
kb_len += 2;
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01"; //2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 (2+8)
algo_len = 10;
allowed = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x04\x10\x11\x18\x99"; //(2+4)
allowed_len = 6;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (*out_len < 8+1+12+6+(8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13)+16) //13 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *)key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)*8, kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->D, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->N, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->E, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E);
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02";
algo_len = 12;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) {
if (*out_len < 8+1+12+6+(8+2*8+9*66+2+4)+16) //4 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P)*8, kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N);
put_uint16_t(1+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X)+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
kb[8+kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.X, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
put_uint16_t(1+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X)+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
kb[8+kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.X, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.Y, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y);
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03";
algo_len = 12;
}
memset(out, 0, *out_len);
*out_len = 0;
memcpy(out+*out_len, kcv, 8);
*out_len += 8;
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES)
out[*out_len] = 15;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA)
out[*out_len] = 5;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC)
out[*out_len] = 12;
*out_len += 1;
if (algo) {
memcpy(out+*out_len, algo, algo_len);
*out_len += algo_len;
}
else
*out_len += 2;
if (allowed) {
memcpy(out+*out_len, allowed, allowed_len);
*out_len += allowed_len;
}
else
*out_len += 2;
//add 4 zeros
*out_len += 4;
memcpy(kb, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
kb_len += 8; //8 random bytes
int kb_len_pad = ((int)(kb_len/16))*16;
if (kb_len % 16 > 0)
kb_len_pad = ((int)(kb_len/16)+1)*16;
//key already copied at kb+10
if (kb_len < kb_len_pad) {
kb[kb_len] = 0x80;
}
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
memcpy(out+*out_len, kb, kb_len_pad);
*out_len += kb_len_pad;
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, out, *out_len, out+*out_len);
*out_len += 16;
if (r != 0)
return r;
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in) {
if (in[8] == 5 || in[8] == 6)
return HSM_KEY_RSA;
else if (in[8] == 12)
return HSM_KEY_EC;
else if (in[8] == 15)
return HSM_KEY_AES;
return 0x0;
}
int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int *key_size_out) {
uint8_t kcv[8];
int r = 0;
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
if (memcmp(kcv, in, 8) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_DKEK;
uint8_t signature[16];
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, in, in_len-16, signature);
if (r != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
if (memcmp(signature, in+in_len-16, 16) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
int key_type = in[8];
if (key_type != 5 && key_type != 6 && key_type != 12 && key_type != 15)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if ((key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02", 12) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if (key_type == 12 && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03", 12) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if (key_type == 15 && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01", 10) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
size_t ofs = 9;
//OID
size_t len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
//Allowed algorithms
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
//Access conditions
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
//Key OID
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
if ((in_len-16-ofs) % 16 != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_PADDING;
uint8_t kb[8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
memcpy(kb, in+ofs, in_len-16-ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len-16-ofs);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
int key_size = get_uint16_t(kb, 8);
if (key_size_out)
*key_size_out = key_size;
ofs = 10;
if (key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *)key_ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(rsa);
if (key_type == 5) {
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->D, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->N, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
//DP-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//DQ-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->P, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
//PQ
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->Q, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->E, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 5) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &rsa->N, NULL, NULL, &rsa->D, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &rsa->P, &rsa->Q, NULL, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 12) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)key_ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(ecdsa);
//A
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//B
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//P
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(kb+ofs, len);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
ofs += len;
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//G
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//d
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ec_id, ecdsa, kb+ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 15) {
memcpy(key_ctx, kb+ofs, key_size);
}
return CCID_OK;
}

View file

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _DKEK_H_
#define _DKEK_H_
extern int load_dkek(uint8_t, uint8_t *);
extern int save_dkek_key(uint8_t, const uint8_t *key);
extern int store_dkek_key(uint8_t, uint8_t *);
extern void init_dkek();
extern void release_dkek(uint8_t *);
extern int import_dkek_share(uint8_t, const uint8_t *share);
extern int dkek_kcv(uint8_t, uint8_t *kcv);
extern int dkek_encrypt(uint8_t, uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int dkek_decrypt(uint8_t, uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t, void *key_ctx, int key_type, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len);
extern int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in);
extern int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int *key_size_out);
#define MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER (8+1+12+6+(8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13)+16)
#define MAX_KEY_DOMAINS 16
#define DKEK_IV_SIZE (IV_SIZE)
#define DKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
#define DKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE (4)
#define DKEK_SIZE (DKEK_IV_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE)
#define DKEK_KEY(p) (p+DKEK_IV_SIZE)
#define DKEK_IV(p) (p)
#define DKEK_CHECKSUM(p) (p+DKEK_IV_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_SIZE)
#endif

View file

@ -1,61 +1,116 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "files.h"
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
extern int parse_token_info(const file_t *f, int mode);
extern int parse_cvca(const file_t *f, int mode);
extern int parse_ef_dir(const file_t *f, int mode);
file_t file_entries[] = {
/* 0 */ { .fid = 0x3f00 , .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} }, // MF
/* 1 */ { .fid = 0x2f00 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.DIR
/* 2 */ { .fid = 0x2f01 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.ATR
/* 3 */ { .fid = 0x2f02 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC,.data = (uint8_t *)parse_cvca, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.GDO
/* 4 */ { .fid = 0x2f03 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC,.data = (uint8_t *)parse_token_info, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 5 */ { .fid = 0x5015 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} }, //DF.PKCS15
/* 6 */ { .fid = 0x5031 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.ODF
/* 7 */ { .fid = 0x5032 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 8 */ { .fid = 0x5033 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.UnusedSpace
/* 9 */ { .fid = 0x1081 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PIN (PIN1)
/* 10 */ { .fid = 0x1082 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //max retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 11 */ { .fid = 0x1083 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 12 */ { .fid = 0x1088 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PIN (SOPIN)
/* 13 */ { .fid = 0x1089 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //max retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 14 */ { .fid = 0x108A , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 15 */ { .fid = EF_DEVOPS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Device options
/* 16 */ { .fid = EF_PRKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.PrKDFs
/* 17 */ { .fid = EF_PUKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.PuKDFs
/* 18 */ { .fid = EF_CDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.CDFs
/* 19 */ { .fid = EF_AODFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.AODFs
/* 20 */ { .fid = EF_DODFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.DODFs
/* 21 */ { .fid = EF_SKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.SKDFs
/* 22 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DOMAIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Key domain options
/* 23 */ { .fid = EF_META , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //EF.CDFs
///* 22 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0, .name = openpgpcard_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 24 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 5, .name = sc_hsm_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 25 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} } //end
/* 0 */ { .fid = 0x3f00, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } }, // MF
/* 1 */ { .fid = 0x2f00, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC, .data = (uint8_t *) parse_ef_dir,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.DIR
/* 2 */ { .fid = 0x2f01, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.ATR
/* 3 */ { .fid = EF_TERMCA, .parent = 0, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.GDO
/* 4 */ { .fid = 0x2f03, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC, .data = (uint8_t *) parse_token_info,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 5 */ { .fid = 0x5015, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } }, //DF.PKCS15
/* 6 */ { .fid = 0x5031, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.ODF
/* 7 */ { .fid = 0x5032, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 8 */ { .fid = 0x5033, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.UnusedSpace
/* 9 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PIN (PIN1)
/* 10 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //max retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 11 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 12 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PIN (SOPIN)
/* 13 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN_MAX_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //max retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 14 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 15 */ { .fid = EF_DEVOPS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Device options
/* 16 */ { .fid = EF_PRKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.PrKDFs
/* 17 */ { .fid = EF_PUKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.PuKDFs
/* 18 */ { .fid = EF_CDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.CDFs
/* 19 */ { .fid = EF_AODFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.AODFs
/* 20 */ { .fid = EF_DODFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.DODFs
/* 21 */ { .fid = EF_SKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.SKDFs
/* 22 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DOMAIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Key domain options
/* 23 */ { .fid = EF_META, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //EF.CDFs
/* 24 */ { .fid = EF_PUKAUT, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Public Key Authentication
/* 25 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Device Key
/* 26 */ { .fid = EF_PRKD_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PrKD Device
/* 27 */ { .fid = EF_EE_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //End Entity Certificate Device
/* 28 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //MKEK
/* 29 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK_SO, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //MKEK with SO-PIN
///* 30 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0, .name = openpgpcard_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 31 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 5, .name = sc_hsm_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } },
/* 32 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_NOT_KNOWN, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } } //end
};
const file_t *MF = &file_entries[0];
const file_t *file_last = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-1];
const file_t *file_openpgp = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-3];
const file_t *file_sc_hsm = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-2];
const file_t *file_last = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 1];
const file_t *file_openpgp = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 3];
const file_t *file_sc_hsm = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 2];
file_t *file_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_sopin = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_sopin = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_sopin = NULL;

View file

@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
@ -22,8 +22,20 @@
#include "file.h"
#define EF_DEVOPS 0x100E
#define EF_MKEK 0x100A
#define EF_MKEK_SO 0x100B
#define EF_XKEK 0x1070
#define EF_PIN1 0x1081
#define EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES 0x1082
#define EF_PIN1_RETRIES 0x1083
#define EF_SOPIN 0x1088
#define EF_SOPIN_MAX_RETRIES 0x1089
#define EF_SOPIN_RETRIES 0x108A
#define EF_DKEK 0x1090
#define EF_KEY_DOMAIN 0x10A0
#define EF_PUKAUT 0x10C0
#define EF_PUK 0x10D0
#define EF_MASTER_SEED 0x1110
#define EF_PRKDFS 0x6040
#define EF_PUKDFS 0x6041
#define EF_CDFS 0x6042
@ -31,9 +43,17 @@
#define EF_DODFS 0x6044
#define EF_SKDFS 0x6045
#define EF_KEY_DEV 0xCC00
#define EF_PRKD_DEV 0xC400
#define EF_EE_DEV 0xCE00
#define EF_TERMCA 0x2F02
#define EF_TOKENINFO 0x2F03
#define EF_STATICTOKEN 0xCB00
extern file_t *file_pin1;
extern file_t *file_retries_pin1;
extern file_t *file_sopin;
extern file_t *file_retries_sopin;
#endif
#endif

714
src/hsm/kek.c Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#endif
#include "kek.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "otp.h"
extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
bool has_mkek_mask = false;
uint8_t pending_save_dkek = 0xff;
#define POLY 0xedb88320
uint32_t crc32c(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
while (len--) {
crc ^= *buf++;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (POLY & (0 - (crc & 1)));
}
}
return ~crc;
}
void mkek_masked(uint8_t *mkek, const uint8_t *mask) {
if (mask) {
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(mkek)[i] ^= mask[i];
}
}
}
int load_mkek(uint8_t *mkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false) {
return PICOKEY_NO_LOGIN;
}
const uint8_t *pin = NULL;
if (pin == NULL && has_session_pin == true) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(mkek, file_get_data(tf), MKEK_SIZE);
pin = session_pin;
}
}
if (pin == NULL && has_session_sopin == true) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK_SO);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(mkek, file_get_data(tf), MKEK_SIZE);
pin = session_sopin;
}
}
if (pin == NULL) { //Should never happen
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (has_mkek_mask) {
mkek_masked(mkek, mkek_mask);
}
int ret = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(pin, MKEK_IV(mkek), MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
if (ret != 0) {
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (crc32c(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE) != *(uint32_t *) MKEK_CHECKSUM(mkek)) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK;
}
if (otp_key_1) {
mkek_masked(mkek, otp_key_1);
}
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
mse_t mse = { .init = false };
int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
mbedtls_chachapoly_context chatx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&chatx);
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&chatx, mse.key_enc + 12);
int ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&chatx, len - 16, mse.key_enc, mse.Qpt, 65, data + len - 16, data, data);
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&chatx);
return ret;
}
int load_dkek(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!file_has_data(tf)) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
return mkek_decrypt(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
void release_mkek(uint8_t *mkek) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
}
int store_mkek(const uint8_t *mkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false) {
return PICOKEY_NO_LOGIN;
}
uint8_t tmp_mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
if (mkek == NULL) {
const uint8_t *rd = random_bytes_get(MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
memcpy(tmp_mkek, rd, MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else {
memcpy(tmp_mkek, mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
}
if (otp_key_1) {
mkek_masked(tmp_mkek, otp_key_1);
}
*(uint32_t *) MKEK_CHECKSUM(tmp_mkek) = crc32c(MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
if (has_session_pin) {
uint8_t tmp_mkek_pin[MKEK_SIZE];
memcpy(tmp_mkek_pin, tmp_mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_pin);
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_pin, MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_pin), MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_pin), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
file_put_data(tf, tmp_mkek_pin, MKEK_SIZE);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_pin);
}
if (has_session_sopin) {
uint8_t tmp_mkek_sopin[MKEK_SIZE];
memcpy(tmp_mkek_sopin, tmp_mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK_SO);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_sopin);
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_sopin, MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_sopin), MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_sopin), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
file_put_data(tf, tmp_mkek_sopin, MKEK_SIZE);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_sopin);
}
low_flash_available();
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int store_dkek_key(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
int r = mkek_encrypt(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
file_put_data(tf, dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int save_dkek_key(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *key) {
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
if (!key) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else {
memcpy(dkek, key, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
return store_dkek_key(id, dkek);
}
int import_dkek_share(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *share) {
uint8_t tmp_dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memset(tmp_dkek, 0, sizeof(tmp_dkek));
if (file_get_size(tf) == DKEK_KEY_SIZE) {
memcpy(tmp_dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
for (int i = 0; i < DKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
tmp_dkek[i] ^= share[i];
}
file_put_data(tf, tmp_dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int dkek_kcv(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kcv) { //kcv 8 bytes
uint8_t hsh[32], dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
memset(kcv, 0, 8);
memset(hsh, 0, sizeof(hsh));
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE, hsh);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
memcpy(kcv, hsh, 8);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int dkek_kenc(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kenc) { //kenc 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4];
memset(kenc, 0, 32);
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(dkek + DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x1", 4);
hash256(dkek, sizeof(dkek), kenc);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int dkek_kmac(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kmac) { //kmac 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4];
memset(kmac, 0, 32);
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(dkek + DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x2", 4);
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4, kmac);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE + 4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
r = aes_encrypt_cfb_256(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_IV(mkek), data, len);
release_mkek(mkek);
return r;
}
int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE + 4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
r = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_IV(mkek), data, len);
release_mkek(mkek);
return r;
}
int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, int key_type, uint8_t *out, uint16_t *out_len, const uint8_t *allowed, uint16_t allowed_len) {
if (!(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES)) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
uint16_t kb_len = 0;
int r = 0;
uint8_t *algo = NULL;
uint8_t algo_len = 0;
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kcv[8];
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128) {
kb_len = 16;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192) {
kb_len = 24;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256) {
kb_len = 32;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512) {
kb_len = 64;
}
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32 && kb_len != 64) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 10 + 6 + (2 + 64 + 14) + 16) { // 14 bytes padding
return PICOKEY_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
put_uint16_t_be(kb_len, kb + 8);
memcpy(kb + 10, key_ctx, kb_len);
kb_len += 2;
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01"; //2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 (2+8)
algo_len = 10;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16) { //13 bytes pading
return PICOKEY_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) * 8, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D), kb + 8 + kb_len);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->D, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N), kb + 8 + kb_len);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E), kb + 8 + kb_len);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->E, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E);
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02";
algo_len = 12;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 8 + 9 * 66 + 2 + 4) + 16) { //4 bytes pading
return PICOKEY_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P) * 8, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A), kb + 8 + kb_len);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B), kb + 8 + kb_len);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), kb + 8 + kb_len);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), kb + 8 + kb_len);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N);
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->grp.G, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, kb + 8 + kb_len + 2, sizeof(kb) - 8 - kb_len - 2);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)olen, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += (uint16_t)olen;
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d), kb + 8 + kb_len);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, kb + 8 + kb_len + 2, sizeof(kb) - 8 - kb_len - 2);
kb_len += put_uint16_t_be((uint16_t)olen, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += (uint16_t)olen;
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03";
algo_len = 12;
}
memset(out, 0, *out_len);
*out_len = 0;
memcpy(out + *out_len, kcv, 8);
*out_len += 8;
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
out[*out_len] = 15;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
out[*out_len] = 5;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
out[*out_len] = 12;
}
*out_len += 1;
if (algo) {
memcpy(out + *out_len, algo, algo_len);
*out_len += algo_len;
}
else {
*out_len += 2;
}
if (allowed && allowed_len > 0) {
*out_len += put_uint16_t_be(allowed_len, out + *out_len);
memcpy(out + *out_len, allowed, allowed_len);
*out_len += allowed_len;
}
else {
*out_len += 2;
}
//add 4 zeros
*out_len += 4;
memcpy(kb, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
kb_len += 8; //8 random bytes
uint16_t kb_len_pad = ((uint16_t) (kb_len / 16)) * 16;
if (kb_len % 16 > 0) {
kb_len_pad = ((int) (kb_len / 16) + 1) * 16;
}
//key already copied at kb+10
if (kb_len < kb_len_pad) {
kb[kb_len] = 0x80;
}
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, PICO_KEYS_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(out + *out_len, kb, kb_len_pad);
*out_len += kb_len_pad;
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, out, *out_len, out + *out_len);
*out_len += 16;
if (r != 0) {
return r;
}
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in) {
if (in[8] == 5 || in[8] == 6) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA;
}
else if (in[8] == 12) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC;
}
else if (in[8] == 15) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES;
}
return 0x0;
}
int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, uint16_t in_len, int *key_size_out, uint8_t **allowed, uint16_t *allowed_len) {
uint8_t kcv[8];
int r = 0;
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
if (memcmp(kcv, in, 8) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK;
}
uint8_t signature[16];
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, in, in_len - 16, signature);
if (r != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
if (memcmp(signature, in + in_len - 16, 16) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
int key_type = in[8];
if (key_type != 5 && key_type != 6 && key_type != 12 && key_type != 15) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if ((key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) &&
memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02", 12) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 12 &&
memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03", 12) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 15 && memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01", 10) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
uint16_t ofs = 9;
//OID
uint16_t len = get_uint16_t_be(in + ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
//Allowed algorithms
len = get_uint16_t_be(in + ofs);
*allowed = (uint8_t *) (in + ofs + 2);
*allowed_len = len;
ofs += len + 2;
//Access conditions
len = get_uint16_t_be(in + ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
//Key OID
len = get_uint16_t_be(in + ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
if ((in_len - 16 - ofs) % 16 != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_PADDING;
}
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
memcpy(kb, in + ofs, in_len - 16 - ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, PICO_KEYS_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len - 16 - ofs);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
int key_size = get_uint16_t_be(kb + 8);
if (key_size_out) {
*key_size_out = key_size;
}
ofs = 10;
if (key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(rsa);
if (key_type == 5) {
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->D, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->N, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
//DP-1
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//DQ-1
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->P, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
//PQ
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->Q, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
//N
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += len + 2;
}
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->E, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 5) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &rsa->N, NULL, NULL, &rsa->D, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &rsa->P, &rsa->Q, NULL, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 12) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(ecdsa);
//A
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//B
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//P
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += 2;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(kb + ofs, len);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
ofs += len;
//N
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//G
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs);
#ifdef MBEDTLS_EDDSA_C
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 && kb[ofs + 2] != 0x09) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519;
}
else if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 && (len != 56 || kb[ofs + 2] != 0x05)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448;
}
#endif
ofs += len + 2;
//d
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ec_id, ecdsa, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
ofs += len;
//Q
len = get_uint16_t_be(kb + ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
#ifdef MBEDTLS_EDDSA_C
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ecdsa->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_EDWARDS) {
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_edwards(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, &ecdsa->d, random_gen, NULL);
}
else
#endif
{
r = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, &ecdsa->d, &ecdsa->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(ecdsa, ecdsa, random_gen, NULL);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 15) {
memcpy(key_ctx, kb + ofs, key_size);
}
return PICOKEY_OK;
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _DKEK_H_
#define _DKEK_H_
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#if defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) || defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include <stdbool.h>
#endif
extern int load_mkek(uint8_t *);
extern int store_mkek(const uint8_t *);
extern int save_dkek_key(uint8_t, const uint8_t *key);
extern int store_dkek_key(uint8_t, uint8_t *);
extern void init_mkek();
extern void release_mkek(uint8_t *);
extern int import_dkek_share(uint8_t, const uint8_t *share);
extern int dkek_kcv(uint8_t, uint8_t *kcv);
extern int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t,
void *key_ctx,
int key_type,
uint8_t *out,
uint16_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *,
uint16_t);
extern int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in);
extern int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t,
void *key_ctx,
const uint8_t *in,
uint16_t in_len,
int *key_size_out,
uint8_t **,
uint16_t *);
#define MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER (8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16)
#define MAX_KEY_DOMAINS 16
#define MKEK_IV_SIZE (IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
#define MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE (4)
#define MKEK_SIZE (MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE)
#define MKEK_IV(p) (p)
#define MKEK_KEY(p) (MKEK_IV(p) + MKEK_IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_CHECKSUM(p) (MKEK_KEY(p) + MKEK_KEY_SIZE)
#define DKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
extern uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
extern bool has_mkek_mask;
typedef struct mse {
uint8_t Qpt[65];
uint8_t key_enc[12 + 32];
bool init;
} mse_t;
extern mse_t mse;
extern int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *, size_t);
extern uint8_t pending_save_dkek;
#endif

18
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "oid.h"

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _OID_H_
#define _OID_H_
#define OID_BSI_DE "\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07"
#define OID_ECKA OID_BSI_DE "\x01\x01\x05"
#define OID_ECKA_EG OID_ECKA "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF OID_ECKA_EG "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA1 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA224 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA256 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x03"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA384 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x04"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA512 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x05"
#define OID_ECKA_DH OID_ECKA "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF OID_ECKA_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA1 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA224 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA256 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x03"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA384 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x04"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA512 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x05"
#define OID_ID_PK OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x01"
#define OID_ID_PK_DH OID_ID_PK "\x01"
#define OID_ID_PK_ECDH OID_ID_PK "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA OID_ID_TA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_1 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_1 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x03"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_256 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x04"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_512 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x05"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_512 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x06"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA OID_ID_TA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_1 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_224 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x03"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_384 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x04"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_512 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x05"
#define OID_ID_CA OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH OID_ID_CA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_3DES_CBC_CBC OID_ID_CA_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_192 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_256 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x04"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH OID_ID_CA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_3DES_CBC_CBC OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_192 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_256 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x04"
#define OID_ID_RI OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x05"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH OID_ID_RI "\x01"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH_SHA_1 OID_ID_RI_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH_SHA_224 OID_ID_RI_DH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH_SHA_256 OID_ID_RI_DH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH OID_ID_RI "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH_SHA_1 OID_ID_RI_ECDH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH_SHA_224 OID_ID_RI_ECDH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH_SHA_256 OID_ID_RI_ECDH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CI OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x06"
#define OID_CARDCONTACT "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x81\xC3\x1F"
#define OID_OPENSCDP OID_CARDCONTACT "\x01"
#define OID_CC_ISO7816 OID_CARDCONTACT "\x02"
#define OID_CC_PKI OID_CARDCONTACT "\x03"
#define OID_CC_FORMAT OID_CARDCONTACT "\x04"
#define OID_CC_GP_PROFILES OID_CARDCONTACT "\x10"
#define OID_SCSH3 OID_OPENSCDP "\x01"
#define OID_SCSH3GUI OID_OPENSCDP "\x02"
#define OID_SMARCARD_HSM OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x01"
#define OID_CC_APDUTEST OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x02"
#define OID_CC_PACKAGES OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x7F"
#define OID_CC_ROLES OID_CC_PKI "\x01"
#define OID_CC_ROLE_SC_HSM OID_CC_ROLES "\x01"
#define OID_CC_EXTENSIONS OID_CC_PKI "\x02"
#define OID_ID_IMPU OID_CC_EXTENSIONS "\x01"
#define OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID OID_CC_EXTENSIONS "\x02"
#define OID_CC_FF_DEVICEID OID_CC_FORMAT "\x01"
#define OID_CC_FF_KDM OID_CC_FORMAT "\x02"
#define OID_CC_FF_PKA OID_CC_FORMAT "\x03"
#define OID_CC_FF_KDA OID_CC_FORMAT "\x04"
#define OID_RSADSI "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D"
#define OID_PKCS OID_RSADSI "\x01"
#define OID_PKCS_5 OID_PKCS "\x05"
#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 OID_PKCS_5 "\x0C"
#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 OID_PKCS_5 "\x0D"
#define OID_PKCS_9 OID_PKCS "\x09"
#define OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG OID_PKCS_9 "\x10\x03"
#define OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x12"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA256 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1D"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA384 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1E"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA512 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1F"
#define OID_DIGEST OID_RSADSI "\x02"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 OID_DIGEST "\x07"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA224 OID_DIGEST "\x08"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA256 OID_DIGEST "\x09"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA384 OID_DIGEST "\x0A"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA512 OID_DIGEST "\x0B"
#define OID_KDF_X963 "\x2B\x81\x05\x10\x86\x48\x3F"
#define OID_NIST_ALG "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04"
#define OID_NIST_AES OID_NIST_ALG "\x01"
#define OID_AES128_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x01"
#define OID_AES128_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x02"
#define OID_AES128_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x03"
#define OID_AES128_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x04"
#define OID_AES128_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x06"
#define OID_AES128_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x07"
#define OID_AES128_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x09" // Not existing
#define OID_AES192_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x15"
#define OID_AES192_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x16"
#define OID_AES192_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x17"
#define OID_AES192_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x18"
#define OID_AES192_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x1A"
#define OID_AES192_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x1B"
#define OID_AES192_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x1D" // Not existing
#define OID_AES256_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x29"
#define OID_AES256_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x2A"
#define OID_AES256_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x2B"
#define OID_AES256_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x2C"
#define OID_AES256_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x2E"
#define OID_AES256_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x2F"
#define OID_AES256_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x31" // Not existing
#define OID_IEEE_ALG "\x2B\x6F\x02\x8C\x53\x00\x00\x01"
#define OID_AES128_XTS OID_IEEE_ALG "\x01"
#define OID_AES256_XTS OID_IEEE_ALG "\x02"
#define OID_HD "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x83\xA8\x78\x05\x8D\x6B"
#endif

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@ -1,52 +1,84 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _SC_HSM_H_
#define _SC_HSM_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifndef ESP_PLATFORM
#include "common.h"
#else
#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS
#endif
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "ccid2040.h"
#endif
#include "file.h"
#include "apdu.h"
#include "pico_keys.h"
#include "usb.h"
#define MAX_APDU_DATA (USB_BUFFER_SIZE - 20)
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
#define ALGO_RSA_RAW 0x20 /* RSA signature with external padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT 0x21 /* RSA raw decrypt */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 0x22
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP 0x23
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 0x30 /* RSA signature with DigestInfo input and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x31 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 0x32
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x33 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x34
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x35
#define ALGO_RSA_RAW 0x20 /* RSA signature with external padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT 0x21 /* RSA decrypt */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 0x30 /* RSA signature with DigestInfo input and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x31 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x33 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS 0x40 /* RSA signature with external hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding*/
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 0x41 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 0x42
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 0x43 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 0x44
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512 0x45
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS 0x40 /* RSA signature with external hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding*/
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 0x41 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 0x43 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_EC_RAW 0x70 /* ECDSA signature with hash input */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA1 0x71 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-1 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA224 0x72 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-224 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA256 0x73 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-256 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA384 0x74
#define ALGO_EC_SHA512 0x75
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_EC_DH_AUTPUK 0x83
#define ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK 0x84
#define ALGO_HD 0xA0
#define ALGO_EC_RAW 0x70 /* ECDSA signature with hash input */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA1 0x71 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-1 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA224 0x72 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-224 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA256 0x73 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-256 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_WRAP 0x92
#define ALGO_UNWRAP 0x93
#define ALGO_REPLACE 0x94
#define ALGO_EC_DERIVE 0x98 /* Derive EC key from EC key */
#define ALGO_EC_DERIVE 0x98 /* Derive EC key from EC key */
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT 0x10
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT 0x11
#define ALGO_AES_CMAC 0x18
#define ALGO_AES_DERIVE 0x99
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT 0x10
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT 0x11
#define ALGO_AES_CMAC 0x18
#define ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT 0x51 /* Extended ciphering Encrypt */
#define ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT 0x52 /* Extended ciphering Decrypt */
#define ALGO_AES_DERIVE 0x99
#define HSM_OPT_RRC 0x0001
#define HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN 0x0002
@ -57,27 +89,46 @@ extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
#define HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY 0x0020
#define HSM_OPT_BOOTSEL_BUTTON 0x0100
#define HSM_OPT_KEY_COUNTER_ALL 0x0200
#define HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK 0x0400
#define PRKD_PREFIX 0xC4 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 PRKD objects */
#define CD_PREFIX 0xC8 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 CD objects */
#define DCOD_PREFIX 0xC9 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 DCOD objects */
#define CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCA /* Hi byte in file identifier for CA certificates */
#define KEY_PREFIX 0xCC /* Hi byte in file identifier for key objects */
#define PROT_DATA_PREFIX 0xCD /* Hi byte in file identifier for PIN protected data objects */
#define EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCE /* Hi byte in file identifier for EE certificates */
#define DATA_PREFIX 0xCF /* Hi byte in file identifier for readable data objects */
#define PRKD_PREFIX 0xC4 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 PRKD objects */
#define CD_PREFIX 0xC8 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 CD objects */
#define DCOD_PREFIX 0xC9 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 DCOD objects */
#define CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCA /* Hi byte in file identifier for CA certificates */
#define KEY_PREFIX 0xCC /* Hi byte in file identifier for key objects */
#define PROT_DATA_PREFIX 0xCD /* Hi byte in file identifier for PIN protected data objects */
#define EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCE /* Hi byte in file identifier for EE certificates */
#define DATA_PREFIX 0xCF /* Hi byte in file identifier for readable data objects */
#define P15_KEYTYPE_RSA 0x30
#define P15_KEYTYPE_ECC 0xA0
#define P15_KEYTYPE_AES 0xA8
#define MAX_PUK 8
extern int pin_reset_retries(const file_t *pin, bool);
extern int pin_wrong_retry(const file_t *pin);
extern void hash(const uint8_t *input, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void hash_multi(const uint8_t *input, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void double_hash_pin(const uint8_t *pin, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void hash(const uint8_t *input, uint16_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern uint16_t get_device_options();
extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
extern uint16_t check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern bool pka_enabled();
extern const uint8_t *dev_name;
extern uint16_t dev_name_len;
extern uint8_t puk_status[MAX_PUK];
extern int puk_store_select_chr(const uint8_t *chr);
extern int delete_file(file_t *ef);
extern const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, uint16_t *tag_len);
extern bool key_has_purpose(file_t *ef, uint8_t purpose);
extern int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ec(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ecdh(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern bool wait_button_pressed();
extern int store_keys(void *key_ctx, int type, uint8_t key_id);
extern int find_and_store_meta_key(uint8_t key_id);
extern uint32_t get_key_counter(file_t *fkey);
extern uint32_t decrement_key_counter(file_t *fkey);
#endif
#endif

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@ -1,27 +1,26 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef __VERSION_H_
#define __VERSION_H_
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0202
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0602
#define HSM_VERSION_MAJOR ((HSM_VERSION >> 8) & 0xff)
#define HSM_VERSION_MINOR (HSM_VERSION & 0xff)
#endif

14
tests/build-in-docker.sh Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
source tests/docker_env.sh
build_image
#run_in_docker rm -rf CMakeFiles
run_in_docker mkdir -p build_in_docker
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" cmake -DENABLE_EMULATION=1 -D__FOR_CI=1 -DENABLE_EDDSA=1 ..
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" make -j ${NUM_PROC}
docker create --name temp_container pico-hsm-test:bullseye
docker cp $PWD/build_in_docker/pico_hsm temp_container:/pico_hsm
docker commit temp_container pico-hsm-test:bullseye
docker stop temp_container
docker rm temp_container
docker image prune -f

33
tests/conftest.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import sys
import pytest
try:
from picohsm import PicoHSM
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: picohsm module not found! Install picohsm package.\nTry with `pip install pypicohsm`')
sys.exit(-1)
@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
def device():
dev = PicoHSM()
return dev

25
tests/const.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
from binascii import unhexlify
DEFAULT_DKEK = [0x1] * 32
TERM_CERT = unhexlify('7f2181e57f4e819e5f290100421045535049434f48534d445630303030327f494f060a04007f000702020202038641043400e4f42ea8b78b2ab58d24c8297a4b1c13a73a631b531e58d0efb60d70dd6666c8fce4130e9b15ffa4ad29708d32764ac4b0cc0e5301898522f4c735f5a90d5f201045535049434f48534d54524c524134437f4c0e060904007f0007030102025301005f25060205010102085f24060206010102085f3740569f6fe91796f95fa77ecdb680468417eed7b4e00ccc2e091a6b56389213f913c4cf91da96fbcb12d363fead30a5598f737975d58b5170b7f45e9e87ec546883')
DICA_CERT = unhexlify('7f2181e97f4e81a25f290100421045535049434f48534d434130303030327f494f060a04007f00070202020203864104e66b473ec328caf39eaed840f9c7a4ba237e1dd19004861fa3f4f134bd2d5ea5f71c6c2e6321add4c8a7793ba41119c5783f48a5d9dfc0898d9ae9e7b14da8d65f201045535049434f48534d445630303030327f4c12060904007f000703010202530580000000045f25060205000400065f24060206000400065f3740a645594c6c338cd6bda6cad039cee54fd822b1011c0af1e4e3a2a6d03d43bdbb8be68a66a8757e7b1f963589bdd80d8e65de5055b722609041ec63f0498ddc8b')

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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
FROM debian:bullseye
ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt update && apt upgrade -y
RUN apt install -y apt-utils
RUN apt autoremove -y
RUN rm -rf /var/cache/apt/archives/*
RUN apt install -y libccid \
libpcsclite-dev \
git \
autoconf \
pkg-config \
libtool \
help2man \
automake \
gcc \
make \
build-essential \
python3 \
python3-pip \
swig \
libssl-dev \
cmake \
vsmartcard-vpcd \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN pip3 install pytest pycvc cryptography base58
WORKDIR /
RUN git clone https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC
WORKDIR /OpenSC
RUN git checkout tags/0.26.1
RUN ./bootstrap
RUN ./configure --enable-openssl
RUN make -j `nproc`
RUN make install
RUN make clean
RUN ldconfig
WORKDIR /
RUN git clone https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded
WORKDIR /sc-hsm-embedded
RUN autoreconf -fi
RUN ./configure
RUN make -j `nproc`
RUN make install
RUN cp ./src/tests/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test /usr/local/bin/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test
RUN make clean
WORKDIR /

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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
FROM ubuntu:jammy
ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt update && apt upgrade -y
RUN apt install -y apt-utils
RUN apt install -y libccid \
libpcsclite-dev \
git \
autoconf \
pkg-config \
libtool \
help2man \
automake \
gcc \
make \
build-essential \
opensc \
python3 \
python3-pip \
swig \
cmake \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN pip3 install pytest pycvc cryptography pyscard
RUN git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/vsmartcard.git
WORKDIR /vsmartcard/virtualsmartcard
RUN autoreconf --verbose --install
RUN ./configure --sysconfdir=/etc
RUN make && make install
WORKDIR /

108
tests/docker_env.sh Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
# Taken from Mbed-TLS project
# https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/master/tests/scripts/docker_env.sh
#
# docker_env.sh
#
# Purpose
# -------
#
# This is a helper script to enable running tests under a Docker container,
# thus making it easier to get set up as well as isolating test dependencies
# (which include legacy/insecure configurations of openssl and gnutls).
#
# WARNING: the Dockerfile used by this script is no longer maintained! See
# https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-test/blob/master/README.md#quick-start
# for the set of Docker images we use on the CI.
#
# Notes for users
# ---------------
# This script expects a Linux x86_64 system with a recent version of Docker
# installed and available for use, as well as http/https access. If a proxy
# server must be used, invoke this script with the usual environment variables
# (http_proxy and https_proxy) set appropriately. If an alternate Docker
# registry is needed, specify MBEDTLS_DOCKER_REGISTRY to point at the
# host name.
#
#
# Running this script directly will check for Docker availability and set up
# the Docker image.
# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# default values, can be overridden by the environment
: ${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST:=bullseye}
DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG="pico-hsm-test:${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}"
# Make sure docker is available
if ! which docker > /dev/null; then
echo "Docker is required but doesn't seem to be installed. See https://www.docker.com/ to get started"
exit 1
fi
# Figure out if we need to 'sudo docker'
if groups | grep docker > /dev/null; then
DOCKER="docker"
else
echo "Using sudo to invoke docker since you're not a member of the docker group..."
DOCKER="docker"
fi
# Figure out the number of processors available
if [ "$(uname)" == "Darwin" ]; then
NUM_PROC="$(sysctl -n hw.logicalcpu)"
else
NUM_PROC="$(nproc)"
fi
build_image() {
# Build the Docker image
echo "Getting docker image up to date (this may take a few minutes)..."
${DOCKER} image build \
-t ${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--cache-from=${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--network host \
--build-arg MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL="-j ${NUM_PROC}" \
tests/docker/${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}
}
run_in_docker()
{
ENV_ARGS=""
while [ "$1" == "-e" ]; do
ENV_ARGS="${ENV_ARGS} $1 $2"
shift 2
done
WORKDIR="${PWD}"
if [ "$1" == '-w' ]; then
WORKDIR="$2"
shift 2
fi
${DOCKER} container run --rm \
--cap-add SYS_PTRACE \
--volume $PWD:$PWD \
--workdir ${WORKDIR} \
-e MAKEFLAGS \
${ENV_ARGS} \
${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
$@
}

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
def test_select(device):
device.select_applet()
def test_initialization(device):
device.initialize(no_dev_cert=True)
def test_termca(device):
data = device.get_termca()
assert(b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['cv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['cv']['car'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['cv']['car'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['dv']['chr'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['dv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMCA' == data['dv']['car'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['dv']['car'][:11])
assert(data['cv']['car'] == data['dv']['chr'])
def test_get_version(device):
version = device.get_version()

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import math
from collections import Counter
def mean(x):
sum = 0
for i in x:
sum += i
return sum/len(x)
def var(x):
sum = 0
m = mean(x)
for i in x:
sum += (i-m)**2
return sum/len(x)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"length", [1, 256, 1024]
)
def test_challenge(device, length):
data = device.get_challenge(length)
assert(len(data) == length)
def test_randomness(device):
data = []
N = 1000
for k2 in range(N):
data += device.get_challenge(1024)
_, values = zip(*Counter(data).items())
nm = mean(values)/(N*1024/256)
sm = math.sqrt(var(values))/mean(values)
assert(0.99 <= nm <= 1.01)
assert(sm <= 0.02)

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picokey import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
KEY_DOMAINS = 3
TEST_KEY_DOMAIN = 1
def test_key_domains(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=KEY_DOMAINS, no_dev_cert=True)
for k in range(KEY_DOMAINS):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=k)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=KEY_DOMAINS)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A86)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
def test_import_dkek_wrong_key_domain(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED)
def test_import_dkek_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED)
def test_set_key_domain_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=10)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2)
def test_set_key_domain_ok(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' not in kd)
assert('dkek' in kd)
assert('total' in kd['dkek'])
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert('missing' in kd['dkek'])
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
def test_import_dkek_ok(device):
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-1)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-2)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
def test_clear_key_domain(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.clear_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
def test_delete_key_domain(device):
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2)
def test_delete_key_domain(device):
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-1)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-2)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picokey import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
WRONG_PIN = '112233'
def test_pin_init_retries(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, no_dev_cert=True)
retries = device.get_login_retries()
assert(retries == DEFAULT_RETRIES)
def test_pin_login(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, no_dev_cert=True)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
def test_pin_retries(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, no_dev_cert=True)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
for ret in range(DEFAULT_RETRIES-1):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.login(WRONG_PIN)
assert(e.value.sw1 == 0x63 and e.value.sw2 == (0xC0 | (DEFAULT_RETRIES-1-ret)))
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.login(WRONG_PIN)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_PIN_BLOCKED)
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, no_dev_cert=True)
retries = device.get_login_retries()
assert(retries == DEFAULT_RETRIES)

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
def test_gen_initialize(device):
device.initialize(no_dev_cert=True)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp192k1', 'secp256k1', 'curve25519', 'curve448', 'ed25519', 'ed448']
)
def test_gen_ecc(device, curve):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) not in resp)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024, 2048, 4096]
)
def test_gen_rsa(device, modulus):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
import os
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, ec, x25519, x448, ed25519, ed448
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_prepare_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024, 2048, 4096]
)
def test_import_rsa(device, modulus):
pkey = rsa.generate_private_key(
public_exponent=65537,
key_size=modulus,
)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid)
assert(pubkey.public_numbers() == pkey.public_key().public_numbers())
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ec.SECP192R1, ec.SECP256R1, ec.SECP384R1, ec.SECP521R1, ec.SECP256K1, ec.BrainpoolP256R1, ec.BrainpoolP384R1, ec.BrainpoolP512R1]
)
def test_import_ecc(device, curve):
pkey = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve().name)
assert(pubkey.public_numbers() == pkey.public_key().public_numbers())
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [x25519.X25519PrivateKey, x448.X448PrivateKey]
)
def test_import_montgomery(device, curve):
pkey = curve.generate()
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve)
assert(pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw) == pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey, ed448.Ed448PrivateKey]
)
def test_import_edwards(device, curve):
pkey = curve.generate()
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve)
assert(pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw) == pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_import_aes(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, x25519, x448
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_prepare_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ec.SECP192R1, ec.SECP256R1, ec.SECP384R1, ec.SECP521R1, ec.SECP256K1, ec.BrainpoolP256R1, ec.BrainpoolP384R1, ec.BrainpoolP512R1]
)
def test_exchange_ecc(device, curve):
pkeyA = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
pbkeyA = pkeyA.public_key()
keyid = device.import_key(pkeyA)
pkeyB = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
pbkeyB = pkeyB.public_key()
sharedB = pkeyB.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pbkeyA)
sharedA = device.exchange(keyid, pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedB)
sharedAA = pkeyA.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedAA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [x25519.X25519PrivateKey, x448.X448PrivateKey]
)
def test_exchange_montgomery(device, curve):
pkeyA = curve.generate()
pbkeyA = pkeyA.public_key()
keyid = device.import_key(pkeyA)
pkeyB = curve.generate()
pbkeyB = pkeyB.public_key()
sharedB = pkeyB.exchange(pbkeyA)
sharedA = device.exchange(keyid, pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedB)
sharedAA = pkeyA.exchange(pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedAA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_gen_aes(device, size):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.AES, size)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)

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"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from picokey import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import algorithms, Cipher, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=1, no_dev_cert=True)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == 1)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=0, total=2)
keyid_in = -1
keyid_out = -1
def test_key_generation_no_key_domain(device):
global keyid_out
keyid_out = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, 'brainpoolP256r1')
device.put_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, p2=keyid_out, data=[0xA0])
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_out) in resp)
assert((DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, keyid_out) in resp)
def test_key_generation_with_key_domain(device):
global keyid_in
keyid_in = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, 'brainpoolP256r1', key_domain=0)
device.put_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, p2=keyid_in, data=[0xA0])
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_in) in resp)
assert((DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, keyid_in) in resp)
def test_export_key_out(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.export_key(keyid_out)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
def test_export_key_in_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.export_key(keyid_in)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
def test_export_import_dkek(device):
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
def test_export_key_in_ok(device):
resp = device.export_key(keyid_in)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(kcv == resp[:8])
assert(resp[8] == 12)
assert(resp[9:21] == b"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03")
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(resp[:-16])
resCMAC = c.finalize()
assert(resCMAC == resp[-16:])
def test_delete_keys_in_out(device):
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_in)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid_in)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_out)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid_out)
def test_export_import(device):
pkey_gen = ec.generate_private_key(ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
keyid = device.import_key(pkey_gen)
resp = device.export_key(keyid)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(kcv == resp[:8])
assert(resp[8] == 12)
assert(resp[9:21] == b"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03")
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(resp[:-16])
resCMAC = c.finalize()
assert(resCMAC == resp[-16:])
iv = b'\x00'*16
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x01').digest()
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
payload = decryptor.update(resp[27:-16]) + decryptor.finalize()
rnd = payload[:8]
ofs = 8
key_size = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
A_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+A_len
B_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+B_len
P_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+P_len
N_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+N_len
G_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+G_len
d_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
d = payload[ofs:ofs+d_len]
ofs += d_len
Q_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
Q = payload[ofs:ofs+Q_len]
ofs += Q_len
pkey_ex = ec.EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers(int.from_bytes(d, 'big'), ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.BrainpoolP256R1(), Q).public_numbers()).private_key()
assert(pkey_gen.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()) == pkey_ex.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()))
assert(pkey_gen.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.X962, serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint) == pkey_ex.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.X962, serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes, Algorithm
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
data = b'Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nullam neque urna, iaculis quis auctor scelerisque, auctor ut risus. In rhoncus, odio consequat consequat ultrices, ex libero dictum risus, accumsan interdum nisi orci ac neque. Ut vitae sem in metus hendrerit facilisis. Mauris maximus tristique mi, quis blandit lectus convallis eget.'
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp256k1']
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"scheme", [Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA512]
)
def test_signature_ecc(device, curve, scheme):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid, param=curve)
if (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW):
datab = hashlib.sha512(data).digest()
else:
datab = data
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=scheme, data=datab)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, datab, signature, scheme)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024,2048,4096]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"scheme", [Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512]
)
def test_signature_rsa(device, modulus, scheme):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=scheme, data=data)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, data, signature, scheme)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['ed25519', 'ed448']
)
def test_signature_edwards(device, curve):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW, data=data)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, data, signature)

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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from binascii import hexlify
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
data = b'Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nullam neque urna, iaculis quis auctor scelerisque, auctor ut risus. In rhoncus, odio consequat consequat ultrices, ex libero dictum risus, accumsan interdum nisi orci ac neque. Ut vitae sem in metus hendrerit facilisis. Mauris maximus tristique mi, quis blandit lectus convallis eget.'
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024,2048,4096]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"pad", [padding.PKCS1v15(), padding.OAEP(
mgf=padding.MGF1(algorithm=hashes.SHA256()),
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
label=None
)]
)
def test_decrypt_rsa(device, modulus, pad):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
message = data[:(modulus//8)-100]
ciphered = pubkey.encrypt(message, pad)
datab = device.decrypt(keyid, ciphered, pad)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(datab == message)

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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from picohsm import Algorithm, DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_cipher_aes_cipher(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
iv = b'\x00'*16
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctA = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
ctB = device.cipher(Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT, keyid, MESSAGE)
assert(ctB == ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
plA = decryptor.update(ctA) + decryptor.finalize()
plB = device.cipher(Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT, keyid, ctA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(plB == plA)
assert(plB == MESSAGE)

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@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import aead
import cryptography.exceptions
from picohsm import DOPrefixes, EncryptionMode
from picokey import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from binascii import hexlify
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
AAD = b'this is a tag for AAD'
def test_prepare_chachapoly(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
def generate_key(device):
# ChaCha uses 32 bytes key
pkey = os.urandom(256 // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
return pkey, keyid
def test_cipher_chachapoly_cipher(device):
iv = b'\x00'*12
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, aad=AAD)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_random_iv(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_no_aad(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, b'')
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, b'')
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_bad_random_iv(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
iv = os.urandom(12)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_WRONG_DATA)
with pytest.raises(cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag):
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_bad_aad(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD + b'bad')
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_WRONG_DATA)
with pytest.raises(cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag):
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD + b'bad')
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)

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@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes, aead
from picohsm import EncryptionMode, AES
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from binascii import hexlify
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
AAD = b'this is a tag for AAD'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
def generate_key(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
return pkey, keyid
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ecb(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.ECB, MESSAGE)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.ECB())
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.ECB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cbc_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CBC, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CBC, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cbc_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CBC, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CBC, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ofb_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.OFB, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.OFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.OFB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ofb_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.OFB, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.OFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.OFB, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cfb_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CFB, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CFB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cfb_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CFB, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CFB, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_gcm_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.GCM, MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv)).encryptor()
encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB + encryptor.tag)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.GCM, ctA, aad=AAD)
decryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv, encryptor.tag)).decryptor()
decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_gcm_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.GCM, MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv)).encryptor()
encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB + encryptor.tag)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.GCM, ctA, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
decryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv, encryptor.tag)).decryptor()
decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [256, 512]
)
def test_aes_xts_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.XTS, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.XTS(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.XTS, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [256, 512]
)
def test_aes_xts_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.XTS, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.XTS(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.XTS, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ctr_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CTR, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CTR(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CTR, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ctr_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CTR, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CTR(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CTR, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ccm_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CCM, MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
iv = b'\x00' * 12
encryptor = aead.AESCCM(pkey)
ctB = encryptor.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CCM, ctA, aad=AAD)
decryptor = encryptor
dtB = decryptor.decrypt(iv, ctB, AAD)
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"iv_len", [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
)
def test_aes_ccm_iv(device, size, iv_len):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(iv_len)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CCM, MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
encryptor = aead.AESCCM(pkey)
ctB = encryptor.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CCM, ctA, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
decryptor = encryptor
dtB = decryptor.decrypt(iv, ctB, AAD)
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)

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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, hmac, cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import algorithms
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
def test_mac_hmac(device, size, algo):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.hmac(algo, keyid, MESSAGE)
h = hmac.HMAC(pkey, algo())
h.update(MESSAGE)
resB = h.finalize()
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(resA == resB)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_mac_cmac(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.cmac(keyid, MESSAGE)
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(MESSAGE)
resB = c.finalize()
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(resA == resB)

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@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'info message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
class TestHKDF:
def test_hkdf_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.hkdf(algo, keyid, INFO, salt, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
resB = hkdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
hkdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_hkdf_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.hkdf(algo, keyid, INFO, salt, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
hkdf.verify(pkey, resA)

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@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 import PBKDF2HMAC
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'info message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"iterations", [1024, 2048]
)
class TestPBKDF2:
def test_pbkdf2_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len, iterations):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.pbkdf2(algo, keyid, salt, iterations=iterations, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
resB = kdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
kdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_pbkdf2_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len, iterations):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.pbkdf2(algo, keyid, salt, iterations=iterations, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
kdf.verify(pkey, resA)

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@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.x963kdf import X963KDF
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'shared message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
class TestX963:
def test_x963_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.x963(algo, keyid, INFO, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
resB = xkdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
xkdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_x963_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.x963(algo, keyid, INFO, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
xkdf.verify(pkey, resA)

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@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from picokey import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from const import TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, utils
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
AUT_KEY = unhexlify('579A995BD7BA35AD3D3968940FA4CDA34116E121A8AC01396234DAFB132B3FD7')
aut_pk = ec.derive_private_key(int.from_bytes(AUT_KEY, 'big'), ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
AUT_PUK = unhexlify('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')
term_chr = CVC().decode(TERM_CERT).chr()
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1, no_dev_cert=False)
device.logout()
def test_register_puk(device):
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,1,1,0]))
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_reg(device):
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
def test_authentication(device):
input = device.puk_prepare_signature()
signature = aut_pk.sign(input, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
r,s = utils.decode_dss_signature(signature)
signature = list(int_to_bytes(r) + int_to_bytes(s))
device.authenticate_puk(term_chr, signature)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,1]))
def test_enumerate_puk_ok(device):
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 1)
def test_check_key(device):
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 1)
bad_chr = b'XXXXX'
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) == -1)
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) != 0)
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) != 1)
def test_puk_reset(device):
device.logout()
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_authentication_fail(device):
input = b'this is a fake input'
signature = aut_pk.sign(input, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
r,s = utils.decode_dss_signature(signature)
signature = list(int_to_bytes(r) + int_to_bytes(s))
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.authenticate_puk(term_chr, signature)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_1(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == -1)
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_2(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=2, puk_min_auts=1, no_dev_cert=True)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 2)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == -1)
assert(puks[1]['status'] == -1)
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 2)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
assert(puks[1]['status'] == -1)
def test_register_more_puks(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=2, puk_min_auts=1, no_dev_cert=True)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([2,2,1,0]))
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(status == bytes([2,1,1,0]))
def test_is_pku(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1, no_dev_cert=True)
assert(device.is_puk() == True)
device.initialize(no_dev_cert=True)
assert(device.is_puk() == False)
def test_check_puk_key(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1, no_dev_cert=True)
status = device.check_puk_key(term_chr)
assert(status == -1)
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
status = device.check_puk_key(term_chr)
assert(status == 0)
def test_register_puk_with_no_puk(device):
device.initialize(no_dev_cert=True)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND)

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@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from const import TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc import oid
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from picokey import APDUResponse, SWCodes
KDM = unhexlify(b'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')
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=1, no_dev_cert=True)
device.logout()
def test_create_xkek(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.create_xkek(KDM)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
device.login()
kcv, did = device.create_xkek(KDM)
assert(kcv == b'\x00'*8)
gskcert = ASN1().decode(KDM).find(0x30).find(0x63).data()
gskQ = CVC().decode(gskcert).pubkey().find(0x86).data()
pub = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.BrainpoolP256R1(), bytes(gskQ))
assert(did == int_to_bytes(pub.public_numbers().x)+int_to_bytes(pub.public_numbers().y))
keyid = -1
def test_derive_xkek(device):
global keyid
keyid = device.generate_xkek_key()
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
xkek_dom = device.get_key_domain()['xkek']
pkey = ec.generate_private_key(ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
pubkey = pkey.public_key()
cert = CVC().cert(pubkey=pubkey, scheme=oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, signkey=pkey, signscheme=oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, car=b"UTCA00001", chr=b"UTCDUMMY00001", extensions=[
{
'tag': 0x73,
'oid': b'\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x81\xC3\x1F\x03\x02\x02',
'contexts': {
0: xkek_dom
}
}
]).encode()
device.derive_xkek(keyid, cert)
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert(resp['kcv'] != b'\x00'*8)
def test_delete_xkek(device):
device.delete_xkek()
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert(resp['kcv'] == b'\x00'*8)
def test_delete_domain_with_key(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.delete_key_domain()
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_FILE_EXISTS)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
def test_delete_domain(device):
device.delete_key_domain()
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert('kcv' not in resp)
assert('xkek' not in resp)
assert('error' in resp)
assert(resp['error'] == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)

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@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc import oid
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from picohsm import EncryptionMode, PicoHSM
from picokey import APDUResponse, SWCodes
import hashlib
TEST_STRING = b'Pico Keys are awesome!'
def sha256_sha256(data):
return hashlib.sha256(hashlib.sha256(data).digest()).digest()
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, no_dev_cert=True)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
seeds = [
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 0,
'seed': unhexlify('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 1,
'seed': unhexlify('fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 2,
'seed': unhexlify('4b381541583be4423346c643850da4b320e46a87ae3d2a4e6da11eba819cd4acba45d239319ac14f863b8d5ab5a0d0c64d2e8a1e7d1457df2e5a3c51c73235be'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 3,
'seed': unhexlify('3ddd5602285899a946114506157c7997e5444528f3003f6134712147db19b678'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 4,
'seed': unhexlify('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 5,
'seed': unhexlify('fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 6,
'seed': unhexlify('a7305bc8df8d0951f0cb224c0e95d7707cbdf2c6ce7e8d481fec69c7ff5e9446'),
},
{
'name': 'symmetric',
'id': 7,
'seed': unhexlify('c76c4ac4f4e4a00d6b274d5c39c700bb4a7ddc04fbc6f78e85ca75007b5b495f74a9043eeb77bdd53aa6fc3a0e31462270316fa04b8c19114c8798706cd02ac8'),
},
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"seed", seeds
)
def test_generate_master(device, seed):
resp = device.hd_generate_master_node(curve=seed['name'], id=seed['id'], seed=seed['seed'])
def hardened(i):
return 0x80000000 + i
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [0],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcFtXgS5sYJABqqG9YLmC4Q1Rdap9gSE8NqtwybGhePY2gZ29ESFjqJoCu1Rupje8YtGqsefD265TMg7usUDFdp6W1EGMcet8',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub68Gmy5EdvgibQVfPdqkBBCHxA5htiqg55crXYuXoQRKfDBFA1WEjWgP6LHhwBZeNK1VTsfTFUHCdrfp1bgwQ9xv5ski8PX9rL2dZXvgGDnw',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1],
'xpub': b'xpub6ASuArnXKPbfEwhqN6e3mwBcDTgzisQN1wXN9BJcM47sSikHjJf3UFHKkNAWbWMiGj7Wf5uMash7SyYq527Hqck2AxYysAA7xmALppuCkwQ',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'xpub': b'xpub6D4BDPcP2GT577Vvch3R8wDkScZWzQzMMUm3PWbmWvVJrZwQY4VUNgqFJPMM3No2dFDFGTsxxpG5uJh7n7epu4trkrX7x7DogT5Uv6fcLW5',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'xpub': b'xpub6FHa3pjLCk84BayeJxFW2SP4XRrFd1JYnxeLeU8EqN3vDfZmbqBqaGJAyiLjTAwm6ZLRQUMv1ZACTj37sR62cfN7fe5JnJ7dh8zL4fiyLHV',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'xpub': b'xpub6H1LXWLaKsWFhvm6RVpEL9P4KfRZSW7abD2ttkWP3SSQvnyA8FSVqNTEcYFgJS2UaFcxupHiYkro49S8yGasTvXEYBVPamhGW6cFJodrTHy',
},
{
'path': [1],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcFW31YEwpkMuc5THy2PSt5bDMsktWQcFF8syAmRUapSCGu8ED9W6oDMSgv6Zz8idoc4a6mr8BDzTJY47LJhkJ8UB7WEGuduB',
},
{
'path': [1, 0],
'xpub': b'xpub69H7F5d8KSRgmmdJg2KhpAK8SR3DjMwAdkxj3ZuxV27CprR9LgpeyGmXUbC6wb7ERfvrnKZjXoUmmDznezpbZb7ap6r1D3tgFxHmwMkQTPH',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'xpub': b'xpub6ASAVgeehLbnwdqV6UKMHVzgqAG8Gr6riv3Fxxpj8ksbH9ebxaEyBLZ85ySDhKiLDBrQSARLq1uNRts8RuJiHjaDMBU4Zn9h8LZNnBC5y4a',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'xpub': b'xpub6DF8uhdarytz3FWdA8TvFSvvAh8dP3283MY7p2V4SeE2wyWmG5mg5EwVvmdMVCQcoNJxGoWaU9DCWh89LojfZ537wTfunKau47EL2dhHKon',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'xpub': b'xpub6ERApfZwUNrhLCkDtcHTcxd75RbzS1ed54G1LkBUHQVHQKqhMkhgbmJbZRkrgZw4koxb5JaHWkY4ALHY2grBGRjaDMzQLcgJvLJuZZvRcEL',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'xpub': b'xpub6FnCn6nSzZAw5Tw7cgR9bi15UV96gLZhjDstkXXxvCLsUXBGXPdSnLFbdpq8p9HmGsApME5hQTZ3emM2rnY5agb9rXpVGyy3bdW6EEgAtqt',
},
{
'path': [2],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcEZVB4dScxMAdx6d4nFc9nvyvH3v4gJL378CSRZiYmhRoP7mBy6gSPSCYk6SzXPTf3ND1cZAceL7SfJ1Z3GC8vBgp2epUt13',
},
{
'path': [2, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub68NZiKmJWnxxS6aaHmn81bvJeTESw724CRDs6HbuccFQN9Ku14VQrADWgqbhhTHBaohPX4CjNLf9fq9MYo6oDaPPLPxSb7gwQN3ih19Zm4Y',
},
{
'path': [3],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcGczjuMoRm6dXaLDEhW1u34gKenbeYqAix21mdUKJyuyu5F1rzYGVxyL6tmgBUAEPrEz92mBXjByMRiJdba9wpnN37RLLAXa',
},
{
'path': [3, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub69AUMk3qDBi3uW1sXgjCmVjJ2G6WQoYSnNHyzkmdCHEhSZ4tBok37xfFEqHd2AddP56Tqp4o56AePAgCjYdvpW2PU2jbUPFKsav5ut6Ch1m',
},
{
'path': [3, hardened(0), hardened(1)],
'xpub': b'xpub6BJA1jSqiukeaesWfxe6sNK9CCGaujFFSJLomWHprUL9DePQ4JDkM5d88n49sMGJxrhpjazuXYWdMf17C9T5XnxkopaeS7jGk1GyyVziaMt',
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_bip(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
assert(resp == path['xpub'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('873dff81c02f525623fd1fe5167eac3a55a049de3d314bb42ee227ffed37d508'),
'public': unhexlify('0339a36013301597daef41fbe593a02cc513d0b55527ec2df1050e2e8ff49c85c2')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('3442193e'),
'chain': unhexlify('47fdacbd0f1097043b78c63c20c34ef4ed9a111d980047ad16282c7ae6236141'),
'public': unhexlify('035a784662a4a20a65bf6aab9ae98a6c068a81c52e4b032c0fb5400c706cfccc56')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('5c1bd648'),
'chain': unhexlify('2a7857631386ba23dacac34180dd1983734e444fdbf774041578e9b6adb37c19'),
'public': unhexlify('03501e454bf00751f24b1b489aa925215d66af2234e3891c3b21a52bedb3cd711c')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('bef5a2f9'),
'chain': unhexlify('04466b9cc8e161e966409ca52986c584f07e9dc81f735db683c3ff6ec7b1503f'),
'public': unhexlify('0357bfe1e341d01c69fe5654309956cbea516822fba8a601743a012a7896ee8dc2')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('ee7ab90c'),
'chain': unhexlify('cfb71883f01676f587d023cc53a35bc7f88f724b1f8c2892ac1275ac822a3edd'),
'public': unhexlify('02e8445082a72f29b75ca48748a914df60622a609cacfce8ed0e35804560741d29')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('d880d7d8'),
'chain': unhexlify('c783e67b921d2beb8f6b389cc646d7263b4145701dadd2161548a8b078e65e9e'),
'public': unhexlify('022a471424da5e657499d1ff51cb43c47481a03b1e77f951fe64cec9f5a48f7011')
},
{
'path': [4],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('beeb672fe4621673f722f38529c07392fecaa61015c80c34f29ce8b41b3cb6ea'),
'public': unhexlify('0266874dc6ade47b3ecd096745ca09bcd29638dd52c2c12117b11ed3e458cfa9e8')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('be6105b5'),
'chain': unhexlify('3460cea53e6a6bb5fb391eeef3237ffd8724bf0a40e94943c98b83825342ee11'),
'public': unhexlify('0384610f5ecffe8fda089363a41f56a5c7ffc1d81b59a612d0d649b2d22355590c')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('9b02312f'),
'chain': unhexlify('4187afff1aafa8445010097fb99d23aee9f599450c7bd140b6826ac22ba21d0c'),
'public': unhexlify('03526c63f8d0b4bbbf9c80df553fe66742df4676b241dabefdef67733e070f6844')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('b98005c1'),
'chain': unhexlify('98c7514f562e64e74170cc3cf304ee1ce54d6b6da4f880f313e8204c2a185318'),
'public': unhexlify('0359cf160040778a4b14c5f4d7b76e327ccc8c4a6086dd9451b7482b5a4972dda0')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('0e9f3274'),
'chain': unhexlify('ba96f776a5c3907d7fd48bde5620ee374d4acfd540378476019eab70790c63a0'),
'public': unhexlify('029f871f4cb9e1c97f9f4de9ccd0d4a2f2a171110c61178f84430062230833ff20')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('8b2b5c4b'),
'chain': unhexlify('b9b7b82d326bb9cb5b5b121066feea4eb93d5241103c9e7a18aad40f1dde8059'),
'public': unhexlify('02216cd26d31147f72427a453c443ed2cde8a1e53c9cc44e5ddf739725413fe3f4')
},
{
'path': [1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('60499f801b896d83179a4374aeb7822aaeaceaa0db1f85ee3e904c4defbd9689'),
'public': unhexlify('03cbcaa9c98c877a26977d00825c956a238e8dddfbd322cce4f74b0b5bd6ace4a7')
},
{
'path': [1, 0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('bd16bee5'),
'chain': unhexlify('f0909affaa7ee7abe5dd4e100598d4dc53cd709d5a5c2cac40e7412f232f7c9c'),
'public': unhexlify('02fc9e5af0ac8d9b3cecfe2a888e2117ba3d089d8585886c9c826b6b22a98d12ea')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('5a61ff8e'),
'chain': unhexlify('be17a268474a6bb9c61e1d720cf6215e2a88c5406c4aee7b38547f585c9a37d9'),
'public': unhexlify('03c01e7425647bdefa82b12d9bad5e3e6865bee0502694b94ca58b666abc0a5c3b')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('d8ab4937'),
'chain': unhexlify('f366f48f1ea9f2d1d3fe958c95ca84ea18e4c4ddb9366c336c927eb246fb38cb'),
'public': unhexlify('03a7d1d856deb74c508e05031f9895dab54626251b3806e16b4bd12e781a7df5b9')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('78412e3a'),
'chain': unhexlify('637807030d55d01f9a0cb3a7839515d796bd07706386a6eddf06cc29a65a0e29'),
'public': unhexlify('02d2b36900396c9282fa14628566582f206a5dd0bcc8d5e892611806cafb0301f0')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('31a507b8'),
'chain': unhexlify('9452b549be8cea3ecb7a84bec10dcfd94afe4d129ebfd3b3cb58eedf394ed271'),
'public': unhexlify('024d902e1a2fc7a8755ab5b694c575fce742c48d9ff192e63df5193e4c7afe1f9c')
},
{
'path': [5],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('96cd4465a9644e31528eda3592aa35eb39a9527769ce1855beafc1b81055e75d'),
'public': unhexlify('02c9e16154474b3ed5b38218bb0463e008f89ee03e62d22fdcc8014beab25b48fa')
},
{
'path': [5, 0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('607f628f'),
'chain': unhexlify('84e9c258bb8557a40e0d041115b376dd55eda99c0042ce29e81ebe4efed9b86a'),
'public': unhexlify('039b6df4bece7b6c81e2adfeea4bcf5c8c8a6e40ea7ffa3cf6e8494c61a1fc82cc')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('946d2a54'),
'chain': unhexlify('f235b2bc5c04606ca9c30027a84f353acf4e4683edbd11f635d0dcc1cd106ea6'),
'public': unhexlify('02f89c5deb1cae4fedc9905f98ae6cbf6cbab120d8cb85d5bd9a91a72f4c068c76')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('218182d8'),
'chain': unhexlify('7c0b833106235e452eba79d2bdd58d4086e663bc8cc55e9773d2b5eeda313f3b'),
'public': unhexlify('03abe0ad54c97c1d654c1852dfdc32d6d3e487e75fa16f0fd6304b9ceae4220c64')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('931223e4'),
'chain': unhexlify('5794e616eadaf33413aa309318a26ee0fd5163b70466de7a4512fd4b1a5c9e6a'),
'public': unhexlify('03cb8cb067d248691808cd6b5a5a06b48e34ebac4d965cba33e6dc46fe13d9b933')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('956c4629'),
'chain': unhexlify('3bfb29ee8ac4484f09db09c2079b520ea5616df7820f071a20320366fbe226a7'),
'public': unhexlify('020ee02e18967237cf62672983b253ee62fa4dd431f8243bfeccdf39dbe181387f')
},
{
'path': [4],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('beeb672fe4621673f722f38529c07392fecaa61015c80c34f29ce8b41b3cb6ea'),
'public': unhexlify('0266874dc6ade47b3ecd096745ca09bcd29638dd52c2c12117b11ed3e458cfa9e8')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(28578)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('be6105b5'),
'chain': unhexlify('e94c8ebe30c2250a14713212f6449b20f3329105ea15b652ca5bdfc68f6c65c2'),
'public': unhexlify('02519b5554a4872e8c9c1c847115363051ec43e93400e030ba3c36b52a3e70a5b7')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(28578), 33941],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('3e2b7bc6'),
'chain': unhexlify('9e87fe95031f14736774cd82f25fd885065cb7c358c1edf813c72af535e83071'),
'public': unhexlify('0235bfee614c0d5b2cae260000bb1d0d84b270099ad790022c1ae0b2e782efe120')
},
{
'path': [6],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('7762f9729fed06121fd13f326884c82f59aa95c57ac492ce8c9654e60efd130c'),
'public': unhexlify('0383619fadcde31063d8c5cb00dbfe1713f3e6fa169d8541a798752a1c1ca0cb20')
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_xpub(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(resp)
assert(xpub['fingerprint'] == path['fingerprint'])
assert(xpub['chain'] == path['chain'])
assert(xpub['public'] == path['public'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [7],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('8F8C33732530A0417DD446097EDB6F6617D52D627C6DB28581D74D11B385D25A'),
'public': unhexlify('dbf12b44133eaab506a740f6565cc117228cbf1dd70635cfa8ddfdc9af734756')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('0e521cdd'),
'chain': unhexlify('446ADED06078CF950DAB737F014C7BAE81EEB6E7BEECC260A38E2E0FA9973104'),
'public': unhexlify('1d065e3ac1bbe5c7fad32cf2305f7d709dc070d672044a19e610c77cdf33de0d')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Master encryption key"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('4a6e721d'),
'chain': unhexlify('7072D5593032B84A90E2E2E42996D277026FF55C1082AC82A121D775FED0ACEB'),
'public': unhexlify('ea163130e35bbafdf5ddee97a17b39cef2be4b4f390180d65b54cf05c6a82fde')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Authentication key"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('4a6e721d'),
'chain': unhexlify('3D5C87DC62CE006681B8C3DF723AE50FEEA40D6C26AEF8135BD321BA390A5B42'),
'public': unhexlify('47194e938ab24cc82bfa25f6486ed54bebe79c40ae2a5a32ea6db294d81861a6')
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_slip(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(resp)
assert(xpub['fingerprint'] == path['fingerprint'])
assert(xpub['chain'] == sha256_sha256(path['chain']))
assert(xpub['public'] == sha256_sha256(path['public']))
def get_master_curve(mid):
for m in seeds:
if (m['id'] == mid):
if (m['name'] == 'secp256k1'):
return ec.SECP256K1()
elif (m['name'] == 'secp256r1'):
return ec.SECP256R1()
return None
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
[0],
[0, hardened(0)],
[0, hardened(0), 1],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
[1],
[1, 0],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
[4],
[4, hardened(0)],
[4, hardened(0), 1],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
[5],
[5, 0],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
]
)
def test_signature(device, path):
pub = device.hd_derive_node(path)
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(pub)
curve = get_master_curve(path[0])
pubkey = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(curve, xpub['public'])
resp = device.hd_signature(path, TEST_STRING)
pubkey.verify(resp, TEST_STRING, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
[7],
[7, b"SLIP-0021"],
[7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Master encryption key"],
[7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Authentication key"],
]
)
def test_signature_slip(device, path):
pub = device.hd_derive_node(path)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
resp = device.hd_signature(path, TEST_STRING)
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"ask_on_encrypt", [True, False]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"ask_on_decrypt", [True, False]
)
def test_cipher_slip(device, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt):
MSG1 = b"testing message!"
enctext = device.hd_cipher([7, b"\x01", b"\x02"], b"test", MSG1, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt)
resp = device.hd_cipher([7, b"\x01", b"\x02"], b"test", enctext, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt)
assert(resp == MSG1)

11
tests/run-test-in-docker.sh Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
source tests/docker_env.sh
if [[ $1 == "pkcs11" ]]; then
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test-pkcs11.sh
elif [[ $1 == "sc-hsm-pkcs11" ]]; then
run_in_docker ./tests/scripts/sc_hsm_test.sh
else
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test.sh
fi

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